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So this is basically DRM, but straight out of the camera. I can only think of a few situations where attestation that early in the chain would actually be helpf

So this is basically DRM, but straight out of the camera. I can only think of a few situations where attestation that early in the chain would actually be helpful (forensics, biometrics). However, even if they are using a per-camera secret, tamper proof hardware is often not very tamper proof, especially in consumer devices. Even things like SGX have glitch attacks and similar. I question if it would really stop a determined attacker from extracting the key and using it to sign edited images. It’s next to impossible to prevent jailbreaks. Further, a low tech proof of concept solution could be to telecine an edited image onto the sensor. You’d then be able to get a signed image of almost anything without even jail breaking the device

makeitdouble 4y ago
Can’t an insurance company for instance seal the camera they provide to their agents and have a decent confidence that the signed photo are genuine ? The default hardware might be vulnerable to ultra determined attackers but that can probably be mitigated where it’s worth doing so. Basically if the software is really working, solving for the hardware part can be done at the owner level.
- lazide 4y ago
  That’s exactly what this is useful for - stopping simple manipulations and forgeries which are a problem now. People have been using digital photos with nothing already for a long time in court.