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>We already know Apple has preserved a backdoor in the end-to-end cryptography of iMessage at the FBI's behest, as reported by Reuters. WhatsApp has always had

by xoa 4y ago

>We already know Apple has preserved a backdoor in the end-to-end cryptography of iMessage at the FBI's behest, as reported by Reuters. WhatsApp has always had the same backdoor (unencrypted backups to cloud services). The largest services are all unsafe for privacy. I don't agree with your characterization of that as a "backdoor" and I think that dilutes the term dangerously. There is no need to use Apple's backup at all, iDevices can still be backed up to your own computer same as always. I do think it's a real problem and one of the real clear cases where Apple's lockdown is anti-user, it should be possible to direct convenient automatic backup at any service one wishes using standard APIs. But it's not any kind of backdoor in iMessage, in the same way it's not a backdoor in Signal or whatever else you might choose to run. Or would be a backdoor if you decided to do unencrypted backups to your own NAS because you decided under your threat model that physical attacks there were less of a risk/value then losing data due to losing keys or something. It's an entirely orthogonal system to the encryption of the messengers themselves. It's not a "backdoor" in a communications system, any communications system, if someone chooses to keep logs unprotected elsewhere. Lack of E2EE in the most convenient wireless backups is a flaw in the general iOS ecosystem, not iMessage specifically.

nr2x 4y ago
As long as iCloud backup is a) on by default, and b) isn’t clearly marked as being readable to Apple, it is a back door in practice, especially since the FBI is the reason that they did this. Let’s not even talk about Chinese users, as apparently Apple bending over to store all their data in CCP data centers doesn’t count.
- aaaaaaaaata 4y ago
  > As long as iCloud backup is a) on by default, and b) isn’t clearly marked as being readable to Apple, it is a back door in practice Tough to disagree.
- natch 4y ago
  Agree and it's not just Chinese users. Just talking about that one country (there are others, let's set that aside) it's Chinese users, and anyone who happens to be in China, and it would seem to be also anyone who, knowingly or unknowingly, anywhere around the world… in the US, the UK, the EU, etc… anywhere, has so much as a one-time interaction with such a user. I feel like that paragraph would lose most people because it's a long chain of connections. It's hard to do a TL;DR but here, I'll try: Basically "If you message someone in China, Apple sees to it that your identity and content is handed to the Chinese government." I don't know this for a fact. But as far as I can tell (and they aren't saying anything) this is exactly what is going on.
  - nr2x 4y ago
    Interesting point! The thing with Apple that annoys me is they believe their own marketing, but if you say "Privacy is a Human Right" and deny it to Chinese citizens, you either don't consider Chinese people human, or you are full of shit. Honestly, not sure where Apple stands given their labor practices in China, the people who assemble the widgets certainly haven't been treated like human beings.
- xoa 4y ago
  No, you're just wrong, even if your statements were right which they aren't either. Again, by your logic every single communication system on iOS is "backdoored" simply because iCloud Backup exists. Or for that matter any comms method on Linux or FreeBSD or macOS or Windows if someone makes unencrypted backups. That's horse shit, and it degrades the specificity and value of the term "backdoor" in the same way as "bricked" has become. Backdooring is a specific part of a given product/stack, a covert method of bypassing regular authentication. There is no convert status here, Apple clearly lays out exactly what components of iCloud are encrypted and how in their "iCloud security overview" [0]. And it's not as if E2EE backups have no downsides mass market, it means that users are fully responsible for their data with zero recovery possible. I still think Apple is wrong to not offer even the capability to do better wirelessly/networked