8 ms·

Can you give an example of a thought or type of thought that is not contained within the set of all computations?

by Stupulous 4y ago

astrange 4y ago
Can you do algorithms in your head with more than two or three variables and reliably get the right answer?
- Stupulous 4y ago
  That's the opposite, an example of a computation that is outside of the set of all thoughts. Notably, such examples wouldn't exist if computation was strictly a subset of thought, but that can be waved away by acknowledging that the brain has finite resources that it does its best to use sparingly. Also, brains definitely run algorithms with staggering numbers of variables, e.g. object recognition from noisy sense data.
  - astrange 4y ago
    Running algorithms doesn’t make something a computer. Lots of things have SoCs in them but aren’t general computers if eg you can’t change the algorithms they do. And all the results about all computers being equivalent only work if they have access to infinite storage and power. That computation isn’t outside the set of all theoretical thoughts, it’s just outside the set of all ones in actually existing human brains that don’t have access to a pen and paper.
    - Stupulous 4y ago
      Maybe I was unclear, but I completely agree both that your example does not prove that computation is a superset of thought. I'm looking for an example that would at least suggest the opposite- something humans can think that a computer couldn't compute.
- Retric 4y ago
  Yes, I can do many such calculations on 10’s of thousands of variables quite easily. Accurately throwing a ball while running for example is a complex activity.
  - astrange 4y ago
    That’s not a program you’re running on your personal brain-computer, it’s a fixed-function DSP. You can’t reuse it to do other tasks in a way a computer could with such a DSP either - eg you can’t accurately simulate ball throwing in your head.
    - deleted 4y ago
      [deleted]
    - Retric 4y ago
      You learn to throw a ball while running by building on top of many processes that allow you to stand up straight, run, etc. It’s like multiple FPGA operating together rather than a DSP. As to simulating a ball being thrown, that’s one thing that the brain already does. Visualization is a simulation.
      - astrange 4y ago
        I said "accurately simulating" though - if you're imagining something there's no way to constrain your own imagination to actually be correct. Like if you're a bad shot you can't install an update to turn into a sniper. Of course, snipers do get to be that good by practicing enough, but I don't know if they visualize the target or do it with conscious math.
        Retric 4y ago
        Visualization practice is part of many training programs to help people get better at making free throws etc. So it isn’t simply imagination, it’s a useful simulation. What’s important to realize is people don’t just picture the path a ball takes but also the feel as they make a throw. Predicting the path of a thrown ball to be able to catch it is a another sign of simulation, but combining that with a simulation of how a throw takes place is useful. Pool is clear example of the brain doing physical simulation. The exact positions are unique, but people learn how to predict what will happen to figure out what’s reasonable to attempt.
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
- d_tr 4y ago
  Why does this matter? Both the brain and the workstation have finite amounts of memory, since they have finite masses, and can do random errors when trying to go through a series of steps. It is just the magnitudes that differ regarding these two aspects.
gizajob 4y ago
Suffering
tsimionescu 4y ago
I will start by saying that I personally do believe that the brain is a computer, with the minnd simply being software. However, given our current level of understanding of how the mind works, we can't say for sure that certain thoughts are algorithmic. For example, we don't know an algorithm by which new systems of axioms can be created, nor even a general algorithm for proving a theorem in a given system of axioms, beyond brute force searching. Given that human minds do these things relatively often, it's unlikely they are arriving at it by brute force search in the enormous domain of mathematical statements. So, we can't say we've ruled out the possibility that the mind is using some unknown non-computational process for finding novel theorem proofs. Note that proof checking is algorithmic, only proof discovery is potentially not. Now, to me extrapolating this to a non-computational theory of mind smells a lot like a God-of-the-gaps argument, so I don't buy it. But it is worth remembering the limits of what is actually proven to be computable. I've taken this example somewhat directly from Turing's paper on computation - there, he bases the model of the Turing machine specifically on a mathematician doing rote mechanical calculation with a pen and paper (the machine state is their brain state, the tape is the notebook, the writing head is the pen, and the reading head is their eyes). However, non-rote calculations are arguably left out of the paper's claims (or at least most of them). Much more famous arguments about non-computational theories of mind are, to me, much less convincing. The most famous is probably The Chinese Room, where the idea is that a man locked in a room receives a question on paper written in Chinese characters, and follows lookup tables and English instructions to return another paper written with Chinese characters, but can't really be said to understand Mandarin even if he is always returning the right answer for the question asked (or so the author claims). Another such famous argument is Mary's Room, where Mary is also locked in a room where nothing has the color red, but where she gets to rid everything that can be known about the physics and biology of the color red and its perception in the human brain (much more knowledge than we have today), but where she is assumed to still have a new experience once she leaves the room and actually sees red for the first time directly.

