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I am not a cypherpunk, but can/should we differentiate between 1. encouraging those running OpenSSL/TLS servers to use a. sane defaults that allow forward secre
by 101001010111 15y ago
I am not a cypherpunk, but can/should we differentiate between 1. encouraging those running OpenSSL/TLS servers to use a. sane defaults that allow forward secrecy and b. ephemeral TLS session ticket keys, 2. using Google's in-house EC cipher implementations and 3. doing 1. and 2.?
We could do 1. only and still reap some benefit, correct?
- benblack 15y agoCorrect!
- tptacek 15y agoThere are environments where ephemeral DH keys violate policy (those sessions can't be passively monitored; some sessions must be), which could militate against PFS suites becoming the default. DHE is good, but I'm not sure forward secrecy is as pressing a security issue as simple adoption of TLS is. I admire Google's continued efforts to set the standard for its secure deployment, though.
- marshray 15y agoLook at it from Google's point of view though: Now they won't have "lawfully intercepted" packet captures showing up in their mailbox with demands that they decrypt them using their private key.