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> The 2FA nonsense does basically nothing in practice (vetting will not and should not magically go away), and only adds an undue burden on developers. I don't
by woodruffw 4y ago
> The 2FA nonsense does basically nothing in practice (vetting will not and should not magically go away), and only adds an undue burden on developers.
I don't understand this claim -- are you saying that 2FA adds no protection of value in the context of package maintainership, or that does nothing in general? I'd like to understand the reasoning behind either, whichever it is.
My 0.02c is that 2FA has empirically reduced the incidence of ATOs on major services, and eliminates entire systemic weaknesses in account systems (like ATO via password reset). It stands to reason (to me) that PyPI is a service like all others, and benefits similarly.
- dvt 4y ago> I don't understand this claim -- are you saying that 2FA adds no protection of value in the context of package maintainership, or that does nothing in general? I'm trying to say two things: (1) that 2FA adds little, if any, protection of value in the context of package maintainership. In other words, if someone wants to be a malicious actor (say, they had a "legitimate" package from versions 1.0 to 2.1, but 2.2 contains a trojan), they can do it even with 2FA. And (2), it adds an undue burden developers, particularly brand new ones that just want to "publish their package," have to deal with. If you're 15 or 16 years old, excited to finally get your package on PyPI, but all of a sudden, you have to jump through all these hoops, including doxxing yourself and providing a real phone number, you would 100% be deterred.
- woodruffw 4y ago> In other words, if someone wants to be a malicious actor (say, they had a "legitimate" package from versions 1.0 to 2.1, but 2.2 contains a trojan), they can do it even with 2FA. That's a different threat model. We're talking about account takeover, which is a separate risk from maintainers going rogue. 2FA addresses the former; the latter is difficult to address in the general case. Nevertheless, it's something that people are tackling both with static analysis and "reputational" schemes. > it adds an undue burden developers, particularly brand new ones that just want to "publish their package," have to deal with You're right, which is why it's not mandatory for everyday users. The decision to enable 2FA for "critical" packages is a practical and calculated one: most critical packages are maintained not by brand new PyPI users, but by seasoned engineers who understand their centrality to the ecosystem and the importance of measures that secure their work. There's no current plan to make 2FA mandatory for every single user; the threat model doesn't justify it. > including doxxing yourself and providing a real phone number, you would 100% be deterred. I'm not sure what this has to do with PyPI. PyPI does not and has never supported SMS 2FA. This was an intentional design decision on my part. The only supported 2FA methods are TOTP and WebAuthn, both of which can (and do, by default) preserve nominal anonymity. No phone numbers are involved.
- anothernewdude 4y ago2FA: 1. Doesn't protect against the developer actually being malicious 2. Is able to be broken, especially when both factors occur on the same mobile device. 3. Doesn't do anything to prevent the theft of API keys from CI/CD builds.
- woodruffw 4y ago2FA has never been described as protecting against (1) or (3). That’s not what it’s for; treating these as deficiencies is tantamount to criticizing a hammer for driving screws poorly. 2FA exists to make authentication more difficult for an impostor or attacker. The goal is to prevent account takeover, which has historically been a risk to critical packages in multiple ecosystems. (2) is sort of ambiguous. I’m not aware of a major case of either TOTP or WebAuthn being compromised en masse because it was on the same device as the first factor. I’m not even aware of a case where WebAuthn has been meaningfully attacked, full stop, despite theoretical breaks of hardware stores. Even with a full break, WebAuthn provides detectability: cloning the factor means cloning the counter, which will alert the user on the next login. On whole, I think it's incorrect to frame 2FA as generally breakable without qualifying the threat and explaining how it applies to PyPI users.