3 ms·

Going by that description (I'm otherwise a n00b), my guess is that only a fraction of validator slots would be active, which means the network could be easily h

Going by that description (I'm otherwise a n00b), my guess is that only a fraction of validator slots would be active, which means the network could be easily hijacked by a well-funded party who just wants to see the network burn (e.g. central bank of a superpower). Another possible weakness could occur if staking is mostly outsourced (i.e. staking as a service) and one provider overwhelmingly dominates the market. That provider would be in a position to hijack the network without having much of a stake in it. Proof of stake doesn't really live up to its name if the validation nodes aren't run by validation slot owners.

WFHRenaissance 4y ago
The threat of a 51% attack still exists on proof-of-stake as it does on proof-of-work, but it's even riskier for the attackers. A attacker would need 51% of the staked ETH (about $15,000,000,000 USD). They could then use their own attestations to ensure their preferred fork was the one with the most accumulated attestations. The 'weight' of accumulated attestations is what consensus clients use to determine the correct chain, so this attacker would be able to make their fork the canonical one. However, a strength of proof-of-stake over proof-of-work is that the community has flexibility in mounting a counter-attack. For example, the honest validators could decide to keep building on the minority chain and ignore the attacker's fork while encouraging apps, exchanges, and pools to do the same. They could also decide to forcibly remove the attacker from the network and destroy their staked ether. These are strong economic defenses against a 51% attack. Staking-as-a-service will operate as a market of diverse options. The network could decide to fork from an outsized dishonest market participant. It would be controversial, but the validity of the network is generally a common incentive for most involved.

WFHRenaissance 4y ago

The threat of a 51% attack still exists on proof-of-stake as it does on proof-of-work, but it's even riskier for the attackers. A attacker would need 51% of the staked ETH (about $15,000,000,000 USD). They could then use their own attestations to ensure their preferred fork was the one with the most accumulated attestations. The 'weight' of accumulated attestations is what consensus clients use to determine the correct chain, so this attacker would be able to make their fork the canonical one. However, a strength of proof-of-stake over proof-of-work is that the community has flexibility in mounting a counter-attack. For example, the honest validators could decide to keep building on the minority chain and ignore the attacker's fork while encouraging apps, exchanges, and pools to do the same. They could also decide to forcibly remove the attacker from the network and destroy their staked ether. These are strong economic defenses against a 51% attack. Staking-as-a-service will operate as a market of diverse options. The network could decide to fork from an outsized dishonest market participant. It would be controversial, but the validity of the network is generally a common incentive for most involved.