> Because then it's rather obvious that having one less bootloader allowed by default means less potential for vulnerabilities. Even if this was true, the fact

> Because then it's rather obvious that having one less bootloader allowed by default means less potential for vulnerabilities. Even if this was true, the fact that this defaults to having the MS signature enabled by default (and the other signatures have to enabled manually) should already make any security-oriented person shiver extensively, considering MS's vulnerability record. At least, it is clearly an (anti-)trust issue, which is already grounds to dismiss the entire idea. Second, the fact that it may reduce the attack surface by an infinitesimal amount, and not even in paper (since the attack surface is still theoretically the same), is really an argument for it? By the same logic, I can always argue for having 40+-character length passwords and other rather dubious practices, which by definition also improve security -- and these ones at least do so on paper. It's just that security people already know that this infinitesimal improvement just does not warrant the other can of worms that such an approach opens, i.e. it is not worth the trade-off. And third, there are better ways to reduce the attack surface to an even lower level; ways that do not put a single vendor in control of the security of the entire ecosystem. Claiming "this is one way, we should do it!" is textbook politician's fallacy. I will note that this crap hasn't worked for Apple when arguing why they should remain an steward of the entire Apple software ecosystem , and it shouldn't work for MS, either.