4 ms·

> This is all the same whataboutism propogandists use to undermine normal democratic elections. Yup. Bush v Gore and then Bush v Kerry motivated me to become

> This is all the same whataboutism propogandists use to undermine normal democratic elections. Yup. Bush v Gore and then Bush v Kerry motivated me to become an election integrity activist. Along with some chicanery in my own state. My friends proved, in court, that Kerry actually won New Mexico (the machines didn't record spanish language ballots), and compelled them to dump the DREs and switch to paper ballots. I also knew people in Ohio, NC, Georgian, Kentucky who uncovered similar problems. But those state's laws didn't permit challenges, or the records (evidence) was destroyed, often illegally. It's with deep chagrin that all of our findings and talking points have since been weaponized by a cult hell bent on ending our democracy. Sometimes I even wonder if my friend Bev Harris (Black Box Voting) demonstrating how to hack Diebold live on TV was a mistake. > In the US they literally pay hundreds of election workers to hand count paper receipts in the event of a recount. This is what happened in Arizona in the US. Ok. I just wasted 30 min quickly figuring out how Arizona currently votes. https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2022_Election_Cycle_Voting_Equipment_Aug.pdf https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2022_Election_Cycle_Vo... Paper ballots. Optical scanners for poll sites. Image scanners for central count. Ballot marking devices for accessibility. No VVPAT. No receipts. Whatever you think about Arizona's 2020 recount circus, the end result was greater confidence in the outcome (for the reality based community). Only because Arizona uses paper ballots.

legitster 4y ago
> Paper ballots. Optical scanners for poll sites. Okay, again - what's the big picture difference between VVPAT and paper ballots that are scanned by a computer? If the computer leaves a receipt that I have to sign and confirm and leave with them - how's that different than one I do by hand and have scanned? It's just a difference in the order of operation.
- specialist 4y ago
  Ya, good question. This stuff is confusing and no one explains it properly. With a DRE (eg a touchscreen) the legal ballot is the memory card. The VVPAT is like a log file printed to a cash register paper roll. VVPATs are not the legal ballot of record. Nor are they used for tabulation. Some jurisdictions may use the VVPAT for recounts or audits, but I wouldn't know. In other words, "Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail" is a lie; It's not used for auditing, and most voters don't even look at it. The implementation of VVPAT isn't really intended for tabulation. It's thermal paper, easily damaged. There's no standardized format. There's no gear for scanning it. The content doesn't even look like a ballot. Also, with the Australian ballot system, private voting and public counting, there are no receipts. (Whether or not DREs and postal ballots qualify as Australian ballots is another discussion.) I think maybe a ballot marking device (BMD) would fit your goals. The UX is like a DRE. But a BMD generates an actual ballot. That is then treated like any other ballot, fed into a separate tabulator. BMDs do not tabulate. I think BMDs are great. I'd bet that every election integrity activist would agree. -- Every statement I make should include a "YMMV" caveat. Every jurisdiction (state, county) can potentially do their own thing. Worse, the details (gear, laws, rules, procedures) keep changing. So there's always a lot of thrashing getting everyone onto the same page. Please keep asking questions. None of this stuff is intuitive, or works how people expect. It took me years of intense effort to get up to speed, which shouldn't be the case.
  - legitster 4y ago
    > Some jurisdictions may use the VVPAT for recounts or audits, but I wouldn't know. I don't understand your statement. You say you don't know if it's used for auditing... then you claim decisively it's not used for auditing? > There's no standardized format. There's no gear for scanning it. That's exactly the point - you are only looking at these by hand in the case of a recount? Again, if I am trying to perpetrate voter fraud, enough to change an election, how do I do it with a VVPAT? Do I change their answer and hope that no one notices their vote got changed on their receipt? Or send a different answer to tabulation that would be caught in the event of a recount? Both of these possibilities seem no different than a BMD. How do I know the tabulator machines themselves are not compromised? It seems like a weird distinction to trust one but not the other. https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/election_reform/ERIPBrief1005pdf.pdf https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpe...

legitster 4y ago

> Paper ballots. Optical scanners for poll sites. Okay, again - what's the big picture difference between VVPAT and paper ballots that are scanned by a computer? If the computer leaves a receipt that I have to sign and confirm and leave with them - how's that different than one I do by hand and have scanned? It's just a difference in the order of operation.

specialist 4y ago
Ya, good question. This stuff is confusing and no one explains it properly. With a DRE (eg a touchscreen) the legal ballot is the memory card. The VVPAT is like a log file printed to a cash register paper roll. VVPATs are not the legal ballot of record. Nor are they used for tabulation. Some jurisdictions may use the VVPAT for recounts or audits, but I wouldn't know. In other words, "Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail" is a lie; It's not used for auditing, and most voters don't even look at it. The implementation of VVPAT isn't really intended for tabulation. It's thermal paper, easily damaged. There's no standardized format. There's no gear for scanning it. The content doesn't even look like a ballot. Also, with the Australian ballot system, private voting and public counting, there are no receipts. (Whether or not DREs and postal ballots qualify as Australian ballots is another discussion.) I think maybe a ballot marking device (BMD) would fit your goals. The UX is like a DRE. But a BMD generates an actual ballot. That is then treated like any other ballot, fed into a separate tabulator. BMDs do not tabulate. I think BMDs are great. I'd bet that every election integrity activist would agree. -- Every statement I make should include a "YMMV" caveat. Every jurisdiction (state, county) can potentially do their own thing. Worse, the details (gear, laws, rules, procedures) keep changing. So there's always a lot of thrashing getting everyone onto the same page. Please keep asking questions. None of this stuff is intuitive, or works how people expect. It took me years of intense effort to get up to speed, which shouldn't be the case.
- legitster 4y ago
  > Some jurisdictions may use the VVPAT for recounts or audits, but I wouldn't know. I don't understand your statement. You say you don't know if it's used for auditing... then you claim decisively it's not used for auditing? > There's no standardized format. There's no gear for scanning it. That's exactly the point - you are only looking at these by hand in the case of a recount? Again, if I am trying to perpetrate voter fraud, enough to change an election, how do I do it with a VVPAT? Do I change their answer and hope that no one notices their vote got changed on their receipt? Or send a different answer to tabulation that would be caught in the event of a recount? Both of these possibilities seem no different than a BMD. How do I know the tabulator machines themselves are not compromised? It seems like a weird distinction to trust one but not the other. https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/election_reform/ERIPBrief1005pdf.pdf https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpe...