5 ms·

...and none of them use chip backdoors, because they just aren't needed. Despite my earlier comments, I think your point is essentially correct - at least it's

...and none of them use chip backdoors, because they just aren't needed. Despite my earlier comments, I think your point is essentially correct - at least it's so when it comes to what we normally consider as criminal behavior. However, that's not necessarily the case when it comes to manufacturers and or state actors who have the power to force manufacturers to secretly install backdoors into chips. Take the case of Huawei and the ban certain countries have placed on telco carriers using its telecommunications equipment. I'm not privy to the reasons as to why certain governments have banned Huawei but one doesn't have to be Einstein to read between the lines in that it would be almost impossible to check every chip in imported Huawei switches (even if it were practicably feasible (which is doubtful) then any such checking would make the normally-competitive Huawei considerably more expensive for telcos to install than if they were to purchase from its competitors). Huawei is and has been on a solid push to develop its own technologies, to quote Wiki "Meanwhile, it was reverse-engineering imported switches and investing heavily in research and development to manufacture its own technologies". With the support, authority and might of the Chinese Government it's not hard to imagine that a chip with a backdoor could be implanted in such equipment. Moreover, this may not happen immediately but rather some years later after an innocuous maintenance fix long after all the original brouhaha had died down.

schoen 4y ago
A more optimistic (!) theory I have is that devices are getting software updates over the Internet from their manufacturers, and a government might try to induce a manufacturer to remotely brick or backdoor devices in a hostile country in the future, even if the devices weren't backdoored at the time they were sold. This could happen even if the manufacturer didn't even intend for it to be a possibility, once other people realized that the manufacturer was capable of going through with it. I remember that, at the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some Americans immediately got angry with Apple for not pushing software updates to disable Russians' iPhones. If people -- albeit members of the public and not actual Apple executives -- are going to strongly insist that this would be reasonable or appropriate, it's not very surprising that people in various countries would become frightened of this possibility! (The reason this theory is "more optimistic" is just that it's conceivable in principle that vendors and customers could find ways to work together to protect against it.)
- trasz 4y ago
  Russia is a completely different situation though - they invaded another country and are perpetrating genocide, which means that anything that hurts Russia should be a fair game. A full data leak would be even better - but sadly in this case we have Apple caring more about PR than morality. This of course ignores the strategic needs. First, it should be a priority to get as many Russians to migrate to the West, to starve the regime of manpower. Second, losing could be Putin’s eventual aim, to make sure Russia gets cut off the outside world, to make it possible for them to shape the society however they want - and in that case preserving the means of communication is even more crucial.
  - omniglottal 4y ago
    The "different situation" you point out simply does not justify back doors. Having a purportedly valid use does nothing to cicumvent their undesirable nature and our need to eshew them entirely. This "difference" has no relevance over whether or not back doors should be tolerated in society because the reasons to have precisely none are so profound. "They" invaded, you say? All the Russian iPhone users, was it? Is it true that zero Russian owners of iPhones were supportive of Ukraine and using their iPhones to organize and communicate anti-Putin protests? And Apple is the enforcer to whom the (US) public should appeal? Yeah, that's a hard "nope".
    - trasz 4y ago
      I agree about backdoors not being acceptable, but we are talking about using legitimate software update mechanisms, not backdoors. As for “not everyone is an active supporter” - governments exist to represent people. From this it naturally follows that the people should bear consequences of their governments’ actions. Its not the first Russian invasion, they had plenty of time to leave the country. Again - at this point, if something can destabilize Russia, then it’s a fair game from ethical point of view. It’s just lesser evil. But then of course there’s the strategic point of view. US approaching Russia in a surprisingly merciful and humane manner, and there are reasons for this.
  - funnyfacts365 4y ago
px43 4y ago
All telecom equipment has "legal intercept" hooks to allow full monitoring by law enforcement in whatever jurisdiction the devices are sold in. You don't need special backdoor chips, the backdoors in telecom equipment are a feature, often legally mandated. These routers are also often riddled with bugs that are well known to any well funded intelligence group. No need for special chips. These are the bugs that intelligence agencies are paying for: https://zerodium.com/program.html https://zerodium.com/program.html With these bugs they get all the access they need.
- alphabetting 4y ago
  >All telecom equipment has "legal intercept" hooks to allow full monitoring by law enforcement in whatever jurisdiction the devices are sold in. You don't need special backdoor chips Aren't the data on chips and with telecoms pretty different? Feels like government would want to monitor what someone is doing on their computer and their communications.
  - salawat 4y ago
    What do you think telecom equipment is implemented with? Chips and firmware.If it isn't in the microcode, it's an embedded system package. You can thank CALEA.
- hilbert42 4y ago
  "All telecom equipment has "legal intercept" hooks to allow full monitoring by law enforcement in whatever jurisdiction the devices are sold in." None of that is in dispute and everyone of relevance knows it. However that's not the point I was making which is that at the highest level of intergovernmental spying things are different. Simply, sleeper backdoors are invisible to all but the perpetrator and they act stenographically when the perpetrator has the need. The technology may change but there's nothing new in this approach, it's centuries old and has a proven track record.

