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It's unlikely there will be a breakthrough that allows adversaries (in the cryptography sense) to crack properly implemented strong encryption. Faced with this
by redler 15y ago
It's unlikely there will be a breakthrough that allows adversaries (in the cryptography sense) to crack properly implemented strong encryption. Faced with this dilemma, the only other options for the government are varying degrees of black-bag and rubber-hose cryptanalysis. Surveillance (legal or otherwise), asset forfeiture laws, jailing for contempt, lawsuits, deception -- all are just different forms of the rubber hose. It worked against Mitnick, and it would probably work against most of us.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black-bag_cryptanalysis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black-bag_cryptanalysis
- etherael 15y agoI'm hesitant to mention this again but it does seem that rubber hose is being overplayed as a trump card here too much. Shadow volumes and multiple layered passphrases in arbitrary memorised data offsets on various volumes amongst a scatter of purely random data is completely invulnerable to rubber hose. It all depends on exactly how paranoid you are as to how deep you go with layers of misdirection here of course but the point remains, they cannot continuously compel you to provide a passphrase when they do not know that another one actually exists. This is the one arena where the only reason the government has any power at all is due to our ignorance, they do not, and indeed should not, have any power at all in this realm.
- rdtsc 15y ago>they cannot continuously compel you to provide a passphrase when they do not know that another one actually exists. unfortunately there have been cases of judges simply jailing people for contempt for years
- etherael 15y agoI understand this, I mean that they don't know how many layers of misdirection are actually involved, you can provide n fake layers of encryption with trivially incriminating information, as long as the "free space" of the volume in question contains randomised data, they can never know if it is actually an encrypted volume one level deeper or not.
- koenigdavidmj 15y agordtsc's point is that you are assuming that the system will play by their own rules. Not necessarily the case, especially when the entire weight of public opinion is against you.
- etherael 15y agoMy point is that I understand that, I'm not expecting the system restrict itself in any way shape or form, this is par for the course in many places around the world where no quarter can be expected from the authorities. They can't continue to compel you for more and more passphrases for more and more encrypted shadow volumes that they're not even aware actually exist, this is what it eventually reduces down to.
- merijnv 15y ago> They can't continue to compel you for more and more passphrases for more and more encrypted shadow volumes that they're not even aware actually exist The point is, they can. If you're in some place run by a dictator they can do whatever the hell they want to you, including torturing you until you die.
- etherael 15y agoSure, but it's tactically useless, as they can't know if they're just applying useless pressure because they don't know how many layers of shadow volumes there are to penetrate. So yes, they can be pricks, but to no discernible effect.
- koenigdavidmj 15y ago>So yes, they can be pricks, but to no discernible effect. They won't get more data, but they will send a clear signal to other users of this stuff to behave themselves.
- 15y ago