9 ms·
Browser password managers – flawed security, by design
- jwcybsafe 4y agoKeen to understand the hackernews take on this...
- ggm 4y agoRead above. Skeptical, misunderstood the threat/risk surface, lack of coherent adoption of modern NIST expectations, focussed on the one story they know, which is the password manager keys are at risk if the machine is compromised.
- jwcybsafe 4y agoThanks! Super useful
- rakoo 4y agoTL;DR: TFA doesn't know what a threat model is and complains that security is not perfect when security can never be perfect
- torstenvl 4y agoEven if the user doesn't turn on a master password, having the key in a predictable place on an encrypted volume with appropriate access permissions is still far more secure than sticky notes on the monitor. Contrary to the OP link's statement, it isn't enough for the attacker to get access to the user's system, they have to get access to the user's account. And if the organization in question isn't using Bitlocker or FileVault or some other encryption, browser password stores are way down the list of security worries.
- olliej 4y agoI'm sorry, but this view is fundamentally incorrect. You have to consider what the actual threat model is. The reality is that your primary threat model is not going to be one employee compromising another's, nor is it someone malicious physically tracking down your employees and stealing and/or physically compromising their devices. Those threats do technically exist, but your employees have to be extraordinarily valuable to warrant the surveillance required to use physical access to compromise them/their account. It is vastly more likely that the attack vector is going to be spam/scam/phishing leading to malicious software installed on the victim's machine. Notably in regard to the post-it/notebook you claimed was the worst option, computers generally can't read post it notes attached to the monitor. Similarly bit locker and FileVault are obviously important, but do nothing at all to stop a remote attacker, because the only threat model that they protect against is physical access to the hardware. If a remote attacker has got some malicious software installed, then by definition once it's running all the drive content is available to the attacker's software (technically SIP should limit this on macOS, but I'll assume that an attacker also compromises SIP). But it is extremely important to understand that in none of these cases did the attacker need to get "access to the user's account" - that was simply a byproduct of their primary attack.
- Timshel 4y agoHow else would you define a phishing attack than getting "access to the user's account" ???
- olliej 4y agoGiven the comment I was replying to that was considering "access to the user's account" being the unlikely case, it seemed reasonable to go into very clear detail on what the real world attack vector is. That said, phishing does not necessarily mean gaining access to an account. The typical path is the low cost "trick someone into providing their credentials to a malicious party" - something browser based password managers do well, as they are very careful in ensuring they only ever enter passwords into the correct domain. You can also phish someone who is very careful by not asking for their account credentials, but having them do something innocuous that compromises their machine. For example you can have a fake company interview them and provide them a PDF with the job offer, and then have the PDF install malware. But the important thing is that the primary attack vector for any device is remote access. So things like disk encryption don't matter, and things like password notebooks are not accessible. The real problem is that once you have malware running on your machine, the presumption is that malware interested in credentials is going to elevate itself to super user at least and so generally gain code injection abilities in most processes that it could be interested in (e.g. all the password managers, or the system pasteboard, or whatever mechanism whichever the target password manager uses). Modern protections such as aggressive code-signing enforcement, sandboxing, SIP (or the windows equivalent), etc make such compromises harder, but harder != impossible.
- ars 4y agoSure, encrypting the passwords is better, but to steal all the stored unencrypted password the attacker would need access to the users computer. If they have that access you have bigger problems on your hand. Yes, this can lead to privilege escalation, but for the vast majority of people access to the desktop is enough for that anyway. If you need better security, you probably already are using more advanced measures.
- nl 4y agoWhoever wrote this seems to have no modern security training. > then your average employee is probably doing one of these three things: Writing passwords down on paper > Hopefully, you have a corporate security awareness training program and have long been discouraging Please, please encourage people to write down passwords on paper! That provides really good safety against most modern threat models, especially in a world where people are working from home. > Even though Chrome, Firefox, and Edge browsers all store passwords in encrypted databases, by default all three products intentionally leave the associated encryption keys completely unprotected in predictable locations. There was (is?) a long lived Chrome issue (which I can't find now). They reasonably make the point that operating system level protection is the correct way to protect this (ie, if a person can log onto your device they are assumed to be you).
- quickthrower2 4y agoDoes this cover things like LassPass, OnePassword, BitWarden? Or just the built in managers?
- tmikaeld 4y agoJust built-in managers
- julienpalard 4y agoJust the built in managers. Other are worse: they do vendor locking for profit.
- quickthrower2 4y agoThey do CSV exports and imports so are quite friendly to moving to another option
- tmikaeld 4y agoBitwarden is fully open source, both client and server - no lock-in.
