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If they are on the box and you don't have your logs offloaded, they can at the very least destroy the logs, and barring your complicated key updating system whi
by jerf 15y ago
If they are on the box and you don't have your logs offloaded, they can at the very least destroy the logs, and barring your complicated key updating system which would itself require lots of careful review, probably forge anything they want. But destruction is a pretty useful capability itself.
If the logs are being offloaded off the system, then you don't need any of this either because they are already being put somewhere the hacker can't touch. (Of course if they hack that system then you're in real trouble, but that's just moving the problem around; ultimately if your hacker owns everything, you've really, really lost.)
There's no inbetween state where all this complexity solves any problem. Either you've got off-box storage and you don't need it, or you don't and you've already lost if a hacker gets root.
- dredmorbius 15y agoI agree with your points here. I don't see the proposed journal solution really solving on-system log integrity. There are a few other points (processes impersonating other processes, e.g., or extended logging formats) which might be better supported in something other than a traditional syslog. But I'm absolutely not sold on Journal.