2 ms·
this just tells the adversary that "a message could be there". Given that information, they still need to find out which bytes are information-carrying This is
by waitwhat 15y ago
this just tells the adversary that "a message could be there". Given that information, they still need to find out which bytes are information-carrying
This is true as far as it goes. It should be noted, however, that in many threat models for steganography, this problem is solved through rubber-hose cryptanalysis. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis
- mbq 15y agoUse few layers of public services and you won't find who to use rubber hose on... the real (and fundamental) problem is how to securely sneak the key in a way that you can still trust it.
- tripzilch 15y agoGood point, as soon as they know "a message could be there", they got motivation to hit extra hard with that rubber-hose until something comes out. Slightly less awful than torture, you also lose plausible deniability in a legal setting, or even other situations. I agree the most important thing about stego is that the existence of the message is not discovered at all. Sounds like that means encryption before stego is pretty much useless, then? Still something in my head says "better safe than sorry", even though you're not mitigating all that much risk. A better idea might be to compress the message before stego. That way you need to hide less bits, even though the bits will be distributed like white noise, which can be harder to hide, but could perhaps also be something that can be relied on in some sense.