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SMS- or TOTP-based 2FA doesn't save you here. The phishing site is designed to look like the real login form. The victim enters their username and password, a
by kelnos 4y ago
SMS- or TOTP-based 2FA doesn't save you here. The phishing site is designed to look like the real login form. The victim enters their username and password, and the phishing site forwards the username and password to the real site's login form, which triggers the "real" 2FA process. Victim enters a TOTP code (or SMS code) into the fake site, and boom, the attackers now have a valid username, password, and 2FA code, as long as they use it quickly enough. Assuming they do, then they have a valid session cookie that they can use wherever they like, which can often be refreshed before expiration without re-authing.
The only 2FA that protects against this is a hardware token, like a Yubikey, if used in U2F/FIDO2 mode. Twilio does use Yubikeys for some roles and access types, but not all, and presumably there was enough sensitive data that was only gated by TOTP 2FA.
I think in this day and age, if I were running a company infosec department, I would mandate U2F/FIDO2 for access to every system, and try to structure things so employees don't need to access company systems on their mobile device. (Yes, I know it's possible to do hardware 2FA on mobile, but I feel like it'd create a large IT support burden since it's not always so straightforward.) And if there are company services that aren't suitable for hardware 2FA, they need to be rare exceptions that are granted, and need to be firewalled off from the rest of the company.