4 ms·

The OP is careful and measured. This comment is the opposite.

AshamedCaptain 4y ago
I actually paraphrased a lot of parts from the OP. I guess (guess because you don't mention the reasons why this is "not careful nor measured") you are one of these people who think that as long as there is some key combination that allows a Linux distribution to boot, there is no reason whatsoever to complain ? Well, sorry, but no. I will sound the alarm way before the only way to install Linux (or any other OS) is to disassemble the laptop and hit some physical switch that will cause a Scary Boot Prompt to be permanently shown on my device, reminding me that I'm booting an "unsupported OS" and that "someone could be doing this to steal my personal data", and requiring me to acknowledge it by waiting 30 seconds before it proceeds to boot my actual OS. Every Single Time I boot the device. I will complain loudly way before we reach that on PCs. Cause that's exactly what I had to do to run Linux on a Chromebook. And Google also seems to think that because they allow me to run some Linux distros under a heavily curtained container inside their OS, "all's good". Google does not get a free pass from me, why should MS?
- wrycoder 4y ago
  And hardware will not allow that “unsupported” OS to access routable network.
  - trelane 4y ago
    Well, crud. With remote attestation, that could become a reality.
    - dane-pgp 4y ago
      First it will be required for playing online games[0], then governments will require ISPs to enforce it for anyone who goes online. Once people start side-loading to get around future bans on E2EE messaging apps, I expect governments will require OS vendors to implement blacklisting of such software even on desktops, using something like Apple's Gatekeeper service[1]. [0] https://www.pcgamesn.com/valorant/windows-11 https://www.pcgamesn.com/valorant/windows-11 [1] https://appleinsider.com/articles/20/11/15/big-sur-telling-apple-what-app-youve-opened-isnt-a-security-or-privacy-issue https://appleinsider.com/articles/20/11/15/big-sur-telling-a...
      - kps 4y ago
        If you want a picture of the future, imagine a secure boot stamping on a human face — forever.
zahllos 4y ago
Agree. There's separate issues at play: the mechanism, what value it adds or subtracts and how it can be used. The critical component is allowing end users to control their own devices. Fair disclosure, I've been involved in products supporting secure boot, have run my own laptop with my own keys such that only my signed stuff runs. I also have one of those Talos 2 boards and it also supports its own secure boot, even though all of the software all the way down to the firmware is open source. So far Microsoft have actually been pretty reasonable: they enabled the shim in the first place. No Linux distros including heavyweights like Redhat or Canonical stepped up to undergo the requirements for default inclusion in the UEFI forum. It always strikes me as a logical fallacy to argue against having a secure boot but then be pro end to end encryption. 'Secure boot is being used to oppress us therefore secure boot is bad' is as extreme a view as 'some awful human beings share csam so end-to-end bad'. Ultimately in both cases the problem is societal and not technical. We need consumer rights protections so we don't end up renting our devices, and we need policing and community work to eradicate csam. Frothing at the mouth misinformed 'activism' comes across very badly to people outside the tech world we necessarily need to engage to make constructive policies for the future.
- cowtools 4y ago
  Secure boot is opressive when you don't have the keys. So is encryption.
  - trelane 4y ago
    If someone else has the keys, you're not the owner, you're a renter.
- Perseids 4y ago
  Your arguments strike me as inconsistent. You say we need consumer rights protections so we don't end up renting our devices, but then you criticize the comment that speaks up about a consumer rights problem. > There's separate issues at play: the mechanism, what value it adds or subtracts and how it can be used. The thing is, it's absurd to separate these issues. Look at it from the perspective of most users: Secure Boot is a solution to a minuscule problem. The vast majority of exploits happen in their browsers, office suits or due to social engineering (phishing, ransomware, adware). So from the start, to sway the trade-off in favor to Secure Boot, the trouble it generates must be minuscule as well. And that is not the case: From the beginning Secure Boot has been a threat to free OS choice on PCs. Microsoft did not start by proposing a non-profit steward that will find good rules how code signing can be implemented and what rules you have to follow to be let in. That would have been "pretty reasonable". Instead they declared themselves rulers and it required a massive effort of the free software community to find ways to fulfill the requirements Microsoft unilaterally declared. Being able to find a working process with Microsoft has generated some fragile trust, but all of that is in peril with news like Lenovo removing the Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA from their default installation. If you would really care about letting the mechanism stand on its own without it being intermingled with politics (and I read that you care about that from the cited line) there is only one solution: Take the private keys to the Secure Boot certificates away from Microsoft and hand them over to neutral party. (And of course that will not happen, and thus the political and technical side remain deeply intertwined.)

