4 ms·
If anyone is curious, the courtlistener link for the lawsuit is here: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/64872195/bernstein-v-national-institute-of-standards-
by jcranmer 4y ago
If anyone is curious, the courtlistener link for the lawsuit is here: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/64872195/bernstein-v-national-institute-of-standards-and-technology/ https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/64872195/bernstein-v-na...
(And somebody has already kindly uploaded the documents to RECAP, so it costs you nothing to access.)
Aside: I really wish people would link to court documents whenever they talk about an ongoing lawsuit.
- Natsu 4y ago> Aside: I really wish people would link to court documents whenever they talk about an ongoing lawsuit. I just want to second that and thank you for the link. Most reporting is just horribly bad at covering legal stuff because all the stuff that makes headlines that people click on is mostly nonsense.
- AndyMcConachie 4y agoAnd a big thank you to the wonderful people at the Free Law Project for giving us the ability to find and link to this stuff. They're a non-profit and they accept donations. (hint hint)
- tptacek 4y agoIt's just a vanilla FOIA lawsuit, of the kind hundreds of people file every month when public bodies fuck up FOIA. If NIST puts up any kind of fight (I don't know why they would), it'll be fun to watch Matt and Wayne, you know, win a FOIA case. There's a lot of nerd utility in knowing more about how FOIA works! But you're not going to get the secrets of the Kennedy assassination by reading this thing.
- chasil 4y agoI will draw to your attention two interesting facts. First, OpenSSH has disregarded the winning (crystals) variants, and implemented hybrid NTRU-Prime. The Bernstein blog post discusses hybrid designs. "Use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com"). The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange (the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security as the status quo." https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html Second, Daniel Bernstein has filed a public complaint against the NIST process, and the FOIA stonewalling adds more concern and doubt that the current results are fair. https://www.google.com/url?q=https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/group/pqc-forum/attach/6f5422d4f193d/complaint-re-apon.pdf%3Fpart%3D0.0.1&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwipx_av07H5AhUUhIkEHWReCvMQFnoECAcQAg&usg=AOvVaw1LzwGP-O8OkCw1IJjU96V5 https://www.google.com/url?q=https://groups.google.com/a/lis... What are the aims of the lawsuit? Can the NIST decision on crystals be overturned by the court, and is that the goal?
- tptacek 4y agoWhat are the aims of the lawsuit? NIST fucked up a FOIA response. The thing you do when a public body gives you an unsatisfactory FOIA response is that you sue them. I've been involved in similar suits. I'd be surprised if NIST doesn't just cough up the documents to make this go away. "Can NIST's decisions on crystals be overturned by the court?" Let me help you out with that: no, you can't use a FOIA suit to "overturn" a NIST contest. OpenSSH implemneted NTRU-Prime? What's your point? That we should just do whatever the OpenSSH team decides to do? I almost agree! But then, if that's the case, none of this matters.
- adrian_b 4y agoI assume that the point was that NSA is against using hybrid algorithms like the one used by OpenSSH, which combine a traditional algorithm with a post-quantum algorithm, arguing that using both algorithms is an unnecessary complication. The position of D. J. Bernstein and also of the OpenSSH team is that the prudent approach is to use only hybrid algorithms until enough experience is gained with the post-quantum algorithms, to be reasonably certain that they are secure against the possible attacks. If they obtain the documents requested through FOIA, it is expected that they will support the opinion that the NSA recommendations should be ignored, because they have a very long history in making attempts to convince the public that certain cryptographic algorithms are secure enough, even when they were aware of weaknesses in those algorithms that they could exploit, so it was in their interest that everybody else should use them, to facilitate the NSA's tasks. As explained at the linked Web page, in the past NSA has forced the standardization of algorithms that had too short keys, i.e. DES and DSA, and has made partially-successful attempts to standardize back-doored algorithms like Clipper and their infamous random bit generator. Similarly now, they want to enforce the use of only the post-quantum winning algorithm, without the additional protection of combining it with a traditional algorithm.
- tptacek 4y agoFucking everybody's position is to combine classical key exchanges with PQC KEMs. It wasn't NIST's job to standardize a classical+PQC construction. The point of the contest is to figure out which PQC constructions to use. NIST also didn't recommend that everyone implement their cryptographic handshakes in a memory-safe language. But not doing that is going to get a bunch of people owned by NSA too. Do you see how silly this argument is?