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In general I don't believe that being an engineer is necessary to run a technology business (some of my best leaders were not), but I have come around to believ

In general I don't believe that being an engineer is necessary to run a technology business (some of my best leaders were not), but I have come around to believing that Intel and Boeing are exceptions: the nature of their business requires new massive bets- not quite 'bet the company' but definitely 'bet the next 10 years of company performance' every so often (new fabs and new planes), and that one decision really needs to be made by an experienced engineer, due to the nature of the underlying evaluation. If not, then people who think they can bafflegab mother nature the same way they can auditors will make the decisions.

neuronexmachina 4y ago
An interesting example is Dennis Muilenberg, who was Boeing CEO from 2015-2019, during the 737 Max debacle: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg He started at Boeing in 1985 as an engineering intern, earned a masters in Aeronautics, and worked his way through management and engineering positions until he became CEO. I have no idea how much of the 737 Max issues could be placed on him directly, but he was CEO during its launch and the crashes.
- nickff 4y ago
  Dennis Muilenberg also featured in the NOVA documentary "War of the X-Planes", around the middle of his career, where he appeared to be a risk-taking, forward-thinking engineering manager. Of note, I believe that a significant portion of his career was spent on the 'defense' side of Boeing, which some have blamed for the company's problems. I personally place more blame on Muilenberg's predecessor, James McNerney, a former Proctor & Gamble, and 3M executive.
- mandevil 4y ago
  The key 737 Max decisions were made circa 2011-2013, while James McNerney was the CEO (2005-2015). That was when the design objective of no simulator training required was set for the plane (and Boeing released marketing information promising that) while also promising to do it with engines that were too big for the wings. That decision was what led to everything else, and was loudly announced and marketed while Muilenburg was over on the Integrated Defense side of the company. James McNerney was a Harvard MBA who spent time at McKinsey before going to the Jack Welch clown show at GE, where he ran the aircraft engine business for a long time. When he lost out to Immelt to be CEO there, he went to 3M for a few years then bounced to Boeing. Now, Muilenburg has to bear the mistakes he made: pushing an unsafe plane through certification, not listening to the right people, not investigating the Lion Air crash sufficiently, etc. But the evidence I think strongly shows that someone who was not an engineer was making the final decisions on the "bet the company for the next 10 years" choice to go forward with the 737Max rather than a clean-sheet design, back in 2011.
  - swyx 4y ago
    just looked McNerney up. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney for his contributions to society, he made between 12-29m/year every year for the 10 years he was CEO. ugh
    - metadat 4y ago
      Yet another case [in a long line] of pedigree over meritocracy.
  - Spooky23 4y ago
    It’s funny. I worked in a geography with a lot of GE alums. The ICs were really good for the most part, hard workers, smart but reserved. The managers and executives turned consultants went out of their way to tell you about how they met Jack Welch or got screamed at by Jack Welch, etc. It was weird, and moreover, they almost without exception idiots.
    - dmix 4y ago
      The peak of the MBA-management culture era: "-with the right kind of eyes you can almost see the high water mark — that place where the wave finally broke, and rolled back" -HST
spaetzleesser 4y ago
I think it boils down to the messaging that comes from top. Do they mainly talk about creating the best products or do they talk about shareholder value?
mandevil 4y ago
Just wanted to clarify that singling out Boeing and Intel specifically was not my intention: I really meant commercial aircraft and semiconductors industries as a whole, using those two companies as a syndoche, because of the massive investment and large time delays between the commitment of money and the result in the market. Those two in particular seem to require regular, hugely expensive (10+ billion dollar) efforts of 5-10 years in duration to keep up the pace of technical development, so picking the wrong horse is catastrophic for a long while. (Obviously the A380 never killed anyone like the 737Max did, but it definitely was a massive, 25 billion dollar sinkhole for the company- some estimates are that Airbus never even turned a profit on the flyaway cost of the airplane, excluding development costs! If Boeing hadn't simultaneously had the 737Max actual disaster, it would have been much worse for Airbus. Intel has seen TSMC power ahead, which has made their problems more obvious.)

neuronexmachina 4y ago

An interesting example is Dennis Muilenberg, who was Boeing CEO from 2015-2019, during the 737 Max debacle: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg He started at Boeing in 1985 as an engineering intern, earned a masters in Aeronautics, and worked his way through management and engineering positions until he became CEO. I have no idea how much of the 737 Max issues could be placed on him directly, but he was CEO during its launch and the crashes.

nickff 4y ago
Dennis Muilenberg also featured in the NOVA documentary "War of the X-Planes", around the middle of his career, where he appeared to be a risk-taking, forward-thinking engineering manager. Of note, I believe that a significant portion of his career was spent on the 'defense' side of Boeing, which some have blamed for the company's problems. I personally place more blame on Muilenberg's predecessor, James McNerney, a former Proctor & Gamble, and 3M executive.
mandevil 4y ago
The key 737 Max decisions were made circa 2011-2013, while James McNerney was the CEO (2005-2015). That was when the design objective of no simulator training required was set for the plane (and Boeing released marketing information promising that) while also promising to do it with engines that were too big for the wings. That decision was what led to everything else, and was loudly announced and marketed while Muilenburg was over on the Integrated Defense side of the company. James McNerney was a Harvard MBA who spent time at McKinsey before going to the Jack Welch clown show at GE, where he ran the aircraft engine business for a long time. When he lost out to Immelt to be CEO there, he went to 3M for a few years then bounced to Boeing. Now, Muilenburg has to bear the mistakes he made: pushing an unsafe plane through certification, not listening to the right people, not investigating the Lion Air crash sufficiently, etc. But the evidence I think strongly shows that someone who was not an engineer was making the final decisions on the "bet the company for the next 10 years" choice to go forward with the 737Max rather than a clean-sheet design, back in 2011.
- swyx 4y ago
  just looked McNerney up. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney for his contributions to society, he made between 12-29m/year every year for the 10 years he was CEO. ugh
  - metadat 4y ago
    Yet another case [in a long line] of pedigree over meritocracy.
- Spooky23 4y ago
  It’s funny. I worked in a geography with a lot of GE alums. The ICs were really good for the most part, hard workers, smart but reserved. The managers and executives turned consultants went out of their way to tell you about how they met Jack Welch or got screamed at by Jack Welch, etc. It was weird, and moreover, they almost without exception idiots.
  - dmix 4y ago
    The peak of the MBA-management culture era: "-with the right kind of eyes you can almost see the high water mark — that place where the wave finally broke, and rolled back" -HST

spaetzleesser 4y ago

I think it boils down to the messaging that comes from top. Do they mainly talk about creating the best products or do they talk about shareholder value?

mandevil 4y ago

Just wanted to clarify that singling out Boeing and Intel specifically was not my intention: I really meant commercial aircraft and semiconductors industries as a whole, using those two companies as a syndoche, because of the massive investment and large time delays between the commitment of money and the result in the market. Those two in particular seem to require regular, hugely expensive (10+ billion dollar) efforts of 5-10 years in duration to keep up the pace of technical development, so picking the wrong horse is catastrophic for a long while. (Obviously the A380 never killed anyone like the 737Max did, but it definitely was a massive, 25 billion dollar sinkhole for the company- some estimates are that Airbus never even turned a profit on the flyaway cost of the airplane, excluding development costs! If Boeing hadn't simultaneously had the 737Max actual disaster, it would have been much worse for Airbus. Intel has seen TSMC power ahead, which has made their problems more obvious.)