- olliej 4y agoYou just need to be able to run your own server?
- quickthrower2 4y agoYes, or go with their hosting, and the password manager design allows you to encrypt your data so even they can't get access to it. Obviously this is quite the honeypot, so people will be trying to attack it in the general case. Browser bugs, JS bugs in extensions and such like are a risk. If you want to be more paranoid (not a bad thing) you might need to do away with a password manager in the browser, and use an independent program like KeePass. More paranoid and you would run that program on it's own separate physical device. There is a balance between security issues trusting someone else, and security issues rolling your own and screwing it up though. For example is KeePass with password only less/more secure than LastPass with encryption key and password.
- modeless 4y agoThis is a bunch of silly hand-wringing. I guarantee that if browsers required creating and memorizing and typing a master password all the time, users would be less secure overall. Because people simply wouldn't use the annoying password manager. Using a password manager without a master password is way more secure than not using a password manager at all. If you are a business and you want your employees to be secure, forget about anything to do with passwords. You need hardware second factor tokens. Which I notice the article doesn't mention at all. An article about login security in 2022 that doesn't even mention hardware tokens for two factor authentication is not worth anyone's time.
- hn_throwaway_99 4y ago> You need hardware second factor tokens. The recent targeted phishing attacks against Twilio and Cloudflare made this abundantly clear. Twilio didn't use hardware tokens and was hacked. Cloudflare reported they had 3 users who entered their username and password into the phishing site, but since all of their employees use hardware keys, they weren't hacked.
- politelemon 4y ago> You need hardware second factor tokens. Be careful what you wish for. It's happening but not in the way you're envisioning. A lot of logins now require a phone app. That's the hardware offloading, and reduces overhead of having to manage dedicated hardware. Instead, users manage it themselves and the business piggybacks off it.
- EGreg 4y agoThat’s great! Why not let the USERS have a choice of how to manage their own identity?
- Double_a_92 4y agoWhat would the alternative even be? Having the users keep a buch of different RSA keys?
- 4y ago
- GlitchMr 4y agoI don't think there is anything wrong with storing passwords unencrypted locally assuming the machine itself has encrypted storage. Malware that retrieves passwords from password manager could get them from an unlocked password manager as well.
- olliej 4y agoEncrypting your mass storage devices doesn't protect against malicious code as by definition the filesystem is unlocked once you're logged in. Mass storage encryption is primarily protection against physical access.
- WhyNotHugo 4y ago> Malware that retrieves passwords from password manager could get them from an unlocked password manager as well. A decent password manager will require explicit user approval before disclosing passwords to clients. Regrettably, few do this.
- throwawayffffas 4y agoReading a file and code execution (which is required for reading another processes memory) are two different levels of vulnerabilities. Essentially if you have a piece a software with a bug that allows someone to remotely read files from you system, your browser stored passwords are compromised while your passwords stored encrypted are safe-ish depending on how good your passphrase is. Of course if you have malware that can run arbitrary code on your system you are hosed either way.
- lsh123 4y agoAs usual with security discussions, one needs to start from analyzing security threats and attack vectors. Is a simple to memorize and likely multi-use password is a bigger security threat than a unique, hard to guess passwords in a file storage? It depends. Is this a laptop without disk encryption that travels a lot and especially internationally? Sure, these semi-unencrypted passwords on disk are likely not very safe from lost laptops, customs inspections, etc. Might still be better than a common and simple password though. Is this a laptop sitting at home most of the time with a strong disk encryption? I’ll take unsecured browser password storage with unique hard passwords any day. Edit: formatting
- zokier 4y ago> Is this a laptop without disk encryption that travels a lot and especially internationally? If yes then password storage is not the thing you should be concerned about. There is no excuse for not having FDE on laptops in 2022.
- WorldMaker 4y agoEven Windows Home SKUs have been trying to gently move casual home users (which today are most likely to be using laptops) to FDE in 2022. It's one of the reasons for the Microsoft Account requirement that is much maligned to a sector of HN commenters. A trade off to using Microsoft Accounts for login is that Microsoft knows you have a recovery path for FDE keys and can enable FDE on your behalf, which in isolation is a good idea for casual home users. (Whatever you think about the other implications of needing a Microsoft Account for a personal casual use device.)
- lucideer 4y agoThis is a bad bad article, the advice is dated and the counter-arguments are well known and oft-discussed by anyone who's actually in the security community. The author / website does seem to be offering services in the security industry, but they seem compliance-focused rather than security-focused (compliance is a component of security). So likely offering legal & administrative expertise rather than technical.
