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> The nature of ground (or surface naval) warfare will be profoundly changed. This is to bullets and shells what bullets and shells were to pikes. They said th

> The nature of ground (or surface naval) warfare will be profoundly changed. This is to bullets and shells what bullets and shells were to pikes. They said this about torpedo boats, submarines, tanks, and guided munitions among others. It will require countermeasures and changes in tactics but I doubt much will change. Since these systems are cheap and slow everyone else will have them too and they will be easy to shoot down.

ethbr0 4y ago
Torpedo boats led to substantially-reinforced secondary batteries on capital ships and eventually mixed composition fleets. Submarines led to ASW (as a doctrine and embodied in single-purpose aerial and surface platforms). Tanks led to ATGMs and decades of penetrator and armor evolution. Guided munitions (and specifically, nuclear ones) led to radically dispersed combat and logistics deployments and the C3 necessary to support them. All of those are very big changes. The most likely effect of loitering munitions will be a revolution in SHORAD and an understanding that even dug-in infantry can't operate outside of an air defense bubble. Or countries with the manpower and ethical flexibility going all-in on poorly-equipped cheap numbers over exquisite platforms.
- dredmorbius 4y ago
  Capital ships are hardly the only, or even primary, target of submarines. Cargo shipping was, and will likely be. Further, submarine warfare by the US against Japan during WWII was absolutely devastating to Japan's ability to supply raw materials for its own war effort. Japan was (and is) an extraordinarily capable and productive country, but, thanks to its volcanic geology, also extraordinarily limited in crucial raw materials, particularly iron and fuels (coal, oil), both of which are formed or concentrated largely through long-term biological activity. The U.S. had become aware of these costs itself due to the earlier actions of German U-boat operations against both intracoastal and transatlantic shipping early in WWII. In March 1943 alone German U-boats sank over 100 Allied vessels, mostly cargo. One consequence of the attacks against US oil shipments was the construction of inland oil pipelines, the "Big Inch" and "Little Inch", as government projects, during the war. These remain in use AFIAU. Later, one of the first projects following establishing a beachhead in Normandy was to run an oil pipeline across the English Channel. (Daniel Yergin's The Prize coves all of this, and I'm relying on it for specifics.) We're familiar with the notion of coal and oil forming over hundred-million-year intervals. Most iron-ore deposits are multi-billion year old accumulations, many predating the Great Oxygenation Event. Present long-distance transport modes (sea and air) are reliant on cheap fuels, large vehicles (both aircraft and ships become more efficient with size, within limits), and secure passage along routes. I was struck a few years ago how the development of large-scale long-distance cargo shipping largely paralleled the evolution of large-scale long-distance whale species. Both rely on the fundamental greater efficiency of long bodies moving through water ("hull speed"), the existence of widely-spaced reward (cargo/payment, food source) locations, and the ability to traverse such routes with little risk. Human-based whale hunting absolutely annihilated whale populations, which crashed to a few percent of their pre-hunt levels. In instances in which combat regions have emperilled commercial aviation flights, airlines have acted quickly to route around such regions, even at the cost of much longer travel (and higher fuel costs). A reintroduction of anti-shipping naval-warefare activities, and unlimited targeting of commercial aviation, would have profound effects.

ethbr0 4y ago

Torpedo boats led to substantially-reinforced secondary batteries on capital ships and eventually mixed composition fleets. Submarines led to ASW (as a doctrine and embodied in single-purpose aerial and surface platforms). Tanks led to ATGMs and decades of penetrator and armor evolution. Guided munitions (and specifically, nuclear ones) led to radically dispersed combat and logistics deployments and the C3 necessary to support them. All of those are very big changes. The most likely effect of loitering munitions will be a revolution in SHORAD and an understanding that even dug-in infantry can't operate outside of an air defense bubble. Or countries with the manpower and ethical flexibility going all-in on poorly-equipped cheap numbers over exquisite platforms.

dredmorbius 4y ago
Capital ships are hardly the only, or even primary, target of submarines. Cargo shipping was, and will likely be. Further, submarine warfare by the US against Japan during WWII was absolutely devastating to Japan's ability to supply raw materials for its own war effort. Japan was (and is) an extraordinarily capable and productive country, but, thanks to its volcanic geology, also extraordinarily limited in crucial raw materials, particularly iron and fuels (coal, oil), both of which are formed or concentrated largely through long-term biological activity. The U.S. had become aware of these costs itself due to the earlier actions of German U-boat operations against both intracoastal and transatlantic shipping early in WWII. In March 1943 alone German U-boats sank over 100 Allied vessels, mostly cargo. One consequence of the attacks against US oil shipments was the construction of inland oil pipelines, the "Big Inch" and "Little Inch", as government projects, during the war. These remain in use AFIAU. Later, one of the first projects following establishing a beachhead in Normandy was to run an oil pipeline across the English Channel. (Daniel Yergin's The Prize coves all of this, and I'm relying on it for specifics.) We're familiar with the notion of coal and oil forming over hundred-million-year intervals. Most iron-ore deposits are multi-billion year old accumulations, many predating the Great Oxygenation Event. Present long-distance transport modes (sea and air) are reliant on cheap fuels, large vehicles (both aircraft and ships become more efficient with size, within limits), and secure passage along routes. I was struck a few years ago how the development of large-scale long-distance cargo shipping largely paralleled the evolution of large-scale long-distance whale species. Both rely on the fundamental greater efficiency of long bodies moving through water ("hull speed"), the existence of widely-spaced reward (cargo/payment, food source) locations, and the ability to traverse such routes with little risk. Human-based whale hunting absolutely annihilated whale populations, which crashed to a few percent of their pre-hunt levels. In instances in which combat regions have emperilled commercial aviation flights, airlines have acted quickly to route around such regions, even at the cost of much longer travel (and higher fuel costs). A reintroduction of anti-shipping naval-warefare activities, and unlimited targeting of commercial aviation, would have profound effects.