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This is not the question I am asking. You can have many people putting up their 32 ETH. Sure that's "decentralized". But what if most of the stakers collude to

This is not the question I am asking. You can have many people putting up their 32 ETH. Sure that's "decentralized". But what if most of the stakers collude to double spend tokens? My understanding is that there is an additional layer of validators that have the power to force them to give up their stake as a penalty. Hence "proof of stake". And that there are very few validators. And it's really just the ethereum foundation.

zaptrem 4y ago
You’re mistaken, validators and stakers are one and the same. A 51% attack becomes unbelievably more expensive in a proof of stake system, especially because at the end of it all of your money is burned (whereas with POW you get to keep the GPUs unless they change the algo).
- spywaregorilla 4y ago
  stakers/validators vs. slashers
  - PretzelPirate 4y ago
    There is no defined role called a “slasher”. There are randomly-decided committees that are regularly updated as part of Ethereum PoS consensus that play different roles. Your validator could be in any one of those roles (or in a pending state) at any time.
    - spywaregorilla 4y ago
      I'm almost certain that is incorrect. This is an optional, expensive seeming process. e.g. https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher
      - deleted 4y ago
        [deleted]
      - AlexandrB 4y ago
        > Running a slasher is not meant to be profitable. Slashing is meant to be rare and whistleblower rewards are purposefully low. Running a slasher is meant to be an altruistic action, and as stated, only a single, honest, properly functioning slasher needs to be active in the network to catch slashable offenses. Hmmm. It seems dangerous to rely on altruistic enforcement in a network built around economic incentives. What if the altruistic slashers are simply paid money to turn off their nodes?
        exo762 4y ago
        How can you detect that people are NOT running slasher nodes? This model assumes that 1/n is honest. This is almost as safe as it gets.
        AlexandrB 4y ago
        Depends how big "n" is. It's certainly not the number of ETH users. Running a slasher currently requires 1TB of SSD among other things[1]. I assume these requirements will grow with the popularity of ETH? If so, in a world where 100TB of SSD space is required the number of individuals who can run slashers drops rapidly. In the extreme case, aren't we looking at a small(er) number of well-funded organizations doing all the slashing? [1] https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher > However, home stakers are advised not to run a slasher on personal hardware, as it is a tremendously resource-hungry process. Slasher is very heavy on database access and disk usage, and the slasher.db will quickly grow to 1TB or more when running on mainnet.
        NavinF 4y ago
        A 1TB SSD is like $50. I put one in a small USB-C M.2 case and use it as a flash drive. I’m pretty sure hardware costs will always be a rounding error compared to the $50k that “home stakers” need if they want to run their own validator.
- mypastself 4y ago
  What happens if the majority of infrastructure is provided by a small number of cloud computing services? An attacker with access to those services needn’t stake their own funds, and an “attack” might simply entail complying with local laws.
  - lupire 4y ago
    The 51% is staked coins, not computers.
    - mypastself 4y ago
      Doesn’t staking require active validator software on a computer with a great deal of uptime?
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
- overtonwhy 4y ago
  What about a DDoS attack?
bowsamic 4y ago
What if most of the miners collude to double spend tokens? The problem is the same. The difference is that proof of work automatically tends to centralisation due to its economy of scale: it's cheaper to add one more miner to your pool if you already have a big mining operation, but staking 1 eth is always staking 1 eth. Both PoS and PoW have the problem where you can buy out the majority if you have the power to do so.
- spywaregorilla 4y ago
  The problem is not the same. In proof of work, it just breaks and you can double spend. In this proof of stake setup, you can double spend, but then the ethereum foundation can punish you with its slashers.
- camjw 4y ago
  I don't understand this comment: "but staking 1eth is always staking 1eth". If I have 100 GPUs and I buy one more can't I turn around and say "But buying one more GPU is just buying one more GPU"? Even if your point is that electricity bills are lower per additional GPU, surely humans discount the value of incremental money after some point so for those with lots of eth incremental eth isn't worth as much?
  - bowsamic 4y ago
    It’s cheaper to run 1 more GPU when you are already running 100 It’s the same price to add 1 eth when you own 100 eth as when you own 1 eth
    - camjw 4y ago
      Kind of, but doesn't that assume a linear utility function for holding eth which I think seems unrealistic? Plus, there are costs associated with holding eth (cold storage etc) which seem fixed, so its cheaper to securely stake 1 additional eth when you're already staking 100eth than when you're not running any. Plus fixed costs of actually running a staking business (by analogy with a mining business).
JohnJamesRambo 4y ago
https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms/pos/ https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_stake https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_stake Start here. “The threat of a 51% attack still exists on proof-of-stake as it does on proof-of-work, but it's even riskier for the attackers. A attacker would need 51% of the staked ETH (about $15,000,000,000 USD).”
- spywaregorilla 4y ago
  I'm pretty much just asking the same question on every thread now. How does something get slashed? These articles say nothing about it. There are many docs saying all you need is 1 honest slasher node. Well, what happens if you have a dishonest slasher node?
  - programmarchy 4y ago
    The slashing can only occur if the validator can be proven to break certain rules e.g. double voting. The reports are evaluated by the network.
    - spywaregorilla 4y ago
      > The reports are evaluated by the network. The network which was just shown to be 51% malicious actors? And how is it evaluated? What if the slasher is dishonest? What if it sends trillions of fake requests?
      - drdeca 4y ago
        Evaluated in the same way that “does this address have enough to send to this much to this other address” is evaluated? If it isn’t valid, then a block containing it isn’t valid, and this is a thing which any client can automatically check. What happens if you try to send trillions of invalid transactions in any sensible chain?
        4y ago
bitxbitxbitcoin 4y ago
What you are referring to is an old problem (arguably now solved) called “nothing at stake.” Short, bastardized answer is that something built into the consensus code called “slashing” keeps the validators/shakers from trying to stake two versions of a block.
- spywaregorilla 4y ago
  Who gets to run a slasher node and who gets to agree that its valid to slash a block?
  - immibis 4y ago
    I don't know the specific rules for Ethereum, but in general PoS systems, anyone can slash. All you have to do is submit two different headers for the same block signed by the same validator. This proves the validator is cheating. The person who submits the proof may get to keep some of the validator's slashed money, which is a good incentive to run slashing nodes as this can amount to thousands of dollars per slash, and a good incentive not to double-validate as this can amount to thousands of dollars per time you are caught. Perversely, since double-validation happens rarely, since it is expensive, the actual interface for slashing on e.g. BSC is not well-documented or user-friendly.
    - spywaregorilla 4y ago
      > This proves the validator is cheating. To whom? Who gets to decide to slash the funds? I caught you cheating and can prove it. You don't give a shit and control 51% of the network. How do you get punished?
      - bhaak 4y ago
        Social slashing. The honest parts of the community would organize and fork you away. If you were following the current events on Ethereum, this question has just arisen in the last weeks when the US sanctioned the privacy oriented Tornado Cash contract.
chippiewill 4y ago
Coordinating and attempting an attack is seriously expensive in proof of stake if something goes wrong due to the slashing

