6 ms·
This is an uncharitable view of philosophy without much evidence to show for it, especially when it comes to the philosophy of consciousness and philosophy of c
by claudiawerner 4y ago
This is an uncharitable view of philosophy without much evidence to show for it, especially when it comes to the philosophy of consciousness and philosophy of computing. Not to mention, falsifiability being taken as the criterion for knowledge was itself (mathematics and logical axioms are not 'falsifiable') a claim produced by a philosopher, and one which some commentators name as circular in itself. You're using a particular philosophy to discount philosophy of science on the whole, which is ironic.
- stale2002 4y ago> This is an uncharitable view of philosophy without much evidence to show for it Oh it has a lot of evidence. Just talk to any philosopher ever on any "meta" topic. Whether that be meta ethics, or meta epistemology, or meta whatever. They start with a conclusion that they want, such as dual-ism, or philosophy souls, or all sorts of things, and then they wrap themselves in obfuscating circles finding a justification than can't be tested in any way outside their own circular pre-suppositions that have no connection to the real world. > to discount philosophy of science on the whole When the philosophers start making testable predictions, that I can measure, as opposed to making stuff up in their own self referential assumptions, I will start taking them seriously.
- claudiawerner 4y ago>They start with a conclusion that they want, such as dual-ism, or philosophy souls, or all sorts of things, and then they wrap themselves in obfuscating circles This is false; if you believe in a proposition, it entirely makes sense for you to argue for it. Whether those arguments are of quality is another matter, but the simple fact of arguing for a position you already hold does not make bad work. >When the philosophers start making testable predictions Philosophy isn't in the business of making testable predictions, just as logic or history isn't in the business of making testable predictions. Why must an argument make a testable prediction for you to take it seriously? Does this argument we're having now result in a testable prediction? If it doesn't, why did you reply? Or if it does, doesn't that show there's more to rational argumentation than testable predictions? You assume that philosophy is like religion. Not so. I'm moderately well read on metaethics and none of your statements ring true to me, except in the case of poorly argued or shoddy philosophy, which I'm more than happy to admit does exist.
- stale2002 4y ago> if you believe in a proposition, it entirely makes sense for you to argue for it If someone believes in a magic soul, because philosophy, yeah they will make up whatever arguments they want to support it. Yes, that is my point. People started off with their conclusion, which is that they believe in magic, or they believe in some moral statement, and then they want to say that the universe proves them right, even though it has zero connection to the real world. > Philosophy isn't in the business of making testable predictions Exactly, they just want to make obfuscatory arguments that then allows them to make whatever claim that they want about anything. And then when people try to actually test their claims, they then say that by definition their arguments can't be tested. > You assume that philosophy is like religion. It effectively is. Just make up a self referential, presumption that god exists, and it is basically the same as the philosophers who believe in dualism. > just as logic or history isn't in the business of making testable predictions. The big difference between mathmaticians, and philosophers, is that even though one could argue that some obscure mathematical theory that is never going to come up in the real world, is as equally "not real" as philosophy, is that mathematicians don't use their self referential axioms (in a situation which does not connect to the real world) to then say "And this is why the world should be switch to socialism" or "this is why you should be a vegan". If I say that a math theory is not real because it has no connection to the real world, a mathmatician isn't going to say that they are, by definition, the experts on truth and morals, and therefore I should do what they say anyway. If you want to say that philosophy helps a little bit with some reasoning skills, or as a way to think about things, sure whatever, fine. But the problem is that philosophers, when they talk about meta-ethics or meta-truth, or whatever, then try to use their circular arguments to then claim that they are the experts on literally everything, because well "truth" and "ethics", by definition are everything. I am going to say no on that. Just because you came up with some circular argument, that relates to truth, or ethics, or whatever, it does not mean that people have to listen to philosophers on basically anything.
- claudiawerner 4y ago>and then they want to say that the universe proves them right, even though it has zero connection to the real world. That's a failure of the argument, not a failure of philosophy. Everything from ethics to epistemology has philosophers arguing against unjustified assumptions. One could say the whole of philosophy is picking out unjustified assumptions. It's perfectly fine to start with a conclusion, so long as you can also argue your way there. If you don't think the argument is valid, then say so. What do you think philosophers do all day, just agree with eachother on every statement? >is that mathematicians don't use their self referential axioms (in a situation which does not connect to the real world) Yes, they do. Plenty of abstract mathematical concepts have zero connection to anything in nature or in the physical world. Some philosophers of mathematics even argue that mathematics has no root in the physical world. Besides that, the position you're arguing for is known in philosophy as 'pragmatism' - so don't pretend it's not philosophy. You're assuming your own axioms here. >then claim that they are the experts on literally everything, because well "truth" and "ethics", by definition are everything. That's not true; moral philosophers confine themselves to the world of moral philosophy. Epistemologists confine themselves to the world of epistemology. They don't claim knowledge about, say, physics or biology. >a mathmatician isn't going to say that they are, by definition, the experts on truth and morals, and therefore I should do what they say anyway. The definition of morality is literally 'what you should do'. If you disagree with that, then talk to a philosopher or just post an argument somewhere. If you don't think morality exists, then congratulations, there are philosophers who argue that too! I'm not impressed that your argument rests upon the simple fact of calling their arguments circular (i) without specifying why and which arguments are circular in particular (ii) and saying that there are no goals to be acheived by even talking about, say, epistemology. Nobody said you "have to listen" to anyone. You don't have to listen to scientists, mathematicians, logicians, historians, or anyone, really. But if faced with an argument you can't counter it ought to be to your embarrassment that you refuse the conclusion without considering the argument itself. All of your arguments, all of them quite philosophical in themselves(!) could equally apply to any other discipline with 'circular' axioms, such as physics (the principle of universal uniformity; the reliance on fallible observation and testimony) or logic (the axiom of non-contradiction).