I actually paraphrased a lot of parts from the OP. I guess (guess because you don't mention the reasons why this is "not careful nor measured") you are one of these people who think that as long as there is some key combination that allows a Linux distribution to boot, there is no reason whatsoever to complain ? Well, sorry, but no. I will sound the alarm way before the only way to install Linux (or any other OS) is to disassemble the laptop and hit some physical switch that will cause a Scary Boot Prompt to be permanently shown on my device, reminding me that I'm booting an "unsupported OS" and that "someone could be doing this to steal my personal data", and requiring me to acknowledge it by waiting 30 seconds before it proceeds to boot my actual OS. Every Single Time I boot the device. I will complain loudly way before we reach that on PCs. Cause that's exactly what I had to do to run Linux on a Chromebook. And Google also seems to think that because they allow me to run some Linux distros under a heavily curtained container inside their OS, "all's good". Google does not get a free pass from me, why should MS?

wrycoder 4y ago
And hardware will not allow that “unsupported” OS to access routable network.
- trelane 4y ago
  Well, crud. With remote attestation, that could become a reality.
  - dane-pgp 4y ago
    First it will be required for playing online games[0], then governments will require ISPs to enforce it for anyone who goes online. Once people start side-loading to get around future bans on E2EE messaging apps, I expect governments will require OS vendors to implement blacklisting of such software even on desktops, using something like Apple's Gatekeeper service[1]. [0] https://www.pcgamesn.com/valorant/windows-11 https://www.pcgamesn.com/valorant/windows-11 [1] https://appleinsider.com/articles/20/11/15/big-sur-telling-apple-what-app-youve-opened-isnt-a-security-or-privacy-issue https://appleinsider.com/articles/20/11/15/big-sur-telling-a...
    - kps 4y ago
      If you want a picture of the future, imagine a secure boot stamping on a human face — forever.

zahllos 4y ago

Agree. There's separate issues at play: the mechanism, what value it adds or subtracts and how it can be used. The critical component is allowing end users to control their own devices. Fair disclosure, I've been involved in products supporting secure boot, have run my own laptop with my own keys such that only my signed stuff runs. I also have one of those Talos 2 boards and it also supports its own secure boot, even though all of the software all the way down to the firmware is open source. So far Microsoft have actually been pretty reasonable: they enabled the shim in the first place. No Linux distros including heavyweights like Redhat or Canonical stepped up to undergo the requirements for default inclusion in the UEFI forum. It always strikes me as a logical fallacy to argue against having a secure boot but then be pro end to end encryption. 'Secure boot is being used to oppress us therefore secure boot is bad' is as extreme a view as 'some awful human beings share csam so end-to-end bad'. Ultimately in both cases the problem is societal and not technical. We need consumer rights protections so we don't end up renting our devices, and we need policing and community work to eradicate csam. Frothing at the mouth misinformed 'activism' comes across very badly to people outside the tech world we necessarily need to engage to make constructive policies for the future.

cowtools 4y ago
Secure boot is opressive when you don't have the keys. So is encryption.
- trelane 4y ago
  If someone else has the keys, you're not the owner, you're a renter.
Perseids 4y ago
Your arguments strike me as inconsistent. You say we need consumer rights protections so we don't end up renting our devices, but then you criticize the comment that speaks up about a consumer rights problem. > There's separate issues at play: the mechanism, what value it adds or subtracts and how it can be used. The thing is, it's absurd to separate these issues. Look at it from the perspective of most users: Secure Boot is a solution to a minuscule problem. The vast majority of exploits happen in their browsers, office suits or due to social engineering (phishing, ransomware, adware). So from the start, to sway the trade-off in favor to Secure Boot, the trouble it generates must be minuscule as well. And that is not the case: From the beginning Secure Boot has been a threat to free OS choice on PCs. Microsoft did not start by proposing a non-profit steward that will find good rules how code signing can be implemented and what rules you have to follow to be let in. That would have been "pretty reasonable". Instead they declared themselves rulers and it required a massive effort of the free software community to find ways to fulfill the requirements Microsoft unilaterally declared. Being able to find a working process with Microsoft has generated some fragile trust, but all of that is in peril with news like Lenovo removing the Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA from their default installation. If you would really care about letting the mechanism stand on its own without it being intermingled with politics (and I read that you care about that from the cited line) there is only one solution: Take the private keys to the Secure Boot certificates away from Microsoft and hand them over to neutral party. (And of course that will not happen, and thus the political and technical side remain deeply intertwined.)