31 ms·

Wars happen because each of the two sides think they can win. In this case, the US is obviously confident it can win. This one is easy to see in this scenario.

Wars happen because each of the two sides think they can win. In this case, the US is obviously confident it can win. This one is easy to see in this scenario. China on the other hand questions the commitment of the US: “really, you’re going to go to war to protect Taiwan? It’s China! What do you care?”, and this could be true if geographic and geopolitical realities were different. But what the CCP somewhat and I think many Chinese citizens misunderstand is that Taiwan isn’t just some island. Taiwan is a crucial linchpin to all of America’s presence and legitimacy in Asia. So for China (more so Chinese citizens) it’s just some island that belongs to China anyway. Of course China would win and take over because Americans don’t really want to fight or think they can win right? There lies the miscalculation that leads to the war. It’s not about Taiwan the island, it’s about existential foreign policy for America. The US is extremely determined to maintain the status quo. China misunderstands this and thinks that an invasion over Taiwan won’t lead to an actual war because they don’t understand what the war is about. Note: When I say China, I mean people who question whether the U.S. is determined to fight a war over Taiwan. Certainly main Chinese including leadership in the CCP understand what’s at stake, which is why they haven’t undertaken an invasion as of yet.

yrlihuan 4y ago
The US will win in a non-war scenario, by using its influence over the other countries and isolating China from the US's western allies. It's an easy choice and seemingly an easy win. A real military conflict with China near China's front door is another thing. I doubt anyone with some common sense should call that an easy win.
- mschuster91 4y ago
  > The US will win in a non-war scenario, by using its influence over the other countries and isolating China from the US's western allies. The US has lost a lot of their soft power, beginning with the Iraq war, but exploding during the 45th Presidency. Their failure to convince Germany to drop North Stream 2 is the best example of that loss - particularly the gang of senators which thought it would be a good idea to threaten a harbor with sanctions [1] was perceived as extremely rude here. And a lot of nominal allies are highly skeptical of how reliable an ally the US themselves are, given the very high likelihood of the Republicans getting obstructionist power again either this November or in two years and the lack of decent candidates on the Democrat side. [1] https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-us-senators-threaten-german-port-with-crushing-sanctions/a-54473119 https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-us-senators-threaten-ger...
  - ericmay 4y ago
    I agree that the US lost a lot of soft power capabilities over the years, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine really reversed most of those loses in short order. What a blessing in disguise for the United States. For example, you mention that a lot of allies are highly skeptical of how reliable of an ally the US is, but you can see actually that when it came down to it the US was extremely reliable in defending Ukraine and bolstering NATO forces, and the issue of Taiwan is a linchpin of US hegemony: it's existential, there's no doubt the US will go to war to defend allies in Asia including Taiwan because failure to do so basically kicks the US out of Asia and destroys those alliances. I think this goes back to my original comment about China's (or at least many of their more hawkish citizens, less so the CCP I believe) misunderstanding about what's at stake regarding Taiwan. Though I think your point about obstructionist Republicans is well-founded and accurate and extremely accurate when it comes to domestic policies. With that being said I don't see a significant threat there in terms of US vs Russia or US vs China given that even when their vote was mostly inconsequential (i.e. they could try and virtue signal) most members of Congress, either Republican or Democrat, tended to vote to support US efforts against Russian aggression. The Senate was voting something like 99-1 to support Ukraine (don't quote me on the exact bill or bills) when they didn't really need to and could have tried to stick it to the Democrats as war mongering and followed in Trump's footsteps there.
    - mschuster91 4y ago