- hn_throwaway_99 4y agoOn reflection, I think this article is why I find it extremely difficult to hire qualified security experts. The vast majority of "security experts" I find tend to be "box tickers", who can require lots of rules like this ("don't use the built in password manager"), but whose advice is worse than useless because they don't understand the actual threat models. I know great security people exist, but in my experience I wasn't able to find them, and instead just decided to learn the most important things myself (I'm an application engineer who felt I had a good grasp of things around application security, but less so around infrastructure and corporate IT security).
- kaoD 4y agoI used to develop custom Node+React web apps for an org that required security audits. I was happy to get my code audited for vulnerabilities, but when the audit came it was just a bunch of boxes ticked for Drupal/WordPress/etc. vulns.
- WhyNotHugo 4y agoI feel that it's also very hard for people who understand security to put themselves out there. For people who actually care about security and not just compliance, there's no real job market at all. Companies never hire for this kind of role. So I think they're hard to find because there's no real market for them, there's little point in announcing themselves and their expertise since there's really [almost] nobody interested in hiring that. It's a sad reality, tbh.
- 4y ago
- GauntletWizard 4y agoIf your home directory is readable or writable by anyone other than you, you're compromised in a dozen more important ways, even though this is of very high importance. Your home directory's security is an axiom. It's not true, no, in the same way that there were once upon a time remote exploitable worms in major http frameworks but we don't question that a webserver doesn't allow remote-code-execution - it's the wrong layer of abstraction. Even encrypting the browser's data store at the application level is misguided and probably pointless - Anything that can read the browser's files is going to read the encryption key just as well . Anything that can read the browser's files when running as you is probably going to pop up an identical looking "Enter Password" prompt and will have the right timing and permissions to enter it into the browser once it's been leaked. Gui frameworks are not designed to protect the user from malicious applications. Android actually handles this much better - Applications (Rather, developers) are given their own user id, and so separation of files between apps is enforced at the OS level. Some level of this is why everyone has moved to Docker on the server, too.
- rapnie 4y agoLot of critical reactions, maybe deserved. Some saying master password is not all that important. I notice that with Firefox Sync that means knowing the unlock swipe of your Android is all that's needed to view passwords in plain text via the Settings UI when you lose your phone or someone peeks in it on an unguarded moment.
- aimor 4y agoThe new Hell I'm experiencing is everyone wanting to validate my identity through my phone. Email does it, banking does it, I suspect by the end of the year Windows will probably be sending me a code before I can log in. I'm sick of it. I don't like needing to have my phone on me, I don't like the fear that if I lose my phone I'll be locked out of everything, and I really don't like being forced into this. It feels like there's a lot of fear around passwords right now. I'm sure companies see them as a liability and are eager to move away from them as soon as possible. Are we going to have a future where each person (or identity) has a single hardware token for all logins? I don't think we're anywhere close to that yet.
- wetpaws 4y agoI switched to Google Voice after changing my phone number a couple of times and going through the 2fa replacement hell.
- rexf 4y agoI use GV, but it's really tough to use with many sites. Many sites will detect the non-cellphone (virtual) nature of the number and require a different (cellphone backed) number. Yesterday, I put my GV number in the DALL·E sign up and it wouldn't let me proceed. So I abandoned the sign up flow.
- avree 4y agoMost 2fa platforms detect and block GV (and similar VOIP numbers)
- plaguepilled 4y agoSMS TOTP is indeed bad and your suspicion is well warranted. Its a lazy way to implement 2-factor authentication and exposes the user to MITM attacks as well as a host of other nastiness. U2F (stuff like what Google Authenticator does) is way better and less phone dependent. The only reason a team would opt for TOTP if they had the resources to implement U2F is because its a good way to get your phone number. Edit: embarrassingly I've made an error in my use of acronyms. What I refer to as TOTP is in fact plaintext OTP sent via SMS, and what I refer to as U2F is actually app-based TOTP. Apologies!
- olliej 4y agoOr you could report this as a security bug on those browsers. This vulnerability does not exist in Safari on any platform: macOS, iOS, or windows. Admittedly in the last case because it is alas dead :D I would have assumed that on macOS Firefox and Chrome use the platform APIs that support secure storage of data, and would absolutely consider this to be a security bug if not.
- iueotnmunto 4y agoIf filesystem access is a legitimate concern, you have bigger problems. Even if passwords were secured by FIDO or similar, session tokens are not. If you compromise a computer, you can compromise web sessions. There is no mitigation for this. Shame on the author for attempting to create panic when far more productive security can be achieved elsewhere.