and in fact that should be against the law, but it's not a "backdoor" and if there were options I'm sure lots of people would still pick the "recoverable in an emergency" one. Think, if it turns out there actually is a backdoor in iMessage, like a secret second key that can be applied to any MITM'd data to decrypt it, how would you even describe that pray tell as different from "choosing to use a non-E2EE backup method"? Or do you not think any differentiation there would matter, that such a thing would be identical to you saying right now that "Signal has a backdoor"? All that said: >a) on by default I've never seen it on by default, it's a toggle. I can't find anything to support this assertion, and Apple's docs seem to indicate too it must be turned on [1]. How would it even be possible for this to work? Apple only gives you 5GB by default, and backups absolutely count against the quota. >and b) isn’t clearly marked as being readable to Apple As I linked they do clearly convey that. If you think it should be some extra warning dialog on enabling it, maybe that's a criticism, but there's certainly no standard around that across software industry-wide including on computers. Whether something is E2EE or not is usually something those that care need to look up. Maybe that should change. But no, it's not a "backdoor in practice". >Let’s not even talk about Chinese users, as apparently Apple bending over to store all their data in CCP data centers doesn’t count. No let's not, and no it doesn't here. That's a case with a lot more complexity then tends to come out on HN where instead people like you use it as a lazy bit of whataboutism. Apple is in the wrong there, and the US for allowing/encouraging it as well, but not for the same reasons as with the FBI and the path away from it is very different and harder as well. They deserve major blame in both cases, but why they deserve blame differs, and that matters. ---- 0: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 1: https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/back-up-iphone-iph3ecf67d29/ios https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/back-up-iphone-iph3ec...
concinds 4y ago
I consider iCloud backups being enabled by default to be a backdoor to E2E encryption; however there's a "more real" backdoor in iMessage, which is that Apple can undetectably add new devices (i.e. an FBI iPhone) to conversations so that all forward secrecy is broken. This has not been fixed. https://www.wired.com/2015/09/apple-fighting-privacy-imessage-still-problems/ https://www.wired.com/2015/09/apple-fighting-privacy-imessag...
- londons_explore 4y ago
  Remember that the FBI really doesn't want to get caught nor does Apple. So if you make a software package that monitors for "FBI iPhones" being added to your account, and make that available on github for other people to use, and have it send results back to a big web dashboard, then both the FBI and Apple would have to immediately stop for fear of being caught. Such a package could be on Mac, where you have easy root access, because the e2e keys of chats has to be visible to all clients, not just iPhones. Remember you only have to find one convincing case of Apple/FBI adding a phone to a users account without consent, and Apples privacy conscious reputation is ruined.
sneak 4y ago
> There is no need to use Apple's backup at all, iDevices can still be backed up to your own computer same as always. Even if you disable iCloud Backup, Apple can still read all of your iMessages. They'll be in the (on by default) iCloud Backups of everyone you chat with. It is absolutely a backdoor: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... You may not be aware that Signal endpoint keys are of a device-local storage class that are excluded from backups of any kind, and consequently they do not leave the device. iMessage endpoint keys are backed up to Apple, effectively without encryption. There is no step you can take that will easily compromise your Signal endpoint keys to a second party. Simply logging in to an iPhone (required to install apps!) will configure your device to escrow your iMessage keys to Apple. That's a backdoor any way you slice it.
stereoradonc 4y ago
Why use Apple in the first place? Problem solved.

