23 ms·

Apologies if I get this incorrect, I'm an amateur, but I have read about the design - the slashers will likely be few and centralized, but that's not disastrous

Apologies if I get this incorrect, I'm an amateur, but I have read about the design - the slashers will likely be few and centralized, but that's not disastrous because the slashers must provide proof of wrong doing to cause someone's ETH to get "slashed". That is, they're likely to be centralized (though they don't have to be! I believe anyone can be one) but they have to prove to everyone that something should be slashed in order to do so, so you don't have to trust the centralized part. Does that make sense?

spywaregorilla 4y ago
> they have to prove to everyone that something should be slashed in order to do so Who is everyone? Because obviously it can't include the people who just colluded to deceive the network.
- EddySchauHai 4y ago
  Wouldn't it be a percentage of the people? So > 51%?
  - spywaregorilla 4y ago
    But you already have 51% of people lying for their own benefit in this scenario.
codegladiator 4y ago
Sounds like the police. Also do they prove before or after slashing?
- rictic 4y ago
  Prove in a machine legible sense, picture a transaction like: "here are two contradictory blocks validated by validator ABC, including ABC's signature, therefore ABC's stake is slashed". (at least, that's how it worked last time I looked into it)
redox99 4y ago
So it works like this: - If you detect some wrongdoing, like somebody attesting twice, you can get a reward for whistleblowing (free money!) - However to claim this reward, you have to include it in a block. Therefore if everybody is aware of this wrongdoing, the next block will get the rewards for slashing/whistleblowing. - Therefore it's economically advantageous to keep this info to yourself, until you get to propose a block, and only then slash and get the rewards. - There are also what are called altruistic whistleblowers, that as soon as they find wrongdoing, they'll broadcast it (instead of keeping it to themselves) so next block proposer will slash the wrongdoer. These kind of whistleblowers will most likely be run by the Ethereum Foundation - In practice even if there were no altruistic whistleblowers, it wouldn't really matter because the same software that validators run can also detect wrongdoing, so in practice even with no altruistic whistleblowers, the next block is almost guaranteed to slash the wrongdoer anyway (free money!).

spywaregorilla 4y ago

> they have to prove to everyone that something should be slashed in order to do so Who is everyone? Because obviously it can't include the people who just colluded to deceive the network.

EddySchauHai 4y ago
Wouldn't it be a percentage of the people? So > 51%?
- spywaregorilla 4y ago
  But you already have 51% of people lying for their own benefit in this scenario.

codegladiator 4y ago

Sounds like the police. Also do they prove before or after slashing?

rictic 4y ago
Prove in a machine legible sense, picture a transaction like: "here are two contradictory blocks validated by validator ABC, including ABC's signature, therefore ABC's stake is slashed". (at least, that's how it worked last time I looked into it)

redox99 4y ago

So it works like this: - If you detect some wrongdoing, like somebody attesting twice, you can get a reward for whistleblowing (free money!) - However to claim this reward, you have to include it in a block. Therefore if everybody is aware of this wrongdoing, the next block will get the rewards for slashing/whistleblowing. - Therefore it's economically advantageous to keep this info to yourself, until you get to propose a block, and only then slash and get the rewards. - There are also what are called altruistic whistleblowers, that as soon as they find wrongdoing, they'll broadcast it (instead of keeping it to themselves) so next block proposer will slash the wrongdoer. These kind of whistleblowers will most likely be run by the Ethereum Foundation - In practice even if there were no altruistic whistleblowers, it wouldn't really matter because the same software that validators run can also detect wrongdoing, so in practice even with no altruistic whistleblowers, the next block is almost guaranteed to slash the wrongdoer anyway (free money!).