5 ms·
If the arbitrary JS is specified by a specially crafted URL or form POST, you can make the JS execute in someone else's browser as easily as getting someone to
by tripzilch 15y ago
If the arbitrary JS is specified by a specially crafted URL or form POST, you can make the JS execute in someone else's browser as easily as getting someone to click on a very innocent-looking link.
And as soon as you can get someone to execute arbitrary JS on a particular domain, any CSRF protection will be useless because you practically control their browser. (You can even literally control their browser, if you use BeEF http://www.bindshell.net/tools/beef.html http://www.bindshell.net/tools/beef.html )
You can even completely hide the XSS happening by loading it into an invisible IFRAME, while the main page keeps the victim's attention occupied by playing the promised video of a cute kitten playing with a ball of string.
- brlewis 15y agoBoth of those attacks fail if the page protects itself against CSRF: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery#Prevention http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery#Prev...
- mike-cardwell 15y agoYou can initiate an XSS attack without making any cross site requests. Being able to launch a CSRF attack, is not a prerequisite for being able to launch an XSS attack. It does help though.
- brlewis 15y agoIf I didn't know that, my original post would have said that all the Apple pages would be invulnerable if they prevented CSRF. I think the expresslane page is one where data could go in the database and others could see it. CSRF is not a prereq in general, but it is a prereq for the attacks tripzilch listed.
- oscardelben 15y agoA simple example: you can pass a link to someone and have some javascript that submits form for them without them knowing.
- brlewis 15y agoCould you demonstrate that for me please? Here's a simple little page that is vulnerable to XSS but not to CSRF: http://brlewis.com/demo/xss-csrf.html http://brlewis.com/demo/xss-csrf.html It works by GET or POST, so it should only take you a minute to craft a link that you can post right here in HN that makes that page pop an alert up in my browser.
- tripzilch 15y agoOoh, that's a good one. When I said that, I wasn't thinking about the CSRF token being required with the XSS-able form. So yeah, that partially mitigates the problem. It can still be done, however. But it'll take more than a few minutes, because I have only read about and played with PoCs of the relevant attacks, never implemented one like that myself. One approach is "clickjacking". It involves putting your page in an IFRAME that is 100% alpha transparent, in a containing page. This is positioned over an image that says "CLICK TO PLAY" (or something) in such a way that the (invisible) button on your page aligns with the image. When you click the image, you're actually clicking the button on your site. Javascript in the containing page monitors when this happens and when it does, it can read the CSRF token from the URL that the IFRAME now points to. Once it knows the token, the XSS attack is straightforward. Now this only works because your form submits the CSRF token via a GET request, so I can read it from the URL. If your form would only accept a POST request, I'm not entirely sure of how I'd do it. I need to think about that for a little while longer, it's an interesting challenge, though. There are some (IMO) far-fetched clickjacking-like attacks that require some social engineering (of the containing page) to get the user to perform certain actions that could do it. One way is to wrap a viewsource: URL to your page in an IFRAME (only works in Firefox, afaik) and position and dress it up so that only the CSRF token is visible and it looks like a CAPTCHA. The user would enter the CAPTCHA/CSRF and then XSS is possible. But that's not very elegant, and I'm not entirely sure if Firefox still allows doing this. Also it's not guaranteed to succeed if the user can't be bothered to enter a CAPTCHA to see the cute kitten video. So in that case I'm not sure. One surefire way to prevent these and related clickjacking-style attacks is to put some framebusting JS code in your site. Twitter does this to prevent clickjacking to autosubmit a those pre-filled tweet form. Check their sourcecode, the way they do it is pretty thorough (even taking into account race conditions that might cause the submit click to go through just before the frame is busted). I'm going to have to think about this for a while (how to do it if it were a POST form, that is. I'm fairly sure I could get the GET variant to work easily--I hope you could follow that example). The way you put a CSRF token in that form definitely makes it non-trivial, though. (BTW for anyone else to attempt a shot at this: the CSRF token is not actually the same value every time, but random generated and fixed with the session cookie, so clear your cookies before you try your brilliant exploit)