schoen 4y ago

A more optimistic (!) theory I have is that devices are getting software updates over the Internet from their manufacturers, and a government might try to induce a manufacturer to remotely brick or backdoor devices in a hostile country in the future, even if the devices weren't backdoored at the time they were sold. This could happen even if the manufacturer didn't even intend for it to be a possibility, once other people realized that the manufacturer was capable of going through with it. I remember that, at the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some Americans immediately got angry with Apple for not pushing software updates to disable Russians' iPhones. If people -- albeit members of the public and not actual Apple executives -- are going to strongly insist that this would be reasonable or appropriate, it's not very surprising that people in various countries would become frightened of this possibility! (The reason this theory is "more optimistic" is just that it's conceivable in principle that vendors and customers could find ways to work together to protect against it.)

trasz 4y ago
Russia is a completely different situation though - they invaded another country and are perpetrating genocide, which means that anything that hurts Russia should be a fair game. A full data leak would be even better - but sadly in this case we have Apple caring more about PR than morality. This of course ignores the strategic needs. First, it should be a priority to get as many Russians to migrate to the West, to starve the regime of manpower. Second, losing could be Putin’s eventual aim, to make sure Russia gets cut off the outside world, to make it possible for them to shape the society however they want - and in that case preserving the means of communication is even more crucial.
- omniglottal 4y ago
  The "different situation" you point out simply does not justify back doors. Having a purportedly valid use does nothing to cicumvent their undesirable nature and our need to eshew them entirely. This "difference" has no relevance over whether or not back doors should be tolerated in society because the reasons to have precisely none are so profound. "They" invaded, you say? All the Russian iPhone users, was it? Is it true that zero Russian owners of iPhones were supportive of Ukraine and using their iPhones to organize and communicate anti-Putin protests? And Apple is the enforcer to whom the (US) public should appeal? Yeah, that's a hard "nope".
  - trasz 4y ago
    I agree about backdoors not being acceptable, but we are talking about using legitimate software update mechanisms, not backdoors. As for “not everyone is an active supporter” - governments exist to represent people. From this it naturally follows that the people should bear consequences of their governments’ actions. Its not the first Russian invasion, they had plenty of time to leave the country. Again - at this point, if something can destabilize Russia, then it’s a fair game from ethical point of view. It’s just lesser evil. But then of course there’s the strategic point of view. US approaching Russia in a surprisingly merciful and humane manner, and there are reasons for this.
- funnyfacts365 4y ago

px43 4y ago

All telecom equipment has "legal intercept" hooks to allow full monitoring by law enforcement in whatever jurisdiction the devices are sold in. You don't need special backdoor chips, the backdoors in telecom equipment are a feature, often legally mandated. These routers are also often riddled with bugs that are well known to any well funded intelligence group. No need for special chips. These are the bugs that intelligence agencies are paying for: https://zerodium.com/program.html https://zerodium.com/program.html With these bugs they get all the access they need.

alphabetting 4y ago
>All telecom equipment has "legal intercept" hooks to allow full monitoring by law enforcement in whatever jurisdiction the devices are sold in. You don't need special backdoor chips Aren't the data on chips and with telecoms pretty different? Feels like government would want to monitor what someone is doing on their computer and their communications.
- salawat 4y ago
  What do you think telecom equipment is implemented with? Chips and firmware.If it isn't in the microcode, it's an embedded system package. You can thank CALEA.
hilbert42 4y ago
"All telecom equipment has "legal intercept" hooks to allow full monitoring by law enforcement in whatever jurisdiction the devices are sold in." None of that is in dispute and everyone of relevance knows it. However that's not the point I was making which is that at the highest level of intergovernmental spying things are different. Simply, sleeper backdoors are invisible to all but the perpetrator and they act stenographically when the perpetrator has the need. The technology may change but there's nothing new in this approach, it's centuries old and has a proven track record.