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It's at best a fringe interpretation, at worst a strawman. The basic argument of a longtermist position is that, similar to how throughout history we extended

by qsort 4y ago

It's at best a fringe interpretation, at worst a strawman. The basic argument of a longtermist position is that, similar to how throughout history we extended the set of entities we give moral value to (some humans -> all humans -> all humans + non-human animals -> ...), we ought to further extend that set to include future (i.e. not yet born) humans. I don't personally find the argument very convincing, but it's not as absurd on its face as Salon is trying to paint it.

s1artibartfast 4y ago
I'm not entirely convinced with the approach. It seems that there should be some significant discounted concern as you project into the future. I do find it interesting that most people don't object to the idea of thinking about what is best for your hypothetical grandchildren.
- qsort 4y ago
  > I'm not entirely convinced with the approach. It seems that there should be some significant discounted concern as you project into the future. I agree, my objection to the serious (say, Bostrom's) version of the argument is exactly along that line. When we add new entities to our set of those worthy of moral consideration, we don't imply they should all be given equal value. In less abstract terms, it's perfectly consistent to hold the following two moral positions: "animals should not be mistreated gratuitously", and "it is morally permissible to eat meat"; this would amount to having an utility function where animals have some nonzero weight, but not enough weight to offset reasonable human desires. Likewise, that averting existential risks should trump all other considerations would not only require that future humans have some nonzero moral value, but that their moral value ought to be high enough that everything else pales in comparison. Something like "my concern with future humans decreases exponentially with time", like you propose, still leaves us with a "normal" position: "sure, we should care somewhat about the future of mankind, but not, like, above all else". Both the premise and the conclusion of this "boring" position seem much more reasonable to me.
  - s1artibartfast 4y ago
    Yeah, it seems like we agree. I still think this kind of writing is incredibly valuable in spurring these types of conversations. the question of how much we should care about the future vs today is a profound one. In a world and society trending towards utilitarianism, someone needs to formulate an answer within that framework for why it is unethical to carry out genocide today to generate prosperity tomorrow.

by qsort 4y ago

s1artibartfast 4y ago

I'm not entirely convinced with the approach. It seems that there should be some significant discounted concern as you project into the future. I do find it interesting that most people don't object to the idea of thinking about what is best for your hypothetical grandchildren.

qsort 4y ago
> I'm not entirely convinced with the approach. It seems that there should be some significant discounted concern as you project into the future. I agree, my objection to the serious (say, Bostrom's) version of the argument is exactly along that line. When we add new entities to our set of those worthy of moral consideration, we don't imply they should all be given equal value. In less abstract terms, it's perfectly consistent to hold the following two moral positions: "animals should not be mistreated gratuitously", and "it is morally permissible to eat meat"; this would amount to having an utility function where animals have some nonzero weight, but not enough weight to offset reasonable human desires. Likewise, that averting existential risks should trump all other considerations would not only require that future humans have some nonzero moral value, but that their moral value ought to be high enough that everything else pales in comparison. Something like "my concern with future humans decreases exponentially with time", like you propose, still leaves us with a "normal" position: "sure, we should care somewhat about the future of mankind, but not, like, above all else". Both the premise and the conclusion of this "boring" position seem much more reasonable to me.
- s1artibartfast 4y ago
  Yeah, it seems like we agree. I still think this kind of writing is incredibly valuable in spurring these types of conversations. the question of how much we should care about the future vs today is a profound one. In a world and society trending towards utilitarianism, someone needs to formulate an answer within that framework for why it is unethical to carry out genocide today to generate prosperity tomorrow.