I think at the core of this probe is strong-arming by market domination, hence antitrust. In theory, patent cross-licensing agreements should be designed to po

I think at the core of this probe is strong-arming by market domination, hence antitrust. In theory, patent cross-licensing agreements should be designed to pool up patents covering the standard, so that every user of such standard could use it regardless of patent portfolio. In practice, with large enough market share to push standards on end users standard consortium can develop a standard inherently infringing on patents held by non-members and use market domination to strong-arm non-members into either reducing presence while litigating or joining the cross-licensing agreement, effectively rendering patents held unenforceable. From what it reads that is the issue: patent pools coupled with market dominance used to expand said patent pool. Other commenters mention an orthogonal issue - cross-licensed patent pools as a tool to effectively eliminate software patents. However, this misses the main point raised by this probe - which companies emerge victorious and in this case (such cases) the founding members emerge on top due to pre-established market dominance.