      > And the issue of Taiwan is a linchpin of US hegemony: it's existential, there's no doubt the US will go to war to defend allies in Asia including Taiwan because failure to do so basically kicks the US out of Asia and destroys those alliances. For now it is, the interesting question is if the US voter class is ready to go to war again after the disasters of Iraq and Afghanistan - at least from an European POV it looks like wide swaths of the population do not want further overseas engagements and wish to reduce military spending in order to have more money available to fix pressing issues (crumbling infrastructure, healthcare, poverty, high energy prices). Additionally, while Trump himself is a very vocal opponent of China and I think Taiwan will be secured even if the Republicans win either of the next elections, it is nowhere near certain that Trump as a President will apply the same towards Russia or other enemies of the Western sphere - particularly not given strong indications of both himself and his close environment being influenced by Russia, both financially and via "kompromat" rumors (e.g. the "pee tape" allegation).
- ericmay 4y ago
  Sorry - I meant that it was easy to see that the US is confident it can win, not that winning would be easy.
barelysapient 4y ago
The US doesn't think they can "win" in the sense that someone 'wins' chess or checkers. What the US can do however, it make the conquest of Taiwan very expensive. Sort of what they're doing in the Ukraine but probably with a shade more direct involvement. China will experience a abrupt cutoff from the US lead international order in addition to some limited skirmishes with western forces. But they also won't be physically prevented by western forces from occupying Taiwan. Western arms and intel will help fuel the Taiwan government until it's defeated. The goal isn't to win. It's simply to make the invasion very expensive. Now, what I think western leaders are missing in this calculus is that China will not stop at Taiwan. The expense of exclusion from the western system is already priced in. It'll be paid for with additional expansion. So, after a short rest, China will ramp up with the annexation of additional territory within and around the nine dash-line setting up further conflicts with those countries. Taiwan's violent subjugation will give those countries pause and likely result in some combination of territorial concessions or vassalization; similar to the recent integration of the Solomon Islands into China's new extra-national order. In parallel, Russia will solidify their holdings in western and southern Ukraine. I think at some point they'll test European and Nato resolve with a handful of attacks / incursions. But don't expect Nato to invade Ukraine or Russia anytime soon, because, you know, nukes. Ultimately, I predict Russia will move to finish their conquest of Georgia or accept their capitulation. Armenia will welcome Russian forces and Russia will begin moving further south into the middle east where they'll support Iran in conflict with some of the wealthy but poorly defended Arab states in the late 2020's or early 2030's.
- ericmay 4y ago
  I'd agree that describing this potential conflict as "win" or "lose" oversimplifies the engagement. But I would definitely disagree here: > But they also won't be physically prevented by western forces from occupying Taiwan. Western arms and intel will help fuel the Taiwan government until it's defeated. I'm a little perplexed because you seem to understand what's at stake, but you don't think the US would fight? All evidence points to the contrary. I mean not only is the US military present, the actual stakes are existential physical and economic security. If you aren't going to fight for those stakes I don't know what you do. > In parallel, Russia will solidify their holdings in western and southern Ukraine. I think this remains to be seen. I'm curious about how well Ukraine will do under current operations. It's bewildering to me that Ukraine can just strike and blow up Russian targets with impunity, including in Belgorod which presumably had some sort of air defense capabilities. I don't think Russia wants a fight with NATO unless the goal is to make defeat easier to swallow, because engagement with NATO necessitates a nuclear response from Russia due to what would clearly appear to be a decisive victory for NATO based on Russian performance in Ukraine and I'm not sure Russia wants to use nuclear weapons either. Engagement with NATO seems to be a lose/lose.

