5 ms·

Marketing hype, if I have physical access to the camera then I can get the key and sign anything. It might require specialized tools or training but it is nowhe

Marketing hype, if I have physical access to the camera then I can get the key and sign anything. It might require specialized tools or training but it is nowhere near impossible. If I am a sovereign entity I can just compel someone to give me the key. I wouldn’t make any life changing decisions about anyone based solely on the presence of a signature.

TeeMassive 4y ago
It will be very hard to extract those keys while hiding evidence of tempering. Yes that leaves the threat of state actors, but they will probably have they keys anyway and still the technology will be good 99.99% of the time which means good enough for most intent and purposes.
- josephcsible 4y ago
  > It will be very hard to extract those keys while hiding evidence of tempering. Why do you need to hide evidence of tampering? You're not supposed to need the camera to later verify its signatures. > good 99.99% of the time That's a bigger disaster than not having this technology at all, because now the 0.01% of forgers will be able to say "look, my photo can't be a forgery, it's digitally signed!" and convince a lot of people who would otherwise disbelieve it.
  - bradstewart 4y ago
    > Why do you need to hide evidence of tampering? If I know my camera was tampered with, I can invalidate the signing key.
    - josephcsible 4y ago
      The forgers aren't going to use your camera. They're going to use their own.
      - TeeMassive 4y ago
        Then they won't be able to generate a signature with that same camera.
- coldtea 4y ago
  >the technology will be good 99.99% of the time This is the kind of technology that's useless if it's not good 100% of the time. Parachutes can be useful even if they open 99.999% of the time. But this is either 100% cryptograhical proven forgery-proof or it isn't. There's no "good enough" middle ground. You care for forgery-proof when important things are hanging on that being the case.
  - lazide 4y ago
    And important things don’t hang from parachutes? Nothing is ever 100%
    - SXX 4y ago
      While in cryptography there is never 100% we tend to expect crypto not to have have serious known flaws and require great amounts of compute power, time and energy for brute-force attack. E.g cryptocurrency is "safe" because cost of attack is too high and require too much resources. On other side this Sony Camera-DRM is not just useless, but dangerous especially since Sony have well established track record with backdoors and cryptography: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootkit_scandal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootk... https://www.engadget.com/2010-12-29-hackers-obtain-ps3-private-cryptography-key-due-to-epic-programm.html https://www.engadget.com/2010-12-29-hackers-obtain-ps3-priva... https://www.pcworld.com/article/411221/backdoor-accounts-found-in-80-sony-ip-security-camera-models.html https://www.pcworld.com/article/411221/backdoor-accounts-fou...
      - lazide 4y ago
        None of what you’re saying appears to be pertinent in this issue, since the primary objections appear to not be related to the crypto but to the end-to-end validation? Which it’s still likely better than the current situation, which is photoshops ahoy everywhere.
    - coldtea 4y ago
      >And important things don’t hang from parachutes? They do. But we're ok with some losses now and then, if it means parachutes still saves tons of lives... The thing is a parachute failing doesn't affect other deployments. Whereas the forgery-proof tech being able to fail means no photo with "forgery proof data" can be trusted.
- Zerverus 4y ago
  That scenario does not exist. It’s like with bank cards where everyone in the judicial system for years agreed that they were safe and only when it couldn’t denied anymore suddenly it took another 3 years for the system to reflect that. A) cryptography is hard. Chances of Sony getting it right are not good. Chances of critical flaws being found later are basically infinite. B) 99.9% doesn’t exist with technology. Once it’s broken the exploit can be scaled.
ChrisLomont 4y ago
It would be extremely hard for almost anyone to do so, and they can use signatures with per camera tokens as well as global ones. That way compromising one camera doesn't compromise all. And there is a lot more stuff they can do to prevent such naive attacks. By your simple reasoning, all iphones would be cracked, yet even the USA govt hasn't been able to crack into them. And what they propose is vastly better than doing nothing.
- myrryr 4y ago
  They need to do no such thing. They never need to access the key, or anything remotely like it. They do need to push other images from where the sensor would be :). And is it better than nothing? I think having having which people may treat ad evidence which is trivial to fake is worse than something which people won't treat as evidence
  - ChrisLomont 4y ago
    >They do need to push other images from where the sensor would be :). Yes, taking a new photo. However, a photo of a photo is going to show artifacts in the frequency spectrum that should not be difficult to detect. So they cannot edit a picture, even trying to feed it back into the sensor. And. if the signing is built into the die of the sensor, it would take incredible resources to even attempt to feed new data into the sensor grid itself, tech vastly beyond anyone but a nation state. >I think having having which people may treat ad evidence which is trivial to fake is worse than something which people won't treat as evidence So you're against police body cams, because everyday people might be faking all the bad police interactions? Because all cameras I've looked into would be easier to tamper with than one designed with signed images that's done well.
- noodlesUK 4y ago
  > By your simple reasoning, all iphones would be cracked, yet even the USA govt hasn't been able to crack into them. I don’t think this is quite the right takeaway. What the threat model is for this is not that you’d be able to crack any iPhone you like in whatever circumstances, but rather more like jail breaking one. Jailbreaks definitely exist, and depending on your need, you’d only need to jailbreak one, once. Even with a per-device token, if what you need is to generate a validly signed photo that has been manipulated (say for a passport photo or forensics), you’d be able to do that.

