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The idea that many vendors have is an agent on the client and server that scrutinizes every connection, at both ends, based on policy and/or entitlement to spec
by mberning 4y ago
The idea that many vendors have is an agent on the client and server that scrutinizes every connection, at both ends, based on policy and/or entitlement to specific resources. For an enterprise this means not having to worry as much about locking down your internal network as it is no longer the only boundary. In reality this is a very tall order. All your internal systems, legacy systems, cloud vendors, etc. have to be on board. The reality is a hybrid solution with all the attendant complexity.
- trashtester 4y agoGood point. I would also like as an argument that the hybrid approach should be seen as having multiple lines of defense. A corporate network should have an outer boundary that is hard-ish to penetrate. Personal devices should either require approval or use some kind of vpn to access any part of this network. Inside, the network should be divided into subnets with their own border protections, in case an attacker penetrates the outer shell/userland. For all subnets, zero-trust should be implemented when possible, even for communication within a subnet. Finally, monitoring should be in place to listen for unusual activity, whether that is unusual or suspicious traffic, unexpected changes in configurations of nodes on the network, etc.