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They say that I'm against progress when I say that I'm contrary to all this new things that are adding to cars since they are dangerous. And this article proves

They say that I'm against progress when I say that I'm contrary to all this new things that are adding to cars since they are dangerous. And this article proves my point of view, if who made the software used publicly available encryption keys (one that knows what it's doing knows that to generate them with openssl you take 1 second) how can that software be trusted? To me self-driving car and all that amount of stuff is simply dangerous, what if someone hacks a million of self-driving cars? What damage can he do? A disaster, worse than hacking a nuclear power plant... and I said coding standard for this kind of vehicle is not minimally comparable to the one of nuclear power plants. We are talking about people that till yesterday did program the offline car radio software that now are programming software that can take the control of the vehicle.

AlotOfReading 4y ago
I've been involved with the software side at a few companies producing autonomous vehicles and took a look at SSG-39 to see how much better nuke standards are. They're pretty dang similar to automotive standards (UL4600, SOTIF, etc). The difference is in the regulatory environment and execution. Automotive software is not well-regulated and most OEMs don't think either the software or the people that produce it are worth investing in. I regularly have disagreements with systems folks about whether we should focus on actual sources of quality issues like memory safety or the checklist items that regulators are going to look at like whether the compiler is verified.
- alerighi 4y ago
  Automobile software has good standard for critical parts. The problem is all the software never considered a remote attack, since it was not connected to the internet. The CAN bus was local and the only way to interact was to physically connect to the bus, thus it has no security built in (every device can send any command since every device is trusted). Now to enable all the smart stuff there is a connection between the car bus and the internet, of course indirectly trough the entratainment system, but if for example the entratainment system (for which coding standards are bad) is exploited, you have full access to the bus and thus can send commands to various parts of the car, which is very bad!
  - AlotOfReading 4y ago
    That's not how any car I know of works. Infotainment stuff can't go on the CAN bus due to bandwidth limitations. It's usually on its own network. Historically that was MOST, now it's usually Ethernet (or A2B for some specific components). That network may be bridged to other networks like CAN with a locked down gateway module, but frankly even that design is out of style due to security issues. If you know a manufacturer putting radio devices on the CAN bus, by all means name and shame. I'd be morbidly curious because of how obviously terrible an idea that is.

AlotOfReading 4y ago

I've been involved with the software side at a few companies producing autonomous vehicles and took a look at SSG-39 to see how much better nuke standards are. They're pretty dang similar to automotive standards (UL4600, SOTIF, etc). The difference is in the regulatory environment and execution. Automotive software is not well-regulated and most OEMs don't think either the software or the people that produce it are worth investing in. I regularly have disagreements with systems folks about whether we should focus on actual sources of quality issues like memory safety or the checklist items that regulators are going to look at like whether the compiler is verified.

alerighi 4y ago
Automobile software has good standard for critical parts. The problem is all the software never considered a remote attack, since it was not connected to the internet. The CAN bus was local and the only way to interact was to physically connect to the bus, thus it has no security built in (every device can send any command since every device is trusted). Now to enable all the smart stuff there is a connection between the car bus and the internet, of course indirectly trough the entratainment system, but if for example the entratainment system (for which coding standards are bad) is exploited, you have full access to the bus and thus can send commands to various parts of the car, which is very bad!
- AlotOfReading 4y ago
  That's not how any car I know of works. Infotainment stuff can't go on the CAN bus due to bandwidth limitations. It's usually on its own network. Historically that was MOST, now it's usually Ethernet (or A2B for some specific components). That network may be bridged to other networks like CAN with a locked down gateway module, but frankly even that design is out of style due to security issues. If you know a manufacturer putting radio devices on the CAN bus, by all means name and shame. I'd be morbidly curious because of how obviously terrible an idea that is.