I tend to think that the problem that underlies all of this is the old question for a sound inductive method, or a deductive method that can replace it. Many B

I tend to think that the problem that underlies all of this is the old question for a sound inductive method, or a deductive method that can replace it. Many Bayesian theoreticists are already named in the comments, for a frequentist view that is well developed and quite strong (i.e. not a strawman) I want to suggest Deborah Mayo’s “Error and the Growth of Empirical Knowledge”. This is related in the following sense to the article: I think the solution for the named ettors may be to stop teaching as if either Bayesianism or Frequentism were set truths and all statistical foundation problems anyway solved, and giving more info on what evidence is and why we think this specific set of tools will help us to prove anything at all. Bayesianism comes with it’s own set of problems, starting with the philosophical underpinnings of it’s flavor of probability, to the often researched theory that humans and scientists are actually not Bayesian thinkers by birth (Giere, Kahneman, Tversky).