3 ms·

>I refuse to use or recommend Signal due to blatantly bad design choices that put people that need privacy most at risk like security researchers, journalists,

>I refuse to use or recommend Signal due to blatantly bad design choices that put people that need privacy most at risk like security researchers, journalists, abortion seekers, or dissidents. I understand your concerns, and if I was a security researcher, journalist, abortion seeker or dissident, I wouldn't use Signal either. But, like the vast majority of us, I am not any of those things. As such, for my (and most others) use case, Signal is great. For those at risk from highly motivated and/or state-level actors, Signal isn't nearly enough. Nor, unless you build and run your own servers and clients (and never screw up your OpSec), is Matrix. Signal isn't perfect. However, for most people, it's good enough. Don't make perfect the enemy of the good. Because perfect doesn't exist.

lrvick 4y ago
Those of us that do not need high privacy today might need it tomorrow, or maybe someone we frequently communicate with. We also have a responsibility to favor tools and practices that make those that really need privacy not stand out. Element or other Matrix clients are easy to use and lack the serious flaws I outlined for Signal.
- nobody9999 4y ago
  I'd point out that for most people (I suppose that could change, and I wouldn't be upset if such changes resulted in better privacy), messaging is often phone-based and includes folks who use secure methods like Signal and Matrix as well as those who use iMessage and OEM SMS clients. When it comes to that sort of messaging ("I'm running a few minutes late and will meet you inside the restaurant," or similar) I don't (and won't) separate those out. I just use Signal for all such messages. Which makes for inconvenience when (especially iPhone users) install Signal and still use iMessage. I'd add that if I have something to discuss that I don't want recorded (don't forget that it's not just your device that puts you at risk, anyone who's received such messages do so as well), I'll use encrypted voice calls (with the assumption -- valid or not -- that the other participant(s) aren't recording that conversation) with Signal or Matrix. In both my personal and professional life, I've always made sure to only put in writing that which I wouldn't care if it was shared with the world. Which is no different than it's ever been. I'm not sure why anyone thinks this is a new thing or that somehow "technology" obviates the need for good OpSec. It never did and still doesn't.
  - lrvick 4y ago
    Matrix bridges support iMessage and SMS and even Signal so you do not need to fragment your communications to multiple apps if you do not want to.
exyi 4y ago
With Matrix you can use F-Droid build of the client. And you don't really need to trust the server too much, right? Maybe it's not enough for Snowden, but it's better. I'm not saying "don't use Signal", in fact I still recommend it to non technical people, since it's just much simpler. But pointing at the flaws is a necessary requirement for them to be fixed
- nobody9999 4y ago
  >With Matrix you can use F-Droid build of the client. And you don't really need to trust the server too much, right? Maybe it's not enough for Snowden, but it's better. And why should I trust F-Droid's build of Matrix over Signal's build of Signal? Please understand, I agree with your point. Mine was orthogonal: If you are under threat from motivated and/or state-level actors, using someone else's servers (or clients, for that matter) is a bad idea. And that includes Matrix. I run my own Matrix server and the users of that server can interact (especially via voice/video) without any fear of being intercepted -- even by me. What's more, I can't decrypt the conversations folks have in Matrix "rooms" that don't include me without a long process of brute-forcing. No one is coming to my house to confiscate my server. That scenario is much more likely with a public/commercial service hosted at a data center/cloud provider. So yes, Matrix is likely more secure than Signal if, and only if you build and install your servers and clients from source with a compiler/linker you built yourself using a trusted tool chain on hardware whose components you've personally confirmed to be free of compromise[0]. [0] https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-tho...
- MayeulC 4y ago
  I like Matrix, but I admit its E2 EE rooms seem to leak more metadata (users in th room, reactionss, maybe replies, display names, avatars) than Signal.
  - lrvick 4y ago
    They leak metadata to the operators of the server. So does Signal, albeit anchored to SGX nodes they pretend they cannot access. Signal also has phone numbers making even worse. With matrix at least you can pick a server operator you trust to provide your metadata to, or host a server yourself.
bscphil 4y ago
> if I was a security researcher, journalist, abortion seeker or dissident, I wouldn't use Signal either. I mean that's really bad, right? Supposedly Signal is the go-to alternative to doing things the hard way (e.g. GPG over email), but apparently it's just not good enough for those with the highest security needs. Given that the alternative is that these people go back to using extremely brittle software, shouldn't someone do something about that? The implication of course is that Signal should do something about that, because they already have the user base and are in a position to adopt user identifiers that are not based on phone numbers.
- nobody9999 4y ago
  >I mean that's really bad, right? Supposedly Signal is the go-to alternative to doing things the hard way (e.g. GPG over email), but apparently it's just not good enough for those with the highest security needs. Is it? If that's what you got from my comment, then I certainly didn't communicate my thoughts clearly. Signal is great for what it is. And that's as a centralized encrypted messaging platform that's easy to use. Have some tradeoffs been made (e.g., not strictly p2p, some data is stored, in encrypted form, on their servers, etc.) in making Signal easy to use? Yes. For the majority of folks, Signal is more than good enough. AFAICT, Signal has been quite successful in that space. However, if you're the target of motivated folks and/or state-level actors, any product that relies on third-party interaction of any kind is suspect. For that use case, you need more. Why is it Signal's responsibility to do that? Should they be held responsible for the (lack of) OpSec[0] of others, whether they're Signal users or not? I mean, I get it. Why should you (or anyone else) have to do any work (other than download this handy app) to protect yourself, especially if your communications are of interest to motivated hostile adversaries? The whole "telephone number as identifier" bit, and the network discovery it provides, is the primary reason Signal has had the level of adoption it has. And is something of a red herring in this case, IMHO[1]. And Signal is a centralized service. All messages (stored until they're delivered) and metadata (the stuff that Signal stores for each user) are stored on Signal's servers. Storing anything on systems accessible to the Internet is risky. Plain text is much worse than encrypted blobs, but there's definitely still a non-zero risk. That alone makes it unsuitable for those whose life may depend on their ability to maintain secure communications. There are other tools that folks can use (a bunch of folks have mentioned Matrix, which is great too), but which should be either fully p2p or privately hosted/managed on hardware under one's physical control, again assuming that you might be harassed, imprisoned or killed for your communications. But for most of us, myself included, Signal is more than good enough. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_security [1] Since Signal is a centralized service, they need a mechanism(s) to identify their users. In some respects, using a phone number for that purpose is sub-optimal, but it doesn't really impact the security of messages sent through the service, nor does it attach (other than an optional photo and other information voluntarily provided by the user) any information that could be used to personally identify the user in question. A such, even if the encrypted blobs were to be accessed and decrypted, they wouldn't be all that useful anyway, except as a self-selected list (those who have registered with Signal) of phone numbers. I'm not sure how much of an issue that is for most folks, given that dozens, perhaps hundreds of other organizations (almost all of whom don't give a rat's ass about your security) have your phone number associated with your name, your address, your shopping/browsing/travel habits and a raft of other PII.
veeti 4y ago
What a terrible argument. You might as well just switch to Telegram
- nobody9999 4y ago
  >What a terrible argument. You might as well just switch to Telegram Should I? What specific features of Telegram make it superior to Signal?