- MattPalmer1086 4y agoYou have misunderstood the threat. When an attacker gains a foothold in a corporate environment, they will immediately try to find any accessible credentials to assist in lateral movement. If the user's passwords to the rest of the corporate systems are sitting unprotected in a browser password store, it is a gold mine. Yes, they should have 2fa and single sign on and so on, but many places don't. The article isn't terrible, it's just pointing out something in browsers that works ok for home users but puts businesses at some risk.
- ShowalkKama 4y agoor he could simply wait until the employee unlocks his password manager and steal the password?
- MattPalmer1086 4y agoThat there exist additional attack vectors is not an argument to ignore one which is simple and requires no user interaction to pull off. If your point is that password managers aren't a total solution to the issue, I'd agree.
- lmns 4y ago>When an attacker gains a foothold in a corporate environment, they will immediately try to find any accessible credentials to assist in lateral movement. So you think this isn't the case with home users? Maybe I still misunderstand the point that is being made here, but from my perspective it's only a matter of time until my encrypted password store gets exposed to the local attacker (as soon as I unlock it).
- hn_throwaway_99 4y ago> Note – many of these dedicated password managers have browser plugins or extensions to help users save and fill passwords. These are very different and much more secure than the built-in password managers that are the subject of this article! This is a shitty article from someone who doesn't really know what he's talking about. Here is a post from Tavis Ormandy, well-known security expert at Google Project Zero, advocating the exact opposite: https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/passmgrs.html https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/passmgrs.html
- jeroenhd 4y agoAlthough I trust Tavis Ormandy more than this random blog post, I disagree with the idea that the password managers built into your browser are somehow superior. I use Bitwarden and there's simply no comparison between what Firefox/Chrome offer me and what Bitwarden offers; you can't even add an extra field to the browser password manager and Google helpfully "encrypts" your data with the password they're already receiving when you're setting up their browser. You can change that, of course, but like a router's default password, if you don't have to change it, people won't. There are also other UI/UX problems (had a side move TLDs, good luck fixing that in your browser!) that browsers don't seem to care about for the sake of "simplicity". The dangers that come with external password managers are because of a lack of good password manager APIs in browsers, forcing them to break the security model. It's easy to say "don't use them, they break some design", especially if you work for a company that designs their own browser, but there are quite tangible benefits to taking the risks, the most important of which is probably "not handing over your data to some browser giant". Re: this article: if the attacker has access to the browser password database, they have access to cookies and the ability to monitor key strokes. You can encrypt passwords all you want but the attacker can still move laterally between services by just copying your session cookie and hitting the next vulnerable target. Credentials will come next time the user logs in. Thinking about secure passwords is important, but there's a bigger picture that needs to be accounted for. The writer of this article mostly seems interested in ticking boxes based on how much they hammer on writing policy and enacting policy and talking to people about policy. I'm not sure who the target audience for this blog is, I would guess managers who are looking to improve their company's security?
- quickco 4y agoA lot of the criticism of this article seems to be: “If they already have access to your local file system, you already have bigger problems” What about defence in depth? This article is suggesting an alternative, which are password managers such as 1Password. These Password managers do not suffer from the same weak key storage as the browser’s build-in password managers. So this article is bringing attention to a weakness in the browser’s built-in password managers, and suggesting a very viable and easy-to-adopt solution. Why the strong criticism of this article?
- Double_a_92 4y agoBecause it might imply to users that using nothing is better. Which leads to people reusing simple passwords... or post-it notes.
- MarkSweep 4y agoThe article states that there is a big problem, but the solution it gives only incrementally improves the situation. If passwords stored in plaintext is a problem, don’t just use slightly harder to access storage. Use SSO so there are not credentials to steal. If the article gave a complete picture of what to do to mitigate the damage of endpoint compromise or was less alarmist in its assessment of risk, I would have liked it better.
- MattPalmer1086 4y agoThat's a fair assessment of the article I think. It's a genuine threat, and one we have had to deal with in a small way before. Most of the criticism I've read here seems to be dismissing the threat entirely, using the weak "if that happened you've got bigger problems" argument.
- CamperBob2 4y agoWhy the strong criticism of this article? These articles always assume everyone has the same threat model: you are head of the NSA's IT department, and hostile nation-states are spending billions to attack your security with everything from 1024-qubit computers to $5 pipe wrenches. Forcing users to employ the same security tools and practices that would be appropriate for dealing with far more serious threats is just annoying, and likely to result in passive-aggressive resistance.
- foota 4y agoI get asked for my windows password when I try to view the passwords, are they not encrypted by windows?
- pretext-1 4y agoNo, the prompt just unlocks the UI. Otherwise you'd be asked for your Windows password every time you auto-fill a password.
- foota 4y agoHuh. So it's just to protect against casual perusal I guess?
