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Well, this, the Chinese Room, is still pretty much a behavioristic work-around (as it is still attempting to argue without any reference to internal states.) E

Well, this, the Chinese Room, is still pretty much a behavioristic work-around (as it is still attempting to argue without any reference to internal states.) Even, if we don't (clearly) understand what "understanding" means, or, at least, aren't able to provide a sane definition, we do know about the semantics of the term and the kind of connotations that come with it. Like a reflexive component. (Which wasn't much of a problem in the age of behaviorism, as this had to be ignored by requirement anyway. If there is no acknowledged difference between a human and a pigeon, what is the problem with computers, as far as the model is concerned?) So we do have a notion of the semantic field and its implications. And these are, well, quite disastrous for this purpose.

masswerk 4y ago
P.S.: In non-behavoristic terms: The term "understanding" is linked not only to the internal semantic field and its structure, as maintained by an individual, but also to its state of mind. We crucially expect the state of mind to be altered by an "act" of understanding. (Commonly expressed by an utterance like "aha!", which asserts this change in state of mind.) So, do we have to consider a state of mind (of some complexity) or a hypothesis of this, as in a theory of mind, in order to predict the productions of GPT-3, or does this further our hopes in a more precise prediction? Do we have to consider such a theory of mind in order to understand it on our side? Probably not.