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The hard problem is "how conscious can be explained purely mechanistically?". "hard problem" is just a label from this question. So I don't get how say there's
by yodsanklai 4y ago
The hard problem is "how conscious can be explained purely mechanistically?". "hard problem" is just a label from this question. So I don't get how say there's no hard problem. It seems to be a legitimate question which nobody can answer.
The philosophical zombie is just a thought experiment to help understanding the distinction between conscience and IO.
Another thought experiment that I like is the macroscopic brain. Imagine a huge mechanical device composed of mechanical entities simulating neurons. Would this whole thing be conscious? and how would we know?
- mtlmtlmtlmtl 4y agoThat's not the hard problem at all. The hard problem of consciousness is a question formulated by Chalmers in the 90s. The problem effectively states that even if we explain in perfect detail how consciousness works mechanisticially, we would still have to explain the existence of "subjective experience" this is highly controversial in the field and serves as a dividing line between physicalist and non-physicalist camps in the philosophy of mind.
- yodsanklai 4y agoconsciousness = subjective experience The easy problem would be to explain how the brain operates to produce output in terms of input. The hard problem is to explain how subjective experience arises from the brain activity. > The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i.e., phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia) If you explain how conscience arises from the brain activity, you effectively solved the hard problem.