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I first heard the term a few years ago, but because I work in that space it didn't bother me. When I talk about it to network ops folks I like to say "perimeter
by cratermoon 4y ago
I first heard the term a few years ago, but because I work in that space it didn't bother me. When I talk about it to network ops folks I like to say "perimeterless", which is a fair description of what they care most about: no more firewalls, DMZ, or "internal" vs "external".
The device-centric authentication and authorization part, I don't really have a good simple term. When it works well, I call it "better user experience" because to the people accessing, there's a lot less for them to deal with, and fewer passwords to remember or VPN status to worry about.
The lack of a VPN requirement is nice. The experience from my last job where we had a VPN was that everything worked pretty well for employees with company-issued laptops, but when a division hired contractors or brought in a third party, they weren't issued laptops, so they couldn't access anything on the VPN, leading to continuous support issues and work for the netops folks.
For my part I really like it because it addresses one aspect of security often neglected (even more so than security in general): internal malicious actors. Disgruntled employees, workers that expeditious bypass security because their boss has to have it NOW, executives and senior leadership that throw their weight around and get special access to bypass security, or simple human error. Also, all the un-encrypted internal traffic. In this case, "zero trust" applies, because where companies used to trust their employees not to screw around with company assets, hard experience has demonstrated that even absent malice, people do stupid things and it costs real money.