by xoa 4y ago

nr2x 4y ago

As long as iCloud backup is a) on by default, and b) isn’t clearly marked as being readable to Apple, it is a back door in practice, especially since the FBI is the reason that they did this. Let’s not even talk about Chinese users, as apparently Apple bending over to store all their data in CCP data centers doesn’t count.

aaaaaaaaata 4y ago
> As long as iCloud backup is a) on by default, and b) isn’t clearly marked as being readable to Apple, it is a back door in practice Tough to disagree.
natch 4y ago
Agree and it's not just Chinese users. Just talking about that one country (there are others, let's set that aside) it's Chinese users, and anyone who happens to be in China, and it would seem to be also anyone who, knowingly or unknowingly, anywhere around the world… in the US, the UK, the EU, etc… anywhere, has so much as a one-time interaction with such a user. I feel like that paragraph would lose most people because it's a long chain of connections. It's hard to do a TL;DR but here, I'll try: Basically "If you message someone in China, Apple sees to it that your identity and content is handed to the Chinese government." I don't know this for a fact. But as far as I can tell (and they aren't saying anything) this is exactly what is going on.
- nr2x 4y ago
  Interesting point! The thing with Apple that annoys me is they believe their own marketing, but if you say "Privacy is a Human Right" and deny it to Chinese citizens, you either don't consider Chinese people human, or you are full of shit. Honestly, not sure where Apple stands given their labor practices in China, the people who assemble the widgets certainly haven't been treated like human beings.
xoa 4y ago
No, you're just wrong, even if your statements were right which they aren't either. Again, by your logic every single communication system on iOS is "backdoored" simply because iCloud Backup exists. Or for that matter any comms method on Linux or FreeBSD or macOS or Windows if someone makes unencrypted backups. That's horse shit, and it degrades the specificity and value of the term "backdoor" in the same way as "bricked" has become. Backdooring is a specific part of a given product/stack, a covert method of bypassing regular authentication. There is no convert status here, Apple clearly lays out exactly what components of iCloud are encrypted and how in their "iCloud security overview" [0]. And it's not as if E2EE backups have no downsides mass market, it means that users are fully responsible for their data with zero recovery possible. I still think Apple is wrong to not offer even the capability to do better wirelessly/networked and in fact that should be against the law, but it's not a "backdoor" and if there were options I'm sure lots of people would still pick the "recoverable in an emergency" one. Think, if it turns out there actually is a backdoor in iMessage, like a secret second key that can be applied to any MITM'd data to decrypt it, how would you even describe that pray tell as different from "choosing to use a non-E2EE backup method"? Or do you not think any differentiation there would matter, that such a thing would be identical to you saying right now that "Signal has a backdoor"? All that said: >a) on by default I've never seen it on by default, it's a toggle. I can't find anything to support this assertion, and Apple's docs seem to indicate too it must be turned on [1]. How would it even be possible for this to work? Apple only gives you 5GB by default, and backups absolutely count against the quota. >and b) isn’t clearly marked as being readable to Apple As I linked they do clearly convey that. If you think it should be some extra warning dialog on enabling it, maybe that's a criticism, but there's certainly no standard around that across software industry-wide including on computers. Whether something is E2EE or not is usually something those that care need to look up. Maybe that should change. But no, it's not a "backdoor in practice". >Let’s not even talk about Chinese users, as apparently Apple bending over to store all their data in CCP data centers doesn’t count. No let's not, and no it doesn't here. That's a case with a lot more complexity then tends to come out on HN where instead people like you use it as a lazy bit of whataboutism. Apple is in the wrong there, and the US for allowing/encouraging it as well, but not for the same reasons as with the FBI and the path away from it is very different and harder as well. They deserve major blame in both cases, but why they deserve blame differs, and that matters. ---- 0: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 1: https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/back-up-iphone-iph3ecf67d29/ios https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/back-up-iphone-iph3ec...

concinds 4y ago

I consider iCloud backups being enabled by default to be a backdoor to E2E encryption; however there's a "more real" backdoor in iMessage, which is that Apple can undetectably add new devices (i.e. an FBI iPhone) to conversations so that all forward secrecy is broken. This has not been fixed. https://www.wired.com/2015/09/apple-fighting-privacy-imessage-still-problems/ https://www.wired.com/2015/09/apple-fighting-privacy-imessag...

londons_explore 4y ago
Remember that the FBI really doesn't want to get caught nor does Apple. So if you make a software package that monitors for "FBI iPhones" being added to your account, and make that available on github for other people to use, and have it send results back to a big web dashboard, then both the FBI and Apple would have to immediately stop for fear of being caught. Such a package could be on Mac, where you have easy root access, because the e2e keys of chats has to be visible to all clients, not just iPhones. Remember you only have to find one convincing case of Apple/FBI adding a phone to a users account without consent, and Apples privacy conscious reputation is ruined.

sneak 4y ago

> There is no need to use Apple's backup at all, iDevices can still be backed up to your own computer same as always. Even if you disable iCloud Backup, Apple can still read all of your iMessages. They'll be in the (on by default) iCloud Backups of everyone you chat with. It is absolutely a backdoor: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... You may not be aware that Signal endpoint keys are of a device-local storage class that are excluded from backups of any kind, and consequently they do not leave the device. iMessage endpoint keys are backed up to Apple, effectively without encryption. There is no step you can take that will easily compromise your Signal endpoint keys to a second party. Simply logging in to an iPhone (required to install apps!) will configure your device to escrow your iMessage keys to Apple. That's a backdoor any way you slice it.

stereoradonc 4y ago

Why use Apple in the first place? Problem solved.