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Note that using a CA cert with SSH (or putting a host cert in DNS, etc) expands the attack surface for your server from just that server to the server + the CA'
by hedora 4y ago
Note that using a CA cert with SSH (or putting a host cert in DNS, etc) expands the attack surface for your server from just that server to the server + the CA's servers + the CA's employees + potentially other CA's + whatever governments are able to compel the CA['s] to issue a MITM cert for your server.
For big organizations security is by-definition lax (you have to trust lots of non-trustworthy employees), but there's no reason to accept this compromise for smaller companies or personal use.
- pphysch 4y agoThat's just the nature of trusting someone else to be your CA. You don't have to do that to use SSH certs.
- hedora 4y agoAt the minimum, you need to trust yourself to be a CA. That's strictly more attack surface than not having a CA.
- pphysch 4y agoIt's not "strictly" more because you reduce the attack surface of your leaf certs through expiration, etc.
- hedora 4y agoWhat attack does that prevent? If the leaf certs are compromised, then so is the server, and it is already game over.
- pphysch 4y agoIt prevents the attack where thousands of users have thousands of long-forgotten keys lying around, and eventually one of them gets compromised months or years after it was last legitimately used. AKA a huge attack surface that can't reliably be culled, because you are effectively relying on users to be their individual CAs. This particular attack took down my former organization once.