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I don't believe that what Mudge is saying there is all that well quoted or explained. The argument I've heard him make, in other settings, is that companies tha

I don't believe that what Mudge is saying there is all that well quoted or explained. The argument I've heard him make, in other settings, is that companies that are interesting enough will get job applicants that are really moles for intelligence agencies. This is very difficult to stop, and once your company has enough employees, downright impossible. His recommendation however is not to make it impossible for people with ties to foreign agencies to join the company. Instead, it's to minimize the access than any individual mole might have. This would also apply if you consider US intelligence an attacker! TLDR; Someone like Twitter, Google or Facebook should have 'some of our employees are malicious and sophisticated' as part of their threat model.

criddell 4y ago
> companies that are interesting enough will get job applicants that are really moles for intelligence agencies Or they will use money or kompromat to turn existing employees.
blitzar 4y ago
> Someone like Twitter, Google or Facebook should have 'some of our employees are malicious and sophisticated' as part of their threat model. I would estimate there is a 100% chance that every one of those companies listed, has multiple employees who work for or are sources for US domestic and foreign intelligence services. It should be expected and part of their internal systems that people only have access to the shared drives they are meant to.
- edgyquant 4y ago
  >estimate there is a 100% chance that every one of those companies listed, has multiple employees who work for or are sources for US domestic and foreign intelligence services What are you basing this on?