yrlihuan 4y ago

The US will win in a non-war scenario, by using its influence over the other countries and isolating China from the US's western allies. It's an easy choice and seemingly an easy win. A real military conflict with China near China's front door is another thing. I doubt anyone with some common sense should call that an easy win.

mschuster91 4y ago
> The US will win in a non-war scenario, by using its influence over the other countries and isolating China from the US's western allies. The US has lost a lot of their soft power, beginning with the Iraq war, but exploding during the 45th Presidency. Their failure to convince Germany to drop North Stream 2 is the best example of that loss - particularly the gang of senators which thought it would be a good idea to threaten a harbor with sanctions [1] was perceived as extremely rude here. And a lot of nominal allies are highly skeptical of how reliable an ally the US themselves are, given the very high likelihood of the Republicans getting obstructionist power again either this November or in two years and the lack of decent candidates on the Democrat side. [1] https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-us-senators-threaten-german-port-with-crushing-sanctions/a-54473119 https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-us-senators-threaten-ger...
- ericmay 4y ago
  I agree that the US lost a lot of soft power capabilities over the years, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine really reversed most of those loses in short order. What a blessing in disguise for the United States. For example, you mention that a lot of allies are highly skeptical of how reliable of an ally the US is, but you can see actually that when it came down to it the US was extremely reliable in defending Ukraine and bolstering NATO forces, and the issue of Taiwan is a linchpin of US hegemony: it's existential, there's no doubt the US will go to war to defend allies in Asia including Taiwan because failure to do so basically kicks the US out of Asia and destroys those alliances. I think this goes back to my original comment about China's (or at least many of their more hawkish citizens, less so the CCP I believe) misunderstanding about what's at stake regarding Taiwan. Though I think your point about obstructionist Republicans is well-founded and accurate and extremely accurate when it comes to domestic policies. With that being said I don't see a significant threat there in terms of US vs Russia or US vs China given that even when their vote was mostly inconsequential (i.e. they could try and virtue signal) most members of Congress, either Republican or Democrat, tended to vote to support US efforts against Russian aggression. The Senate was voting something like 99-1 to support Ukraine (don't quote me on the exact bill or bills) when they didn't really need to and could have tried to stick it to the Democrats as war mongering and followed in Trump's footsteps there.
  - mschuster91 4y ago
    > And the issue of Taiwan is a linchpin of US hegemony: it's existential, there's no doubt the US will go to war to defend allies in Asia including Taiwan because failure to do so basically kicks the US out of Asia and destroys those alliances. For now it is, the interesting question is if the US voter class is ready to go to war again after the disasters of Iraq and Afghanistan - at least from an European POV it looks like wide swaths of the population do not want further overseas engagements and wish to reduce military spending in order to have more money available to fix pressing issues (crumbling infrastructure, healthcare, poverty, high energy prices). Additionally, while Trump himself is a very vocal opponent of China and I think Taiwan will be secured even if the Republicans win either of the next elections, it is nowhere near certain that Trump as a President will apply the same towards Russia or other enemies of the Western sphere - particularly not given strong indications of both himself and his close environment being influenced by Russia, both financially and via "kompromat" rumors (e.g. the "pee tape" allegation).
ericmay 4y ago
Sorry - I meant that it was easy to see that the US is confident it can win, not that winning would be easy.

barelysapient 4y ago

The US doesn't think they can "win" in the sense that someone 'wins' chess or checkers. What the US can do however, it make the conquest of Taiwan very expensive. Sort of what they're doing in the Ukraine but probably with a shade more direct involvement. China will experience a abrupt cutoff from the US lead international order in addition to some limited skirmishes with western forces. But they also won't be physically prevented by western forces from occupying Taiwan. Western arms and intel will help fuel the Taiwan government until it's defeated. The goal isn't to win. It's simply to make the invasion very expensive. Now, what I think western leaders are missing in this calculus is that China will not stop at Taiwan. The expense of exclusion from the western system is already priced in. It'll be paid for with additional expansion. So, after a short rest, China will ramp up with the annexation of additional territory within and around the nine dash-line setting up further conflicts with those countries. Taiwan's violent subjugation will give those countries pause and likely result in some combination of territorial concessions or vassalization; similar to the recent integration of the Solomon Islands into China's new extra-national order. In parallel, Russia will solidify their holdings in western and southern Ukraine. I think at some point they'll test European and Nato resolve with a handful of attacks / incursions. But don't expect Nato to invade Ukraine or Russia anytime soon, because, you know, nukes. Ultimately, I predict Russia will move to finish their conquest of Georgia or accept their capitulation. Armenia will welcome Russian forces and Russia will begin moving further south into the middle east where they'll support Iran in conflict with some of the wealthy but poorly defended Arab states in the late 2020's or early 2030's.

ericmay 4y ago
I'd agree that describing this potential conflict as "win" or "lose" oversimplifies the engagement. But I would definitely disagree here: > But they also won't be physically prevented by western forces from occupying Taiwan. Western arms and intel will help fuel the Taiwan government until it's defeated. I'm a little perplexed because you seem to understand what's at stake, but you don't think the US would fight? All evidence points to the contrary. I mean not only is the US military present, the actual stakes are existential physical and economic security. If you aren't going to fight for those stakes I don't know what you do. > In parallel, Russia will solidify their holdings in western and southern Ukraine. I think this remains to be seen. I'm curious about how well Ukraine will do under current operations. It's bewildering to me that Ukraine can just strike and blow up Russian targets with impunity, including in Belgorod which presumably had some sort of air defense capabilities. I don't think Russia wants a fight with NATO unless the goal is to make defeat easier to swallow, because engagement with NATO necessitates a nuclear response from Russia due to what would clearly appear to be a decisive victory for NATO based on Russian performance in Ukraine and I'm not sure Russia wants to use nuclear weapons either. Engagement with NATO seems to be a lose/lose.