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Intel's Software Guard Extensions were supposed to run at a higher, inaccessible privilege level on consumer CPUs and that turned out to be susceptible to side
by jeroenhd 4y ago
Intel's Software Guard Extensions were supposed to run at a higher, inaccessible privilege level on consumer CPUs and that turned out to be susceptible to side channel attacks. ARM TrustZone was defeated through cache latency measurements on Android in 2016, though that specific flaw might have been patched since.
Perhaps with an entirely separate chip running its own OS with its own RAM and IO, you could work with secrets, but traditional secure chips have so far been far from a silver bullet.
I think the Intel Management Engine is close enough to the system CPU that it is probably affected by side channel attacks, but perhaps AMD's PSP is removed far enough to nullify the effect.
- mike_hearn 4y agoSGX was patched to solve those issues though. This is one of the issues with the security and side channels space: often there are mitigations powerful enough to stop attacks, but people don't remember them being rolled out. They recall the attack, say "oh well that is broken forever" and never re-visit the issue. As I mention elsewhere, an enclave is a good construct to use here because you're explicitly signalling to the CPU that the memory space has unusually sensitive secrets and you're willing to lose performance to protect them.
- jeroenhd 4y agoThat's true, but the point is that simply relying on security extensions is no guarantee for safety. If it was broken before, the theoretical separation isn't complete enough to guarantee it won't be broken again. SGX is already being phased out by Intel for consumer/workstation products so I think they've given up on the concept themselves. I don't think they're supporting an alternative on consumer products either. Even if their server/enterprise implementation is secure enough, it won't protect against developers having their SSH keys exfiltrated by a game running in their browser during their downtime. I think externalising the security mechanism is a good idea, but the current implementations simply aren't good enough to combat this issue.
- mike_hearn 4y agoWell, Intel are introducing new features built on SGX so it's definitely not abandoned. Their encrypted VM feature is built on it for instance. I used to work quite closely with Intel on SGX related stuff. My understanding is, the issue on the client side is not really that Intel itself don't believe in it. They do. The issue is that it requires extensive kernel support. Microsoft never committed the resources to fully implement SGX or make it useful. What little support they shipped wasn't actually workable, especially as Intel updated SGX to address market feedback. Servers run Linux and there Intel were able to write their own drivers and do the necessary work for it themselves, so were less constrained by what Microsoft wanted to do. It's also an easier pitch in the cloud - there are more ideas for use cases. W.R.T. SSH keys I don't quite understand the threat model you have in mind there. The point of SGX is that root access to the server where the enclave runs is unimportant. The attacker is assumed to have root throughout.
- jeroenhd 4y agoTheir disabling of SGX is now preventing Blurays from being played and educational test stalkerware that tries to detect cheaters from being run on 12th gen Intel. What little support Intel had now seems to have evaporated completely. Their decision to turn SGX into an enterprise feature seems more like another product segmentation strategy to me, same with ECC RAM support. I don't see the point of dropping support entirely for a feature that's still actively being used by consumer products but maintaining the feature in more expensive chips. WRT ssh keys: in a perfect world, authentication systems such as FIDO key stores, password managers and SSH agents live on a secure coprocessor, signing key material for applications on the main chip and loading their decryption keys from a secure chip like a TPM. If the code is written well, this would make it impossible for even an attacker with root access to gain access to the key material, you'd need physical probes on the motherboards to steal keys. Even kernel modules shouldn't affect the secrecy of the system once it's been initialized correctly. Without a separate, secure system, an attacker in a sufficiently performant browser writing their own timers can now extract data from the kernel (like, say, a process map) and make their way into SSH agent memory, extracting data at kilobytes per second in some processors, all through side channel attacks. A browser tab running 100% CPU for a while wouldn't even be that strange these days, for all you know it's Microsoft Teams or Slack running in the background.