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> It's entirely possible that to enable compliance with this will require explicit compromises to the security of iMessage, for example by requiring key exchang

> It's entirely possible that to enable compliance with this will require explicit compromises to the security of iMessage, for example by requiring key exchange with startup messaging providers. Is that really much worse than the status quo, where all iMessage plaintexts are shared with Apple by default, unless every participant in the thread has disabled iCloud Backup? > So Apple just needs to explain security & encryption to Brussels attorneys to keep iMessage in a silo, for example. (Obviously making iMessage interoperable with e.g. Discord or ICQ will compromise the integrity of the software features of iMessage.) Are you arguing that it's impossible for Discord or ICQ to implement the same feature set as the native iMessage client?

runako 4y ago
Yes, it is. All of the participants in an iMessage chat have consented to have their data stored by Apple. We can all do rough evaluations on how well we think Apple can protect our data. The wording in the Act appears to not place constraints on exactly what services must be able to interop with iMessage, and it says Apple can't preference iMessage. So presumably the blue bubbles have to go. This means that when chatting in Messages now, one will not be able to know whether it's Apple alone protecting the privacy of the conversation, or whether the weakest link is a company of a single person that started this week using an OSS package to spin up a new messaging app on a Linode VM and was able to achieve parity in iOS messaging simply by virtue of this Act. That's a very different situation than the status quo. Similar logic applies to the App Store and payment details, but messaging is egregious because other participants in the chat can make (and potentially change) the security posture of the chat without your knowledge. (Edit, adding reply to this part.) > Are you arguing that it's impossible for Discord or ICQ to implement the same feature set as the native iMessage client? No, I am saying that it's going to be trivial to implement the feature set. I fully expect there to be OSS libraries to implement the iMessage client. The issue is that when people use iMessage and see a blue bubble, they also know something about how the encryption keys are handled & who does the handling, etc. This Act as written appears to allow any person to install an OSS iMessage server on a VM and achieve OS parity with iMessage, and Apple is prevented from indicating that others in the chat may be compromising the security of the chat. I used ICQ and Discord as examples because Apple exchanging my encryption keys with ICQ is definitely compromising a core feature of iMessage.
- gentleman11 4y ago
  Most of my extended family is unaware that iCloud backups sends your words to apple, not to mention all the other things. There was no rough evaluation
  - runako 4y ago
    (This is also about the encryption of the communication channel itself.) I agree with you in general, but it is possible for this evaluation to be done by a simple read of e.g. the iOS marketing page. The Act proposes a regime where it is not possible for a chat participant to determine who holds the encryption keys for the chat. You may consider that better or worse or neither, but it is a significant change in the security posture for billions of deployed devices.
- donmcronald 4y ago
  > The issue is that when people use iMessage and see a blue bubble, they also know something about how the encryption keys are handled & who does the handling, etc. Realistically, the average person doesn't even know what an encryption key is and the average tech enthusiast doesn't know anything beyond "Apple handles everything". > So presumably the blue bubbles have to go. This means that when chatting in Messages now, one will not be able to know whether it's Apple alone protecting the privacy of the conversation Why can't iMessage to iMessage be blue bubbles with iMessage to anything else being green bubbles? Do you think the average iPhone user understands that green bubbles mean insecure rather than thinking they're "Android bubbles"? Why are so many people convinced that consumer choice and security are mutually exclusive?
  - runako 4y ago
    > average tech enthusiast doesn't know anything beyond "Apple handles everything". The new law removes that person's ability to even discern this much. > Why can't iMessage to iMessage be blue bubbles with iMessage to anything else being green bubbles? This would pretty clearly be Apple preferring its own service over other services, and is prohibited under the new law. I should be clear here: I think this law is clumsy and will have to be fixed or loosely enforced. But even if one is in favor of these changes, it's fair to acknowledge the reality that the law basically mandates a major change in the security posture of a billion deployed devices. One may still be in favor, but it's important not to lose sight of the fact that there are in fact compromises being made. > Why are so many people convinced that consumer choice and security are mutually exclusive? I am 100% not convinced this is true; security and choice can coexist. But this EU law does not aim at the goal of preserving security while increasing consumer choice. Which is strange, given how a consequence of a prior EU Act was the pollution of the Web with cookie banners. (I am aware these banners are not specifically required for many use cases, which is why I said this is a consequence of their Act and not something ordered by their Act.)

