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It is wrong. It is conflating two things: market cap and total vulnerable funds in a reorg. Doing a 51% attack isn't free range to steal any bitcoin, all you ca
by adastra22 4y ago
It is wrong. It is conflating two things: market cap and total vulnerable funds in a reorg. Doing a 51% attack isn't free range to steal any bitcoin, all you can do is reverse a recent transaction. And in practice it needs to be very recent (like within the last hour) to be pulled off.
Let's work out an actual attack: I send 1000 btc to an exchange, let it confirm, exchange for something else (Ethereum, let's say) and withdraw. Once my ethereum withdraw is seen on that network, I start 51% attacking the bitcoin chain and unwind the dozen or so blocks that have occurred since I sent the deposit. Maybe this attack costs me 500 btc, but in doing so I get my 1000 btc back. So I effectively bought that ethereum at half price by defrauding the exchange. It needs to be a lot of currency because the 500 btc price of the reorg (made up number!) is a fixed cost, independent of the value of the transaction I'm reversing.
The total market cap of bitcoin doesn't enter into this. The most value I can obtain is the lesser of (1) how much bitcoin I have, and (2) what limit the exchange places on deposits. Exchanges (or other trading partners) can put a hold or delay on high-value deposits, which completely mitigates this attack.
Now the expense of the attack is dependent on the mining revenue per block. So if the mining revenue per block is $300k or so, to use a number from the article, then exchanges and other users of bitcoin should require extra confirmations for transactions > $1MM or so.
I don't know about you, but I think it's perfectly acceptable to say that settling a transaction worth $500MM will require waiting for at least a day's worth of confirmations. And that's all that's required to prevent this attack from being profitable at scale.
- zeroclip 4y agoFrom what I understand, the primary mode of 51% attack is controlling 51% of hash power, such as renting a lot of GPU for a short term attack. This gives you the ability to censor the network, rendering it near useless and probably crashing the value of BTC. If the attacker has shorted BTC it may be profitable to crash the price.
- paulgb 4y agoI agree that a 51% attack just to reverse a transaction is unlikely, but given how disruptive it would be (as a break in an otherwise ~perfect security track record), there could be other motives. For example, someone could take a short position in Bitcoin. Or a government could attack it for any number of reasons.
- adastra22 4y agoBitcoin had been 51% attacked before. But the point is the total market cap doesn’t factor into any of those possible attacks, which is what I said was incorrect about Vitalik’s statement.