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I consider iCloud backups being enabled by default to be a backdoor to E2E encryption; however there's a "more real" backdoor in iMessage, which is that Apple c

I consider iCloud backups being enabled by default to be a backdoor to E2E encryption; however there's a "more real" backdoor in iMessage, which is that Apple can undetectably add new devices (i.e. an FBI iPhone) to conversations so that all forward secrecy is broken. This has not been fixed. https://www.wired.com/2015/09/apple-fighting-privacy-imessage-still-problems/ https://www.wired.com/2015/09/apple-fighting-privacy-imessag...

londons_explore 4y ago
Remember that the FBI really doesn't want to get caught nor does Apple. So if you make a software package that monitors for "FBI iPhones" being added to your account, and make that available on github for other people to use, and have it send results back to a big web dashboard, then both the FBI and Apple would have to immediately stop for fear of being caught. Such a package could be on Mac, where you have easy root access, because the e2e keys of chats has to be visible to all clients, not just iPhones. Remember you only have to find one convincing case of Apple/FBI adding a phone to a users account without consent, and Apples privacy conscious reputation is ruined.