lrvick 4y ago

Those of us that do not need high privacy today might need it tomorrow, or maybe someone we frequently communicate with. We also have a responsibility to favor tools and practices that make those that really need privacy not stand out. Element or other Matrix clients are easy to use and lack the serious flaws I outlined for Signal.

nobody9999 4y ago
I'd point out that for most people (I suppose that could change, and I wouldn't be upset if such changes resulted in better privacy), messaging is often phone-based and includes folks who use secure methods like Signal and Matrix as well as those who use iMessage and OEM SMS clients. When it comes to that sort of messaging ("I'm running a few minutes late and will meet you inside the restaurant," or similar) I don't (and won't) separate those out. I just use Signal for all such messages. Which makes for inconvenience when (especially iPhone users) install Signal and still use iMessage. I'd add that if I have something to discuss that I don't want recorded (don't forget that it's not just your device that puts you at risk, anyone who's received such messages do so as well), I'll use encrypted voice calls (with the assumption -- valid or not -- that the other participant(s) aren't recording that conversation) with Signal or Matrix. In both my personal and professional life, I've always made sure to only put in writing that which I wouldn't care if it was shared with the world. Which is no different than it's ever been. I'm not sure why anyone thinks this is a new thing or that somehow "technology" obviates the need for good OpSec. It never did and still doesn't.
- lrvick 4y ago
  Matrix bridges support iMessage and SMS and even Signal so you do not need to fragment your communications to multiple apps if you do not want to.