runako 4y ago

Yes, it is. All of the participants in an iMessage chat have consented to have their data stored by Apple. We can all do rough evaluations on how well we think Apple can protect our data. The wording in the Act appears to not place constraints on exactly what services must be able to interop with iMessage, and it says Apple can't preference iMessage. So presumably the blue bubbles have to go. This means that when chatting in Messages now, one will not be able to know whether it's Apple alone protecting the privacy of the conversation, or whether the weakest link is a company of a single person that started this week using an OSS package to spin up a new messaging app on a Linode VM and was able to achieve parity in iOS messaging simply by virtue of this Act. That's a very different situation than the status quo. Similar logic applies to the App Store and payment details, but messaging is egregious because other participants in the chat can make (and potentially change) the security posture of the chat without your knowledge. (Edit, adding reply to this part.) > Are you arguing that it's impossible for Discord or ICQ to implement the same feature set as the native iMessage client? No, I am saying that it's going to be trivial to implement the feature set. I fully expect there to be OSS libraries to implement the iMessage client. The issue is that when people use iMessage and see a blue bubble, they also know something about how the encryption keys are handled & who does the handling, etc. This Act as written appears to allow any person to install an OSS iMessage server on a VM and achieve OS parity with iMessage, and Apple is prevented from indicating that others in the chat may be compromising the security of the chat. I used ICQ and Discord as examples because Apple exchanging my encryption keys with ICQ is definitely compromising a core feature of iMessage.

gentleman11 4y ago
Most of my extended family is unaware that iCloud backups sends your words to apple, not to mention all the other things. There was no rough evaluation
- runako 4y ago
  (This is also about the encryption of the communication channel itself.) I agree with you in general, but it is possible for this evaluation to be done by a simple read of e.g. the iOS marketing page. The Act proposes a regime where it is not possible for a chat participant to determine who holds the encryption keys for the chat. You may consider that better or worse or neither, but it is a significant change in the security posture for billions of deployed devices.
donmcronald 4y ago
> The issue is that when people use iMessage and see a blue bubble, they also know something about how the encryption keys are handled & who does the handling, etc. Realistically, the average person doesn't even know what an encryption key is and the average tech enthusiast doesn't know anything beyond "Apple handles everything". > So presumably the blue bubbles have to go. This means that when chatting in Messages now, one will not be able to know whether it's Apple alone protecting the privacy of the conversation Why can't iMessage to iMessage be blue bubbles with iMessage to anything else being green bubbles? Do you think the average iPhone user understands that green bubbles mean insecure rather than thinking they're "Android bubbles"? Why are so many people convinced that consumer choice and security are mutually exclusive?
- runako 4y ago
  > average tech enthusiast doesn't know anything beyond "Apple handles everything". The new law removes that person's ability to even discern this much. > Why can't iMessage to iMessage be blue bubbles with iMessage to anything else being green bubbles? This would pretty clearly be Apple preferring its own service over other services, and is prohibited under the new law. I should be clear here: I think this law is clumsy and will have to be fixed or loosely enforced. But even if one is in favor of these changes, it's fair to acknowledge the reality that the law basically mandates a major change in the security posture of a billion deployed devices. One may still be in favor, but it's important not to lose sight of the fact that there are in fact compromises being made. > Why are so many people convinced that consumer choice and security are mutually exclusive? I am 100% not convinced this is true; security and choice can coexist. But this EU law does not aim at the goal of preserving security while increasing consumer choice. Which is strange, given how a consequence of a prior EU Act was the pollution of the Web with cookie banners. (I am aware these banners are not specifically required for many use cases, which is why I said this is a consequence of their Act and not something ordered by their Act.)