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>I think the article overlooks that the reasons for declining birth rate in different places are different. Among white Americans and Europeans, declining birth

>I think the article overlooks that the reasons for declining birth rate in different places are different. Among white Americans and Europeans, declining birth rates are due to post-modern views about families, social obligations, and self determination. In Bangladesh (where I’m from) it’s a matter of population control in a densely populated country. OP here. You're correct, I didn't get into specific reasons for why fertility has declined. This was primarily because it would send the article of on a tangent but also because the final outcome is the same regardless of the reasons behind it. The key point I was trying to highlight was that religious people can be persuaded to drastically reduce their fertility. Within Bangladesh, there was a persistent Islamic resistance to the adoption of birth control, though its adoption eventually won out despite their ultra-conservative religious views. which is what I wanted to stress. >As countries develop economically (and face demographic inversion) I wouldn’t assume birth rates wouldn’t go back up. The US fertility rate got down to 2 in 1940 (likely due to the economic pressures of the Great Depression) before bouncing back to 3.5 in 1960. Also a very interesting point you bring up, though the 1950s baby boom was predicated on the end of WWII + post-WWII prosperity. In countries like India and Bangladesh the middle class and aspirants towards upward mobility often face significantly more expenses that a 1950s American did. For example, education is a major financial expense. Private schooling is often viewed as a must by anyone who can afford it, owing to the poor quality of public schooling in these countries. So is private tuition. Unlike 1950s America it is very difficult to achieve middle class status without a university education (and even then it is not a given), these factors serve as strong incentives too reducing the number of children in these countries. Likewise conservative practices like dowries also may be driving the birth rate down as it is viewed as the responsibility of the parents to raise a substantial enough dowry to ensure their daughter can land a decent husband. Families who cannot achieve this will be viewed as parents who failed their daughters. Unfortunately, neoliberalism has increased not decreased the size and prevalence of dowries. So for this reason, I do not foresee a South Asian baby boom as it enters middle-income status. Asian nations like South Korea didn't see one for the same reasons.

rayiner 4y ago
> but also because the final outcome is the same regardless of the reasons behind it. I disagree the outcome is the same, for the reason suggested by your second point. > Unlike 1950s America it is very difficult to achieve middle class status without a university education (and even then it is not a given), these factors serve as strong incentives too reducing the number of children in these countries. European countries have found it difficult to increase their birth rates, despite robust incentives and social services, because in their post-religion society people don’t view child rearing as a moral obligation. Bangladesh, by contrast, hasn’t experienced the same religious and cultural changes. Thus, the population could respond differently in the event the economic and resource pressures are removed. That’s why the reason for the decline in birth rate matters. Over the remainder of the century, Bangladesh and India are going to suffer a severe demographic inversion even as it becomes a middle income country. Thats’s a recipe for a reversal in family planning targets, as evidenced by China’s three child policy. Bangladeshis are going to need much less persuasion to have more kids than Germans. Moreover, there is going to be strong migration out of this part of the world to Europe due to population decline in the former and climate change pressures in the latter. The fertility rate of Muslim immigrants to Europe remains robustly above that of native Europeans. Indeed, several projections show the world becoming more religious over the next century: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/islam-could-become-the-worlds-largest-religion-after-2070/389210/ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/is...

rayiner 4y ago

> but also because the final outcome is the same regardless of the reasons behind it. I disagree the outcome is the same, for the reason suggested by your second point. > Unlike 1950s America it is very difficult to achieve middle class status without a university education (and even then it is not a given), these factors serve as strong incentives too reducing the number of children in these countries. European countries have found it difficult to increase their birth rates, despite robust incentives and social services, because in their post-religion society people don’t view child rearing as a moral obligation. Bangladesh, by contrast, hasn’t experienced the same religious and cultural changes. Thus, the population could respond differently in the event the economic and resource pressures are removed. That’s why the reason for the decline in birth rate matters. Over the remainder of the century, Bangladesh and India are going to suffer a severe demographic inversion even as it becomes a middle income country. Thats’s a recipe for a reversal in family planning targets, as evidenced by China’s three child policy. Bangladeshis are going to need much less persuasion to have more kids than Germans. Moreover, there is going to be strong migration out of this part of the world to Europe due to population decline in the former and climate change pressures in the latter. The fertility rate of Muslim immigrants to Europe remains robustly above that of native Europeans. Indeed, several projections show the world becoming more religious over the next century: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/islam-could-become-the-worlds-largest-religion-after-2070/389210/ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/is...