4 ms·
You should assume every bit of information sent on the internet is archived in a massive warehouse somewhere, because it is. Thus, we have to trust the cryptog
by dcow 4y ago
You should assume every bit of information sent on the internet is archived in a massive warehouse somewhere, because it is.
Thus, we have to trust the cryptography itself. Sending an encrypted message to a peer is no different from sending an encrypted message to yourself (other than the use of symmetric vs asymmetric crypto). The fact that you send a message to yourself which is stored persistently on signal's server doesn't change anything (and it's even opt in AFAIU). Sure, there are concerns about the implementation, but until someone can decrypt the blobs in storage (the crypto is broken) I don't see reason for outrage.
Pretty simply, if you don't trust the crypto then you have a very different threat model to pretty much everyone else. If you don't trust crypto you can't use the internet because you can't use TLS. You're relegated to networks where you trust every single node (where you don't need crypto) and other such stuff. Most of us trust the crypto because it's really the only practical option. I don't see the problem.
- autoexec 4y ago> You should assume every bit of information sent on the internet is archived in a massive warehouse somewhere, because it is. Leaving aside the whataboutism here, you shouldn't assume that when you're using a secure messaging app that claims to be designed to never collect or store user data. Signal makes that claim at the start of their privacy policy and it is a lie. It started out true, but they begain colleting data and they refuse to update their policy. > Thus, we have to trust the cryptography itself. No one is suggesting we can't trust cryptography. The fact is that doesn't matter how strong your algprythm is when you're encrypting that data with a 4 digit number. You can 100% "trust the cryptography" and still acknollege that it won't take very long for someone to brute-force your pin and get your data plain text. > Sending an encrypted message to a peer is no different from sending an encrypted message to yourself... (and it's even opt in AFAIU). This has nothing to do with "sending data to yourself" and everything to do with Singal collecting data from you and storing it for itself. There is a massive difference between encrypting something yourself and sending that data to yourself and someone else copying data from you, encryping it, and saving it for themselves. This data collection is also not opt in. At all. You can opt out of setting a pin, but if you do one will be automatically generated for you and your data still gets silently uploaded to Singal servers to be stored. The community spent months begging for Signal to add a way to opt out of this data collection, but they were ignored. See: https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-anything-stored-in-cloud/14057 https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-... https://community.signalusers.org/t/mandatory-pin-without-clear-explanation-within-the-app-might-cause-significant-number-of-users-to-quit-using-signal/11597/4 https://community.signalusers.org/t/mandatory-pin-without-cl... > Pretty simply, if you don't trust the crypto then you have a very different threat model "The crypto" isn't the problem here. The problem is Signal collecting sensitive user data and permanently storing it on their servers in a manner that could allow it to be accessed by third parties and then not clearly disclosing that to their users and refusing to update their privacy policy to reflect the change.
- dcow 4y agoSignal can't possibly read the data. How is that for itself? Only you can decrypt it! Signal doesn't have your data. They have garbage bits of effectively random noise. You can prove it to yourself. Go take one of Signal's servers and try to find someone else's data there. You won't. Why would Signal update their privacy policy to reflect the desire of misguided fear mongers? I certainly wouldn't do that if I were them.
- autoexec 4y ago> Signal can't possibly read the data. They literally can. If you can brute force a 4 digit pin, you can access any of the data protected by a 4 digit pin. Some pins are longer, but it's notable that even after a lot of backlash they continue to push for "pins" and not "passwords" knowing that many will continue to use a simple four digit number. > You can prove it to yourself. Go take one of Signal's servers and try to find someone else's data there. You won't. um... what? > Why would Signal update their privacy policy To accurately reflect the data they collect and how it is used? So that they don't lie to their users by making claims that are demonstrably false? To notify whistleblowers and activists that their information and the information of those who they are in contact with could be discovered by state actors who can force Signal to give them access? There's three good reasons right there. I'm sorry you're so upset by this. I know the reality is uncomfortable but that doesn't make it "fear mongering". I honestly wish it wasn't true. I wish they weren't collecting user data, I wish they were doing more to secure what they do collect, and most of all I wish they were honest and forthcoming about what they are doing, but wishes can't change what is. I hope that regardless of if you use Signal or not, you'll try to accept facts even when they aren't easy to accept.
- dcow 4y agoLet me make this clear: if the data is stored in a way that Signal's service cannot decipher it, then it's not collected by any reasonable definition of collected". In order for Signal to collect it they would have to obtain it, which they don't, and can't, do. This term isn't just some loose word to be thrown around and abused on message boards. If we take your definition of collected where handling encrypted data is collecting it, then "the internet" collects all data. Uh oh. What signal does is route encrypted messages between principals in a system. That's all they do. They don't collect personal information. Read their subpoena responses, they publish all of them.