3 ms·

> under what pretext does this construction arise? I'm not sure if I understand your question, but the general rule is that the person with agency also bears r

> under what pretext does this construction arise? I'm not sure if I understand your question, but the general rule is that the person with agency also bears responsibility (this is a widely-held axiom). In this case, we have parents who have agency to predictably create a life which depends on carriage and birth, and thus responsibility to provide carriage/birth (obviously biological realities preclude an identical share of the responsibility between parents). > It's hard not to view it as a post hoc rationalization of a just world fallacy. Are there any other ways to construct the consequence of a waiver of the right to forego birth that stems directly from the act of sex? Some sort of sex teleology? Something else? Again, not sure if I understand your question.

kelseyfrog 4y ago
Thanks for taking the time to try help me understand this. I feel like analogizing here might confuse rather than clarify, but I'm thinking of other cases where agents taking actions waive their rights and how those waivers are socially justified. For example contracts bind people in ways that limit their rights. Ex: if you and I enter a futures contract for you to purchase wheat from me at a certain price, there is a constraint placed on each of us - me to pay you the money, and you to deliver the wheat. The reason we socially allow such contracts of obligation is to facilitate commerce. We allow for other waivers of rights for other reasons. What is the underlying social reason for the agency-responsibility regarding pregnancy? I'm genuinely asking with the understanding that there may be multiple reasons, but I don't have an internal sense of agency-responsibility toward pregnancy that apparently others do. Under what principles is such a responsibility formulated? This possibly confuses things more, but we socially recognize that some rights are non-alienatible, ex: you cannot voluntarily enslave one's self in a legally meaningful way. So there do seem to be some limits to which rights people can consent to void.
- throwaway894345 4y ago
  > Thanks for taking the time to try help me understand this. No worries! > I feel like analogizing here might confuse rather than clarify Agreed--finding accurate analogies is hard for most things, IMHO. > What is the underlying social reason for the agency-responsibility regarding pregnancy? I'm genuinely asking with the understanding that there may be multiple reasons, but I don't have an internal sense of agency-responsibility toward pregnancy that apparently others do. Under what principles is such a responsibility formulated? Protection of life. Indeed, as a society we purport to value life (especially vulnerable life) even above commerce. We also don't let parents neglect children even though this restricts parents' liberties. When you elect into parenthood (e.g., via consensual sex or adoption), you have a legal/moral responsibility to provide vital necessities to your children while they're in your care. Of course, once a child has been born, parents can elect to transfer that responsibility (to the state or other parent/s), but for obvious reasons we can't transfer care of an unborn baby. Of course, this is predicated on the axiom that an unborn baby constitutes human life.
  - kelseyfrog 4y ago
    This has helped clarify my thought - that bodily autonomy is non-alienable, not even through sex. Moreover it's non-alienable in the same way freedom from slavery is or less so in the way that certain contracts are unenforceable - they simply deprive too much.
    - throwaway894345 4y ago
      I can understand that position if someone’s axiom is that an unborn child is “just a clump of cells”, but do you think it’s okay for a child to be killed in cases where a couple just couldn’t be bothered to use contraception? If yes, in a hypothetical world in which giving a child up for adoption isn’t possible, would you support a parent killing their toddler because they don’t want to have to slave to support them (that is, their autonomy is harshly limited)? If no, how do you reconcile this with your position on abortion (e.g., perhaps you would draw some distinction between slavery/forced-labor and bodily autonomy?)?
      - kelseyfrog 4y ago
        Sorry, but this thread excludes arguments that presuppose the "life of a child" maybe there are different threads that follow that line of reasoning. This thread is also not about post-birth situations. I'm strictly interested in discussing the construction of a bodily autonomy right to abortion that is not predicated on the aliveness of anything. Maybe you'll have better luck elsewhere.

kelseyfrog 4y ago

Thanks for taking the time to try help me understand this. I feel like analogizing here might confuse rather than clarify, but I'm thinking of other cases where agents taking actions waive their rights and how those waivers are socially justified. For example contracts bind people in ways that limit their rights. Ex: if you and I enter a futures contract for you to purchase wheat from me at a certain price, there is a constraint placed on each of us - me to pay you the money, and you to deliver the wheat. The reason we socially allow such contracts of obligation is to facilitate commerce. We allow for other waivers of rights for other reasons. What is the underlying social reason for the agency-responsibility regarding pregnancy? I'm genuinely asking with the understanding that there may be multiple reasons, but I don't have an internal sense of agency-responsibility toward pregnancy that apparently others do. Under what principles is such a responsibility formulated? This possibly confuses things more, but we socially recognize that some rights are non-alienatible, ex: you cannot voluntarily enslave one's self in a legally meaningful way. So there do seem to be some limits to which rights people can consent to void.

throwaway894345 4y ago
> Thanks for taking the time to try help me understand this. No worries! > I feel like analogizing here might confuse rather than clarify Agreed--finding accurate analogies is hard for most things, IMHO. > What is the underlying social reason for the agency-responsibility regarding pregnancy? I'm genuinely asking with the understanding that there may be multiple reasons, but I don't have an internal sense of agency-responsibility toward pregnancy that apparently others do. Under what principles is such a responsibility formulated? Protection of life. Indeed, as a society we purport to value life (especially vulnerable life) even above commerce. We also don't let parents neglect children even though this restricts parents' liberties. When you elect into parenthood (e.g., via consensual sex or adoption), you have a legal/moral responsibility to provide vital necessities to your children while they're in your care. Of course, once a child has been born, parents can elect to transfer that responsibility (to the state or other parent/s), but for obvious reasons we can't transfer care of an unborn baby. Of course, this is predicated on the axiom that an unborn baby constitutes human life.
- kelseyfrog 4y ago
  This has helped clarify my thought - that bodily autonomy is non-alienable, not even through sex. Moreover it's non-alienable in the same way freedom from slavery is or less so in the way that certain contracts are unenforceable - they simply deprive too much.
  - throwaway894345 4y ago
    I can understand that position if someone’s axiom is that an unborn child is “just a clump of cells”, but do you think it’s okay for a child to be killed in cases where a couple just couldn’t be bothered to use contraception? If yes, in a hypothetical world in which giving a child up for adoption isn’t possible, would you support a parent killing their toddler because they don’t want to have to slave to support them (that is, their autonomy is harshly limited)? If no, how do you reconcile this with your position on abortion (e.g., perhaps you would draw some distinction between slavery/forced-labor and bodily autonomy?)?
    - kelseyfrog 4y ago
      Sorry, but this thread excludes arguments that presuppose the "life of a child" maybe there are different threads that follow that line of reasoning. This thread is also not about post-birth situations. I'm strictly interested in discussing the construction of a bodily autonomy right to abortion that is not predicated on the aliveness of anything. Maybe you'll have better luck elsewhere.