- olliej 4y agoReally? I would have assumed that they do what keychain on macOS does which is password gate the decryption key, so it's good to know they're just sitting on disk somewhere. It's a shame as half assed stuff like this is why people don't trust these tools :-/
- what-imright 4y agoLastpass just sent us a bill for $750 and unless we pay it they locked the whole company out of out shared password database and refuse to supply even chat or email support to discuss it
- mikkom 4y agoLastpass was acquired by some shady chinese company. It's time to migrate to some reliable open source manager like Bitwarden (also provides cloud sync)
- tallanvor 4y agoNo it wasn't. LastPass is (soon to be was) owned by LogMeIn - now GoTo - which was originally a Hungarian company and is now owned by an American investment firm. LastPass is being spun off into a standalone company again.
- pigbearpig 4y ago> Microsoft Edge is Windows-exclusive of course No, no it is not. When an article gets something so easy to check so wrong, it's difficult to believe anything else in it.
- dmateos 4y agoOne thing i often do when i forget one of my passwords, is go into chrome, goto the webpage corresponding to the login of the thing in question and let it autofill, then i turn the password area to a plain text area in the HTML editor. I've always thought this kind of bypasses most checks you get if you try to go into the password db in the browser it self.
- JacobSeated 4y agoI remember there being a lot of buzz about security issues related to allowing Browsers storing passwords, this was more than 10 years ago, but ever since that I have just not trusted them. I reluctantly use a open source password manager, keepass, and figure it is still better than using the same password everywhere. Why would we store password in the browser? Seriously. I want my passwords to be available wherever I need to use them, and that only happens if I somehow share the passwords between my devices. I would not trust a proprietary browser developer do store my passwords securely. Period. I have no way of seeing or knowing what is going on on their cloud servers. There are very simple ways to sync files between systems, which are open source, and are much more unlikely to compromise your passwords. E.g. The database itself is encrypted, and the methods of sharing are so simple that it is easy to cover many of the most probable points of entry. Obviously, sharing a password database file over the internet is extremely bad, but if you feel you must, do at least manage the server where you keep the pw db yourself. Heck, I would even 7zip it with another layer of security, because I can not know for sure if Keepass' encryption is safe.
- throwawayffffas 4y agoThere is a lot of backlash against this article, which to be fair is kind of poorly written, but still makes a valid point. Encrypting something and writing the key on the same place is pointless. These browsers encrypting the passwords with a key saved on the device is security theater and has to be called out. Security is not all or nothing, most people don't have full disk encryption so their passwords are sitting there completely unencrypted, trivially retrieved from anyone with physical access.
- lucideer 4y ago> makes a valid point. Encrypting something and writing the key on the same place is pointless. The backlash is due to this not being a valid point. Security best practice has long moved on from dogmatic binaries and treating humans like robots. Encrypting something in transit and writing the key in plaintext locally, while not ideal, is far from pointless. Building perfectly secure systems that nobody will use is what's pointless. > trivially retrieved from anyone with physical access Pretty bold using the word "trivial" here: physical access is not the primary threat model for average password manager use.
- throwawayffffas 4y agoIt's not in transit, it's the equivalent of storing your passwords in plaintext, which I don't think can be actually defended as a good practice. Regardless the question that arises which is a lot more worrisome is what happens when you turn on synchronization on these browsers? Do they encrypt the passwords with a key only you know? Or do they just ship the "encrypted" passwords along with the key, so that your passwords are now essentially plaintext on their servers?
- lucideer 4y ago> which I don't think can be actually defended as a good practice Allow me to try defending it: Even storing your passwords in plaintext locally using an integrated password manager would: 1. discourage password reuse 2. usually encourage generated strong passwords/phrases (best password is one you don't know) 3. allow easy automated password auditing 4. prevent phishing-based credential capture via domain matching Just point (1) above is a much greater threat than the likelihood of physical access (or rootkit/malware in which case key logging would invalidate keyed encryption either way) > what happens when you turn on synchronization on these browsers? [...] Or do they just ship the "encrypted" passwords along with the key, so that your passwords are now essentially plaintext on their servers? The typical approach is to ship the encrypted password without the key: provided it's a key known by the user, this makes it easy to download the encrypted credentials on any device and decrypt locally. If it's a generated key unknown to the user, there's a few different strategies to adding a second client - more complex but doable.
- stjohnswarts 4y agoI'm just not sure why they haven't built in something like Apple's face ID. I know security experts hate anything that isn't locked down with 3 forms of verification but my goal is to have security to the point that it isn't a hastle every time I want to go to a new website.
- kurupt213 4y agoTIL. I enabled master password on my work browser before I finished reading the article. Seems obvious now