TeeMassive 4y ago

It will be very hard to extract those keys while hiding evidence of tempering. Yes that leaves the threat of state actors, but they will probably have they keys anyway and still the technology will be good 99.99% of the time which means good enough for most intent and purposes.

josephcsible 4y ago
> It will be very hard to extract those keys while hiding evidence of tempering. Why do you need to hide evidence of tampering? You're not supposed to need the camera to later verify its signatures. > good 99.99% of the time That's a bigger disaster than not having this technology at all, because now the 0.01% of forgers will be able to say "look, my photo can't be a forgery, it's digitally signed!" and convince a lot of people who would otherwise disbelieve it.
- bradstewart 4y ago
  > Why do you need to hide evidence of tampering? If I know my camera was tampered with, I can invalidate the signing key.
  - josephcsible 4y ago
    The forgers aren't going to use your camera. They're going to use their own.
    - TeeMassive 4y ago
      Then they won't be able to generate a signature with that same camera.
coldtea 4y ago
>the technology will be good 99.99% of the time This is the kind of technology that's useless if it's not good 100% of the time. Parachutes can be useful even if they open 99.999% of the time. But this is either 100% cryptograhical proven forgery-proof or it isn't. There's no "good enough" middle ground. You care for forgery-proof when important things are hanging on that being the case.
- lazide 4y ago
  And important things don’t hang from parachutes? Nothing is ever 100%
  - SXX 4y ago
    While in cryptography there is never 100% we tend to expect crypto not to have have serious known flaws and require great amounts of compute power, time and energy for brute-force attack. E.g cryptocurrency is "safe" because cost of attack is too high and require too much resources. On other side this Sony Camera-DRM is not just useless, but dangerous especially since Sony have well established track record with backdoors and cryptography: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootkit_scandal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootk... https://www.engadget.com/2010-12-29-hackers-obtain-ps3-private-cryptography-key-due-to-epic-programm.html https://www.engadget.com/2010-12-29-hackers-obtain-ps3-priva... https://www.pcworld.com/article/411221/backdoor-accounts-found-in-80-sony-ip-security-camera-models.html https://www.pcworld.com/article/411221/backdoor-accounts-fou...
    - lazide 4y ago
      None of what you’re saying appears to be pertinent in this issue, since the primary objections appear to not be related to the crypto but to the end-to-end validation? Which it’s still likely better than the current situation, which is photoshops ahoy everywhere.
  - coldtea 4y ago
    >And important things don’t hang from parachutes? They do. But we're ok with some losses now and then, if it means parachutes still saves tons of lives... The thing is a parachute failing doesn't affect other deployments. Whereas the forgery-proof tech being able to fail means no photo with "forgery proof data" can be trusted.
Zerverus 4y ago
That scenario does not exist. It’s like with bank cards where everyone in the judicial system for years agreed that they were safe and only when it couldn’t denied anymore suddenly it took another 3 years for the system to reflect that. A) cryptography is hard. Chances of Sony getting it right are not good. Chances of critical flaws being found later are basically infinite. B) 99.9% doesn’t exist with technology. Once it’s broken the exploit can be scaled.

ChrisLomont 4y ago

It would be extremely hard for almost anyone to do so, and they can use signatures with per camera tokens as well as global ones. That way compromising one camera doesn't compromise all. And there is a lot more stuff they can do to prevent such naive attacks. By your simple reasoning, all iphones would be cracked, yet even the USA govt hasn't been able to crack into them. And what they propose is vastly better than doing nothing.

myrryr 4y ago
They need to do no such thing. They never need to access the key, or anything remotely like it. They do need to push other images from where the sensor would be :). And is it better than nothing? I think having having which people may treat ad evidence which is trivial to fake is worse than something which people won't treat as evidence
- ChrisLomont 4y ago
  >They do need to push other images from where the sensor would be :). Yes, taking a new photo. However, a photo of a photo is going to show artifacts in the frequency spectrum that should not be difficult to detect. So they cannot edit a picture, even trying to feed it back into the sensor. And. if the signing is built into the die of the sensor, it would take incredible resources to even attempt to feed new data into the sensor grid itself, tech vastly beyond anyone but a nation state. >I think having having which people may treat ad evidence which is trivial to fake is worse than something which people won't treat as evidence So you're against police body cams, because everyday people might be faking all the bad police interactions? Because all cameras I've looked into would be easier to tamper with than one designed with signed images that's done well.
noodlesUK 4y ago
> By your simple reasoning, all iphones would be cracked, yet even the USA govt hasn't been able to crack into them. I don’t think this is quite the right takeaway. What the threat model is for this is not that you’d be able to crack any iPhone you like in whatever circumstances, but rather more like jail breaking one. Jailbreaks definitely exist, and depending on your need, you’d only need to jailbreak one, once. Even with a per-device token, if what you need is to generate a validly signed photo that has been manipulated (say for a passport photo or forensics), you’d be able to do that.