zaptrem 4y ago

You’re mistaken, validators and stakers are one and the same. A 51% attack becomes unbelievably more expensive in a proof of stake system, especially because at the end of it all of your money is burned (whereas with POW you get to keep the GPUs unless they change the algo).

spywaregorilla 4y ago
stakers/validators vs. slashers
- PretzelPirate 4y ago
  There is no defined role called a “slasher”. There are randomly-decided committees that are regularly updated as part of Ethereum PoS consensus that play different roles. Your validator could be in any one of those roles (or in a pending state) at any time.
  - spywaregorilla 4y ago
    I'm almost certain that is incorrect. This is an optional, expensive seeming process. e.g. https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher
    - deleted 4y ago
      [deleted]
    - AlexandrB 4y ago
      > Running a slasher is not meant to be profitable. Slashing is meant to be rare and whistleblower rewards are purposefully low. Running a slasher is meant to be an altruistic action, and as stated, only a single, honest, properly functioning slasher needs to be active in the network to catch slashable offenses. Hmmm. It seems dangerous to rely on altruistic enforcement in a network built around economic incentives. What if the altruistic slashers are simply paid money to turn off their nodes?
      - exo762 4y ago
        How can you detect that people are NOT running slasher nodes? This model assumes that 1/n is honest. This is almost as safe as it gets.
        AlexandrB 4y ago
        Depends how big "n" is. It's certainly not the number of ETH users. Running a slasher currently requires 1TB of SSD among other things[1]. I assume these requirements will grow with the popularity of ETH? If so, in a world where 100TB of SSD space is required the number of individuals who can run slashers drops rapidly. In the extreme case, aren't we looking at a small(er) number of well-funded organizations doing all the slashing? [1] https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher > However, home stakers are advised not to run a slasher on personal hardware, as it is a tremendously resource-hungry process. Slasher is very heavy on database access and disk usage, and the slasher.db will quickly grow to 1TB or more when running on mainnet.
        NavinF 4y ago
        A 1TB SSD is like $50. I put one in a small USB-C M.2 case and use it as a flash drive. I’m pretty sure hardware costs will always be a rounding error compared to the $50k that “home stakers” need if they want to run their own validator.
mypastself 4y ago
What happens if the majority of infrastructure is provided by a small number of cloud computing services? An attacker with access to those services needn’t stake their own funds, and an “attack” might simply entail complying with local laws.
- lupire 4y ago
  The 51% is staked coins, not computers.
  - mypastself 4y ago
    Doesn’t staking require active validator software on a computer with a great deal of uptime?
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
overtonwhy 4y ago
What about a DDoS attack?

