So in the acoup essay actually referenced by NavalGazing >>>That thinking actually took a while to take hold in actual American policy and instead during the 1

So in the acoup essay actually referenced by NavalGazing >>>That thinking actually took a while to take hold in actual American policy and instead during the 1940s and 1950s, the United States focused resources on bomber fleets with the assumption that they would match Soviet superiority in conventional arms in Europe with American nuclear superiority So in my simplified view, while RAND corporation had "nuclear stalemate / MAD" as a concept in 48, this did not take root in American foreign policy till the 60s and Kennedy - so the oft cited battles between Kennedy and Curtis Le May where (probably personal as well) but a chnage in policy based on a new understanding of nuclear realities - that they could not use nukes to wipe out the Russian Tank invasion because that just immediately starts a nuclear war. And this links to development of missile technology - as long and medium range unstoppable ballistic missiles came into being the idea of limiting a nuclear war to Europe or having "acceptable losses" stopped becoming doctrine and was finally overturned by Kennedy and subsequent presidents - so it is possible for eisenhower and kennedy to have the sensible response in the respective periods (NB there is footage of Kennedy and eisenthower on a phone call discussing actions during Cuba - and it's just ... normal confused uncertain human beings. It's the best explanation of why we should not have one person making these sort of decisions - no human is up to it. So from a point of view, Kennedy did have a weaker hand because he had a weaker conventional force (in Europe). Interesting