exyi 4y ago

With Matrix you can use F-Droid build of the client. And you don't really need to trust the server too much, right? Maybe it's not enough for Snowden, but it's better. I'm not saying "don't use Signal", in fact I still recommend it to non technical people, since it's just much simpler. But pointing at the flaws is a necessary requirement for them to be fixed

nobody9999 4y ago
>With Matrix you can use F-Droid build of the client. And you don't really need to trust the server too much, right? Maybe it's not enough for Snowden, but it's better. And why should I trust F-Droid's build of Matrix over Signal's build of Signal? Please understand, I agree with your point. Mine was orthogonal: If you are under threat from motivated and/or state-level actors, using someone else's servers (or clients, for that matter) is a bad idea. And that includes Matrix. I run my own Matrix server and the users of that server can interact (especially via voice/video) without any fear of being intercepted -- even by me. What's more, I can't decrypt the conversations folks have in Matrix "rooms" that don't include me without a long process of brute-forcing. No one is coming to my house to confiscate my server. That scenario is much more likely with a public/commercial service hosted at a data center/cloud provider. So yes, Matrix is likely more secure than Signal if, and only if you build and install your servers and clients from source with a compiler/linker you built yourself using a trusted tool chain on hardware whose components you've personally confirmed to be free of compromise[0]. [0] https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-tho...
MayeulC 4y ago
I like Matrix, but I admit its E2 EE rooms seem to leak more metadata (users in th room, reactionss, maybe replies, display names, avatars) than Signal.
- lrvick 4y ago
  They leak metadata to the operators of the server. So does Signal, albeit anchored to SGX nodes they pretend they cannot access. Signal also has phone numbers making even worse. With matrix at least you can pick a server operator you trust to provide your metadata to, or host a server yourself.

bscphil 4y ago

> if I was a security researcher, journalist, abortion seeker or dissident, I wouldn't use Signal either. I mean that's really bad, right? Supposedly Signal is the go-to alternative to doing things the hard way (e.g. GPG over email), but apparently it's just not good enough for those with the highest security needs. Given that the alternative is that these people go back to using extremely brittle software, shouldn't someone do something about that? The implication of course is that Signal should do something about that, because they already have the user base and are in a position to adopt user identifiers that are not based on phone numbers.

nobody9999 4y ago
>I mean that's really bad, right? Supposedly Signal is the go-to alternative to doing things the hard way (e.g. GPG over email), but apparently it's just not good enough for those with the highest security needs. Is it? If that's what you got from my comment, then I certainly didn't communicate my thoughts clearly. Signal is great for what it is. And that's as a centralized encrypted messaging platform that's easy to use. Have some tradeoffs been made (e.g., not strictly p2p, some data is stored, in encrypted form, on their servers, etc.) in making Signal easy to use? Yes. For the majority of folks, Signal is more than good enough. AFAICT, Signal has been quite successful in that space. However, if you're the target of motivated folks and/or state-level actors, any product that relies on third-party interaction of any kind is suspect. For that use case, you need more. Why is it Signal's responsibility to do that? Should they be held responsible for the (lack of) OpSec[0] of others, whether they're Signal users or not? I mean, I get it. Why should you (or anyone else) have to do any work (other than download this handy app) to protect yourself, especially if your communications are of interest to motivated hostile adversaries? The whole "telephone number as identifier" bit, and the network discovery it provides, is the primary reason Signal has had the level of adoption it has. And is something of a red herring in this case, IMHO[1]. And Signal is a centralized service. All messages (stored until they're delivered) and metadata (the stuff that Signal stores for each user) are stored on Signal's servers. Storing anything on systems accessible to the Internet is risky. Plain text is much worse than encrypted blobs, but there's definitely still a non-zero risk. That alone makes it unsuitable for those whose life may depend on their ability to maintain secure communications. There are other tools that folks can use (a bunch of folks have mentioned Matrix, which is great too), but which should be either fully p2p or privately hosted/managed on hardware under one's physical control, again assuming that you might be harassed, imprisoned or killed for your communications. But for most of us, myself included, Signal is more than good enough. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_security [1] Since Signal is a centralized service, they need a mechanism(s) to identify their users. In some respects, using a phone number for that purpose is sub-optimal, but it doesn't really impact the security of messages sent through the service, nor does it attach (other than an optional photo and other information voluntarily provided by the user) any information that could be used to personally identify the user in question. A such, even if the encrypted blobs were to be accessed and decrypted, they wouldn't be all that useful anyway, except as a self-selected list (those who have registered with Signal) of phone numbers. I'm not sure how much of an issue that is for most folks, given that dozens, perhaps hundreds of other organizations (almost all of whom don't give a rat's ass about your security) have your phone number associated with your name, your address, your shopping/browsing/travel habits and a raft of other PII.

veeti 4y ago

What a terrible argument. You might as well just switch to Telegram

nobody9999 4y ago
>What a terrible argument. You might as well just switch to Telegram Should I? What specific features of Telegram make it superior to Signal?