bowsamic 4y ago

What if most of the miners collude to double spend tokens? The problem is the same. The difference is that proof of work automatically tends to centralisation due to its economy of scale: it's cheaper to add one more miner to your pool if you already have a big mining operation, but staking 1 eth is always staking 1 eth. Both PoS and PoW have the problem where you can buy out the majority if you have the power to do so.

spywaregorilla 4y ago
The problem is not the same. In proof of work, it just breaks and you can double spend. In this proof of stake setup, you can double spend, but then the ethereum foundation can punish you with its slashers.
camjw 4y ago
I don't understand this comment: "but staking 1eth is always staking 1eth". If I have 100 GPUs and I buy one more can't I turn around and say "But buying one more GPU is just buying one more GPU"? Even if your point is that electricity bills are lower per additional GPU, surely humans discount the value of incremental money after some point so for those with lots of eth incremental eth isn't worth as much?
- bowsamic 4y ago
  It’s cheaper to run 1 more GPU when you are already running 100 It’s the same price to add 1 eth when you own 100 eth as when you own 1 eth
  - camjw 4y ago
    Kind of, but doesn't that assume a linear utility function for holding eth which I think seems unrealistic? Plus, there are costs associated with holding eth (cold storage etc) which seem fixed, so its cheaper to securely stake 1 additional eth when you're already staking 100eth than when you're not running any. Plus fixed costs of actually running a staking business (by analogy with a mining business).

JohnJamesRambo 4y ago

https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms/pos/ https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_stake https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_stake Start here. “The threat of a 51% attack still exists on proof-of-stake as it does on proof-of-work, but it's even riskier for the attackers. A attacker would need 51% of the staked ETH (about $15,000,000,000 USD).”

spywaregorilla 4y ago
I'm pretty much just asking the same question on every thread now. How does something get slashed? These articles say nothing about it. There are many docs saying all you need is 1 honest slasher node. Well, what happens if you have a dishonest slasher node?
- programmarchy 4y ago
  The slashing can only occur if the validator can be proven to break certain rules e.g. double voting. The reports are evaluated by the network.
  - spywaregorilla 4y ago
    > The reports are evaluated by the network. The network which was just shown to be 51% malicious actors? And how is it evaluated? What if the slasher is dishonest? What if it sends trillions of fake requests?
    - drdeca 4y ago
      Evaluated in the same way that “does this address have enough to send to this much to this other address” is evaluated? If it isn’t valid, then a block containing it isn’t valid, and this is a thing which any client can automatically check. What happens if you try to send trillions of invalid transactions in any sensible chain?
      - 4y ago

bitxbitxbitcoin 4y ago

What you are referring to is an old problem (arguably now solved) called “nothing at stake.” Short, bastardized answer is that something built into the consensus code called “slashing” keeps the validators/shakers from trying to stake two versions of a block.

spywaregorilla 4y ago
Who gets to run a slasher node and who gets to agree that its valid to slash a block?
- immibis 4y ago
  I don't know the specific rules for Ethereum, but in general PoS systems, anyone can slash. All you have to do is submit two different headers for the same block signed by the same validator. This proves the validator is cheating. The person who submits the proof may get to keep some of the validator's slashed money, which is a good incentive to run slashing nodes as this can amount to thousands of dollars per slash, and a good incentive not to double-validate as this can amount to thousands of dollars per time you are caught. Perversely, since double-validation happens rarely, since it is expensive, the actual interface for slashing on e.g. BSC is not well-documented or user-friendly.
  - spywaregorilla 4y ago
    > This proves the validator is cheating. To whom? Who gets to decide to slash the funds? I caught you cheating and can prove it. You don't give a shit and control 51% of the network. How do you get punished?
    - bhaak 4y ago
      Social slashing. The honest parts of the community would organize and fork you away. If you were following the current events on Ethereum, this question has just arisen in the last weeks when the US sanctioned the privacy oriented Tornado Cash contract.

chippiewill 4y ago

Coordinating and attempting an attack is seriously expensive in proof of stake if something goes wrong due to the slashing