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> * Make core messaging functionality interoperable. They lay out concrete examples like file transfer It's entirely possible that to enable compliance with th

by runako 4y ago

> * Make core messaging functionality interoperable. They lay out concrete examples like file transfer It's entirely possible that to enable compliance with this will require explicit compromises to the security of iMessage, for example by requiring key exchange with startup messaging providers. The other rules seem to prohibit Apple from describing the risks involved in such a compromise. > * Use existing hardware and software features without competitive prejudice. E.g. NFC This appears to say that a malicious app can present UX elements that were previously limited to the OS. Read liberally, that would mean that e.g. any app could now get biometric data by presenting a fake privilege escalation screen (e.g. FaceID/TouchID) and then capturing the results from the Secure Enclave. Is this something people really want? > * Not preference their services. This includes CTAs in settings to encourage users to subscribe to Gatekeeper services, and ranking their own services above others in selection and advertising portals This will likely make it harder for users to find safe/private services to use. If every offering can find its way into the default browser/App Store/etc. settings page in the OS, scam services will appear to be endorsed and therefore legitimate. Edit: Limitation of interop is still possible, the EU is just deciding to move decision making from California engineers to Brussels attorneys. From the Act: > The gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking strictly necessary and proportionate measures to ensure that interoperability does not compromise the integrity of the operating system, virtual assistant, hardware or software features provided by the gatekeeper, provided that such measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper. So Apple just needs to explain security & encryption to Brussels attorneys to keep iMessage in a silo, for example. (Obviously making iMessage interoperable with e.g. Discord or ICQ will compromise the integrity of the software features of iMessage.) I don't think this is going to increase the pace of product improvements.

SheinhardtWigCo 4y ago
> It's entirely possible that to enable compliance with this will require explicit compromises to the security of iMessage, for example by requiring key exchange with startup messaging providers. Is that really much worse than the status quo, where all iMessage plaintexts are shared with Apple by default, unless every participant in the thread has disabled iCloud Backup? > So Apple just needs to explain security & encryption to Brussels attorneys to keep iMessage in a silo, for example. (Obviously making iMessage interoperable with e.g. Discord or ICQ will compromise the integrity of the software features of iMessage.) Are you arguing that it's impossible for Discord or ICQ to implement the same feature set as the native iMessage client?
- runako 4y ago
  Yes, it is. All of the participants in an iMessage chat have consented to have their data stored by Apple. We can all do rough evaluations on how well we think Apple can protect our data. The wording in the Act appears to not place constraints on exactly what services must be able to interop with iMessage, and it says Apple can't preference iMessage. So presumably the blue bubbles have to go. This means that when chatting in Messages now, one will not be able to know whether it's Apple alone protecting the privacy of the conversation, or whether the weakest link is a company of a single person that started this week using an OSS package to spin up a new messaging app on a Linode VM and was able to achieve parity in iOS messaging simply by virtue of this Act. That's a very different situation than the status quo. Similar logic applies to the App Store and payment details, but messaging is egregious because other participants in the chat can make (and potentially change) the security posture of the chat without your knowledge. (Edit, adding reply to this part.) > Are you arguing that it's impossible for Discord or ICQ to implement the same feature set as the native iMessage client? No, I am saying that it's going to be trivial to implement the feature set. I fully expect there to be OSS libraries to implement the iMessage client. The issue is that when people use iMessage and see a blue bubble, they also know something about how the encryption keys are handled & who does the handling, etc. This Act as written appears to allow any person to install an OSS iMessage server on a VM and achieve OS parity with iMessage, and Apple is prevented from indicating that others in the chat may be compromising the security of the chat. I used ICQ and Discord as examples because Apple exchanging my encryption keys with ICQ is definitely compromising a core feature of iMessage.
  - gentleman11 4y ago
    Most of my extended family is unaware that iCloud backups sends your words to apple, not to mention all the other things. There was no rough evaluation
    - runako 4y ago
      (This is also about the encryption of the communication channel itself.) I agree with you in general, but it is possible for this evaluation to be done by a simple read of e.g. the iOS marketing page. The Act proposes a regime where it is not possible for a chat participant to determine who holds the encryption keys for the chat. You may consider that better or worse or neither, but it is a significant change in the security posture for billions of deployed devices.
arlcode 4y ago
Apple: it's impossible because of the encryption Regulator: what are the others using? Apple: something very similar but slightly different Regulator: and it's impossible to develop an open standard thet allows p2p encryption to be maintained? Apple: Yes obviously in this specific field of technology that's not possible at all. (Not the) Regulator: Sounds legit
- runako 4y ago
  This facile response ignores that Apple Messages is a system, not just an encryption algorithm. Of particular concern is key management: who manages the keys that allow the messages to be decrypted? Currently, it's Apple. What this Act says is that Apple Messages must interop with any other messaging system. If you spin up a VM running an iMessage-compatible server on Hetzner, Apple Messages must interop with you and cannot privilege Messages (e.g. by continuing to use blue bubbles as a differentiator). That VM may be malicious (for ex: it may log who communicated with whom when), but the Act still requires that it be placed on an even footing with Messages. Similarly, the Act essentially says that once implemented, anyone using a phone can unintentionally be sending all of their messages to Facebook Messenger, which by law must have seamless interop with Messages. Any group chat could be logged by Facebook by virtue of one person in the chat choosing Facebook Messenger as their default messaging app. This requirement materially changes the security posture of a billion devices currently in use. You may believe the tradeoff is worthwhile, but it's still not a free tradeoff.
  - lstodd 4y ago
    That only means that the Apple Messages model is outdated and a replacement is hereby being required. If Apple prefers lock-in over innovation, it's their problem, not the users'.
    - d12bb 4y ago
      Is Signal's too, then? They also stated interop is no good.
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
dx034 4y ago
> This will likely make it harder for users to find safe/private services to use. That's what tech companies like to say. But from experiences with less tech-savy friends, the current way always leads people to share as much as possible. Opt-out is always harder than opt-in.

