6 ms·
When will people realize that the problem is running untrusted code on the same CPU as code that needs to keep secrets?
by rayiner 4y ago
When will people realize that the problem is running untrusted code on the same CPU as code that needs to keep secrets?
- bombcar 4y agoThe problem is cloud, basically, where you're defined by running various VMs on the same CPU. Single-user systems can be affected by these, but they can be affected by more direct attacks.
- merb 4y agoon clouds the only problem is HT. on vm providers it's cpu overcommitment (clouds rarely do that)
- superkuh 4y agoBack in the 2000s pretty much everyone knew not to run un-trusted code ("don't open that email attachment"). But then javascript happened and the utility was so profound everyone decided to forget.
- selfhoster11 4y agoEven if it's far from obvious to an average person that JavaScript is a pwn vector, I think you're more correct than not. You need enough isolation to run untrusted code. If JS code can still exploit CPU bugs, then clearly more isolation is needed one way or another.
- mirashii 4y agoI think you're looking at the past with rose-colored glasses. ActiveX allowed the execution of unsandboxed x86 code from controls embedded in webpages and was enabled by default in Internet Explorer, the dominant browser of the time. Javascript caught on because it's at least interpreted and sandboxed, a huge step up from what ActiveX was.
- ginko 4y agoCan't you mitigate just the Javascript VM? JS is a slow scripting language anyways. Seems like a waste to slow down the entire system.
- marshray 4y agoPeople have been running code having different security levels on the same hardware since the early time-sharing systems (1960's).
- tedunangst 4y agoI only have so many CPUs, and I visit more websites than that.
- lsbehe 4y agoConsider disabling javascript on websites by default and only allowing it on those that you trust. e.g. uBlock origin has that built in. You'd be surprised how much still works perfectly fine and of cause, which sites break for no good reason.
- hgazx 4y agoI want an extension that disables JavaScript by default and then allows me to enable and disable JavaScript for the current site that I’m visiting (and all of its dependencies; I don’t want to deal with enabling it also for its cdns etc) with only one click and then remembers my setting. Does that exist?
- simcop2387 4y agoUmatrix from the author of ublock origin can do this. Not with a single click (it'll take two, one to enable and one to tell it to remember) but it's very close. https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/umatrix/ https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/umatrix/
- dredmorbius 4y agoClarifying, for those unfamiliar with it: uMatrix permits enabling or disabling JS (and other website features: images, CSS, media, frames, XSS, ...) by domain or subdomain, including default allow/deny permissions should you choose. You can also temporarily enable or disable specific permissions, and save those changes permanently should you choose. It's fiddly, but good fiddly.
- boring_twenties 4y agoNoScript used to do it in 1 click. Now that it's a Web Extension, it takes two.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- staticassertion 4y agoIs that the problem? 1. Most hosts have some secrets. For example, client credentials. That's hard to avoid unless you just don't do auth at all. 2. Most hosts let users ssh to them. 3. What you've described is the cloud provider/ PaaS model. 4. It's not that easy to just "keep untrusted code" out. Like, what if an attacker exploits an exposed service and then wants to privesc?
- wglb 4y agoI am unclear on how this relates to untrusted code. Regardless of your programming language, the low-level machine code is vulnerable. At some point, passwords and other sensitive data is in the memory, and by using these exploits, they can be exposed. Alternatively, let's be sure that the attackers are not running untrusted code.
- jjnoakes 4y ago> I am unclear on how this relates to untrusted code. If you only run code you trust, then (assuming your trust was placed in it properly) it won't steal anything from you.
- wglb 4y agoBut in most environments, you as a user are not in total control of what is running. If you are in the cloud, other users in unrelated virtual machines can steal your junk. Also, if you are running a web browser with JavaScript turned on, that is effectively another user able to steal your junk.
- jjnoakes 4y agoYes that is true. Untrusted code in general computing environments is basically inevitable.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- monocasa 4y agoIt's a way deeper problem than untrusted code, as NetSpectre [0] showed. The issue is with untrusted speculative instruction streams which can be influenced by untrusted code and/or untrusted data. NetSpectre was a remote kernel read primitive entirely from malformed network packets, no untrusted code needed, and no data other than network packets coming in over the wire. [0] https://gruss.cc/files/netspectre.pdf https://gruss.cc/files/netspectre.pdf
- tptacek 4y agoThis is about as trenchant an analysis as "when will people realize that the problem is computers?". The constraint we work with when securing systems is that we don't get to rearchitect the entire world; that's what makes systems security hard.
- daniel-cussen 4y agoAt least don't share the same core. There's gotta be some limit.
- scottlamb 4y agoIIUC on Linux you can enable CONFIG_SCHED_CORE/PR_SCHED_CORE to realize that idea. [1] Some caveats may apply... edit: to be clear, I just learned about retbleed five minutes ago, so I'm definitely not promising core scheduling mitigates it. I do think core scheduling is a good idea in general. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/c...
- msbarnett 4y agoIs that even enough? Hyperthreading let some of the earlier spectre exploits work faster, but as long as there's some shared cached between two cores (L2 or L3), that's enough for timing variations to leak what's in that cache afaik. Maybe it's enough for this attack (unsure), but I don't think it solves speculative side-channel leaks in general.
- ndesaulniers 4y ago> when will people realize that the problem is computers? That's how I feel though some days, tbh.
- rayiner 4y agoAs a security guy, you’re stuck with the world as it is. But as a mere user, I can certainly complain about the direction computing has gone.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- naniwaduni 4y agoReally, the problems all started from secrets existing in the same universe as untrusted actors.
- renewiltord 4y agoThere's an FTX customer with nodes accessing via API keys that control hundreds of millions of dollars of crypto. That customer has Spectre/Meltdown mitigations off and will probably run with Retbleed mitigations off. I think people will realize when someone offensively applies this in the civilian space. The money is there waiting for those of you who want a few hundred million USD worth of crypto. The test of the exploit will be in the exploiting.