Can you give an example of a thought or type of thought that is not contained within the set of all computations?

astrange 4y ago

Can you do algorithms in your head with more than two or three variables and reliably get the right answer?

Stupulous 4y ago
That's the opposite, an example of a computation that is outside of the set of all thoughts. Notably, such examples wouldn't exist if computation was strictly a subset of thought, but that can be waved away by acknowledging that the brain has finite resources that it does its best to use sparingly. Also, brains definitely run algorithms with staggering numbers of variables, e.g. object recognition from noisy sense data.
- astrange 4y ago
  Running algorithms doesn’t make something a computer. Lots of things have SoCs in them but aren’t general computers if eg you can’t change the algorithms they do. And all the results about all computers being equivalent only work if they have access to infinite storage and power. That computation isn’t outside the set of all theoretical thoughts, it’s just outside the set of all ones in actually existing human brains that don’t have access to a pen and paper.
  - Stupulous 4y ago
    Maybe I was unclear, but I completely agree both that your example does not prove that computation is a superset of thought. I'm looking for an example that would at least suggest the opposite- something humans can think that a computer couldn't compute.
Retric 4y ago
Yes, I can do many such calculations on 10’s of thousands of variables quite easily. Accurately throwing a ball while running for example is a complex activity.
- astrange 4y ago
  That’s not a program you’re running on your personal brain-computer, it’s a fixed-function DSP. You can’t reuse it to do other tasks in a way a computer could with such a DSP either - eg you can’t accurately simulate ball throwing in your head.
  - deleted 4y ago
    [deleted]
  - Retric 4y ago
    You learn to throw a ball while running by building on top of many processes that allow you to stand up straight, run, etc. It’s like multiple FPGA operating together rather than a DSP. As to simulating a ball being thrown, that’s one thing that the brain already does. Visualization is a simulation.
    - astrange 4y ago
      I said "accurately simulating" though - if you're imagining something there's no way to constrain your own imagination to actually be correct. Like if you're a bad shot you can't install an update to turn into a sniper. Of course, snipers do get to be that good by practicing enough, but I don't know if they visualize the target or do it with conscious math.
      - Retric 4y ago
        Visualization practice is part of many training programs to help people get better at making free throws etc. So it isn’t simply imagination, it’s a useful simulation. What’s important to realize is people don’t just picture the path a ball takes but also the feel as they make a throw. Predicting the path of a thrown ball to be able to catch it is a another sign of simulation, but combining that with a simulation of how a throw takes place is useful. Pool is clear example of the brain doing physical simulation. The exact positions are unique, but people learn how to predict what will happen to figure out what’s reasonable to attempt.
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
d_tr 4y ago
Why does this matter? Both the brain and the workstation have finite amounts of memory, since they have finite masses, and can do random errors when trying to go through a series of steps. It is just the magnitudes that differ regarding these two aspects.

gizajob 4y ago

Suffering

tsimionescu 4y ago

I will start by saying that I personally do believe that the brain is a computer, with the minnd simply being software. However, given our current level of understanding of how the mind works, we can't say for sure that certain thoughts are algorithmic. For example, we don't know an algorithm by which new systems of axioms can be created, nor even a general algorithm for proving a theorem in a given system of axioms, beyond brute force searching. Given that human minds do these things relatively often, it's unlikely they are arriving at it by brute force search in the enormous domain of mathematical statements. So, we can't say we've ruled out the possibility that the mind is using some unknown non-computational process for finding novel theorem proofs. Note that proof checking is algorithmic, only proof discovery is potentially not. Now, to me extrapolating this to a non-computational theory of mind smells a lot like a God-of-the-gaps argument, so I don't buy it. But it is worth remembering the limits of what is actually proven to be computable. I've taken this example somewhat directly from Turing's paper on computation - there, he bases the model of the Turing machine specifically on a mathematician doing rote mechanical calculation with a pen and paper (the machine state is their brain state, the tape is the notebook, the writing head is the pen, and the reading head is their eyes). However, non-rote calculations are arguably left out of the paper's claims (or at least most of them). Much more famous arguments about non-computational theories of mind are, to me, much less convincing. The most famous is probably The Chinese Room, where the idea is that a man locked in a room receives a question on paper written in Chinese characters, and follows lookup tables and English instructions to return another paper written with Chinese characters, but can't really be said to understand Mandarin even if he is always returning the right answer for the question asked (or so the author claims). Another such famous argument is Mary's Room, where Mary is also locked in a room where nothing has the color red, but where she gets to rid everything that can be known about the physics and biology of the color red and its perception in the human brain (much more knowledge than we have today), but where she is assumed to still have a new experience once she leaves the room and actually sees red for the first time directly.