6 ms·
I took a look at the paper. Unlike the Hertzbleed attack this one seems to justify the bleed naming given the ability to rapidly locate the password hash (which
by mike_hearn 4y ago
I took a look at the paper. Unlike the Hertzbleed attack this one seems to justify the bleed naming given the ability to rapidly locate the password hash (which can then be quickly brute forced back to the root password, most likely). However! There are caveats. It appears that modern Intel chips actually already mitigate this:
> "We observed that eIBRS systems seem protected from RETBLEED. IBRS, which is the alternative for earlier systems, was considered too expensive to use in practice when Spectre was introduced in 2018. Flushing the entire BTB through IBPB upon kernel entry would arguably be even more expensive. Intel’s mitigation. Despite the performance cost of IBRS, it mitigates RETBLEED on vulnerable Intel CPUs. Hence, IBRS will selectively be enabled on systems that exhibit RSB-to-BTB fallback behavior that do not support eIBRS."
Translated:
• New Intel chips have better support for blocking this attack. You can get performance+security by using a new(ish) CPU. Windows already uses that support if present. Linux apparently doesn't, but will presumably migrate now the retpoline trick is broken. The big slowdowns would come for older CPUs without the right hardware to control these attacks.
But, wait:
"Concurrently to our work, Branch History Injection (BHI) [7] explored the limitations of eIBRS and found that indirect branch speculation can be hijacked to run previously executed indirect branch targets in the kernel. Whereas RETBLEED targets Intel CPUs without eIBRS and certain AMD CPUs, BHI targets Intel CPUs with eIBRS and ARM. Moreover, because of the limited number of disclosure gadgets available to BHI, unprivileged eBPF is required for practical exploitation, which consequentially has been disabled as a mitigation"
Translating again:
• Even with new Intel chips there's a way to break them but the conditions are so specific that no normal kernel compile will produce them. Instead you have to be able to JIT compile custom code on the fly that runs in kernel mode. The eBPF feature lets users do this, but, if you limit it to root then the problem goes away. Oh and also ARM chips aren't magically invulnerable or anything.
Overall, I think this confirms the impression I already had for some time - despite whatever other issues it may have Intel is ahead when it comes to security. People aren't really looking for vulns in ARM chips though that may change now with M1. In fact even vulns in AMD chips are considered second tier and not that interesting. But, Intel chips have more features to stop speculation attacks.
A lot of Spectre-type attacks have actually been addressed over time by new hardware features (usually in combination with OS patches), but chip makers seem to suck at communicating this to the general public. If you're worried about specex attacks then your best bet is to aggressively upgrade your CPU to stay on the leading edge, to ensure your OS and browser are always fully patched, and if you write software for Intel servers, to explore SGX enclaves which these days do a lot of pipeline flushing and partitioning on entry/exit.