by runako 4y ago

SheinhardtWigCo 4y ago

> It's entirely possible that to enable compliance with this will require explicit compromises to the security of iMessage, for example by requiring key exchange with startup messaging providers. Is that really much worse than the status quo, where all iMessage plaintexts are shared with Apple by default, unless every participant in the thread has disabled iCloud Backup? > So Apple just needs to explain security & encryption to Brussels attorneys to keep iMessage in a silo, for example. (Obviously making iMessage interoperable with e.g. Discord or ICQ will compromise the integrity of the software features of iMessage.) Are you arguing that it's impossible for Discord or ICQ to implement the same feature set as the native iMessage client?

runako 4y ago
Yes, it is. All of the participants in an iMessage chat have consented to have their data stored by Apple. We can all do rough evaluations on how well we think Apple can protect our data. The wording in the Act appears to not place constraints on exactly what services must be able to interop with iMessage, and it says Apple can't preference iMessage. So presumably the blue bubbles have to go. This means that when chatting in Messages now, one will not be able to know whether it's Apple alone protecting the privacy of the conversation, or whether the weakest link is a company of a single person that started this week using an OSS package to spin up a new messaging app on a Linode VM and was able to achieve parity in iOS messaging simply by virtue of this Act. That's a very different situation than the status quo. Similar logic applies to the App Store and payment details, but messaging is egregious because other participants in the chat can make (and potentially change) the security posture of the chat without your knowledge. (Edit, adding reply to this part.) > Are you arguing that it's impossible for Discord or ICQ to implement the same feature set as the native iMessage client? No, I am saying that it's going to be trivial to implement the feature set. I fully expect there to be OSS libraries to implement the iMessage client. The issue is that when people use iMessage and see a blue bubble, they also know something about how the encryption keys are handled & who does the handling, etc. This Act as written appears to allow any person to install an OSS iMessage server on a VM and achieve OS parity with iMessage, and Apple is prevented from indicating that others in the chat may be compromising the security of the chat. I used ICQ and Discord as examples because Apple exchanging my encryption keys with ICQ is definitely compromising a core feature of iMessage.
- gentleman11 4y ago
  Most of my extended family is unaware that iCloud backups sends your words to apple, not to mention all the other things. There was no rough evaluation
  - runako 4y ago
    (This is also about the encryption of the communication channel itself.) I agree with you in general, but it is possible for this evaluation to be done by a simple read of e.g. the iOS marketing page. The Act proposes a regime where it is not possible for a chat participant to determine who holds the encryption keys for the chat. You may consider that better or worse or neither, but it is a significant change in the security posture for billions of deployed devices.

arlcode 4y ago

Apple: it's impossible because of the encryption Regulator: what are the others using? Apple: something very similar but slightly different Regulator: and it's impossible to develop an open standard thet allows p2p encryption to be maintained? Apple: Yes obviously in this specific field of technology that's not possible at all. (Not the) Regulator: Sounds legit

runako 4y ago
This facile response ignores that Apple Messages is a system, not just an encryption algorithm. Of particular concern is key management: who manages the keys that allow the messages to be decrypted? Currently, it's Apple. What this Act says is that Apple Messages must interop with any other messaging system. If you spin up a VM running an iMessage-compatible server on Hetzner, Apple Messages must interop with you and cannot privilege Messages (e.g. by continuing to use blue bubbles as a differentiator). That VM may be malicious (for ex: it may log who communicated with whom when), but the Act still requires that it be placed on an even footing with Messages. Similarly, the Act essentially says that once implemented, anyone using a phone can unintentionally be sending all of their messages to Facebook Messenger, which by law must have seamless interop with Messages. Any group chat could be logged by Facebook by virtue of one person in the chat choosing Facebook Messenger as their default messaging app. This requirement materially changes the security posture of a billion devices currently in use. You may believe the tradeoff is worthwhile, but it's still not a free tradeoff.
- lstodd 4y ago
  That only means that the Apple Messages model is outdated and a replacement is hereby being required. If Apple prefers lock-in over innovation, it's their problem, not the users'.
  - d12bb 4y ago
    Is Signal's too, then? They also stated interop is no good.

deleted 4y ago

[deleted]

dx034 4y ago

> This will likely make it harder for users to find safe/private services to use. That's what tech companies like to say. But from experiences with less tech-savy friends, the current way always leads people to share as much as possible. Opt-out is always harder than opt-in.