Sarcasm aside,I feel like AMP was the first time Google violated their promise to users, and to their own ecosystem. "Make the web fast" was Google's way of kee

Sarcasm aside,I feel like AMP was the first time Google violated their promise to users, and to their own ecosystem. "Make the web fast" was Google's way of keeping up with native performance in iOS's walled garden, before Android came into its own. Obviously this same strategy is important for Workspace's competitiveness against Office, pre MS365. But with AMP, Google's promise mutated into something which had no exchange in value: Google said, "We'll serve your content, we'll make it fast. You don't even need to sustain the traffic, we'll do that for you. It's the ultimate fast." But then, Google turned around and cost-extracted that same market into semi-permanent chaos. This promise to users ("we both win when the web is fast") was borrowed and manipulated to Google's benefit and the publisher's detriment, and, in essence, became, "look at me; I am the [publisher] now. Here are your GA stats for the traffic we decided to send you today for your content." I'm not even sure as a user that I care about AMP. So what, articles were faster for awhile. You could have accomplished the same thing for almost no money with a desktop version of Google Reader, but here we are.