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A problem with your insurance incentive is that it only works for people who have insurance. It does nothing to deter uninsured drivers. The risk of dying in a

A problem with your insurance incentive is that it only works for people who have insurance. It does nothing to deter uninsured drivers. The risk of dying in a car accident isn’t enough to stop some people from driving recklessly. Why would a penalty that only applies to the rare occasion when someone causes harm be any better of an incentive for people who seem to already assume they’re not going to cause harm by their behavior?

pdonis 4y ago
> A problem with your insurance incentive is that it only works for people who have insurance. It does nothing to deter uninsured drivers. Uninsured drivers who can pay compensation if they cause harm aren't the problem. The problem is uninsured drivers who are judgment proof, i.e., who have no significant assets with which to pay compensation. The way that problem is currently handled for driving is for auto insurance policies to include coverage if you get hit by an uninsured driver who can't pay compensation. But, you say, what if I get killed by that uninsured driver? The answer is that you're already at risk from that today, because someone that reckless isn't going to be deterred by anything, since they're not reasonable people to begin with. In other words, the basic problem you point out, that some people aren't deterred by reasonable incentives against reckless actions, is a valid problem, but can't be solved by social engineering. Your only defense against drivers like that is to drive defensively so that you aren't the one that ends up being their victim. And more generally, your only defense against people who genuinely aren't deterred by reasonable incentives against reckless behavior is to avoid them.