17 ms·

Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

204 points by danso 4y ago

drawkbox 4y ago
> The code shows that the messages were secretly duplicated and sent to a “ghost” contact that was hidden from the users’ contact lists. Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. Other areas that "secure" messaging apps have holes in is the anti-spam/moderation systems that need to view messages and in the clients themselves who have access to the unencrypted content. This is also taking place in other client apps as well: VPN, password managers, extensions, wallets, even build systems and more. Many like VPNs have logs sent elsewhere but deleted locally -- access to entire machine and all network access. People are way too trusting of "secure" systems/apps that are very common today based on trust. All of these apps/systems would pass code checks, reviews, security inspections and essentially be encrypted/"secure" though a copy is sent off to another area for review. At runtime the leak is in the direction of the data.
- mavhc 4y ago
  Matrix treats all chats as chatrooms, even 2 people chats. This is promoted as a simplification, but maybe it's a security problem. If a protocol only allows 2 people to chat, harder to exfiltrate the messages
  - jeroenhd 4y ago
    Encrypted chats need device/key verification/permission before the receiver can see any message contents. Even if Matrix were to limit chats by protocol, a malicious sysadmin could probably fake a cross-signed device if they had access to the client like this. I don't think this is actually a problem, a chat room is as good a representation as anything.
  - Arathorn 4y ago
    As the sibling implies: it doesn’t matter if the conversation is limited to 2 users - it’d just shift the attack adding a ghost device to one of those users, which is equivalent (and arguably more subtle) than adding a 3rd user to the conversation.
- dmix 4y ago
  > Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. It's how Apple would do iMessage intercepts for the FBI.
  - criddell 4y ago
    I wonder if Messages will be available at all in lockdown mode? If Apple can be compelled to build in surveillance (and it's not clear to me that they can be), then it really should be.
    - selykg 4y ago
      I think they indicated it will be, for example, they indicated that link previews would not be available, if I recall correctly.
    - gabagool 4y ago
      In a word, yes. > Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled. https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/07/apple-expands-commitment-to-protect-users-from-mercenary-spyware/ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/07/apple-expands-commitm...
      - londons_explore 4y ago
        Lockdown mode protects against bad snoopers, not good snoopers...
  - nojito 4y ago
    You can't really do this in iMessage.
    - vorpalhex 4y ago
      What makes you think that?
      - 4y ago
- richbell 4y ago
  > Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. Lots of VPNs, too! "We don't keep any logs! We just pipe a direct feed to the government so they can keep logs!"
  - l33t2328 4y ago
    Do you have any examples?
    - richbell 4y ago
      Unfortunately Google is failing me right now. There was a case within the last few years where someone was convicted because their VPN provider was sharing raw traffic (not logs) with the government. If anyone knows what I'm referring to, please chime in. But given the existence of Room 641A[0], and other extra-judicial mass surveillance, I am confident in my assertion. Moreover, the explosion of VPN companies with large marketing budgets over the past few years has always made me suspicious. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A
      - mike00632 4y ago
        You're probably thinking of the big story from January of this year: https://www.pcmag.com/news/nordvpn-actually-we-do-comply-with-law-enforcement-data-requests https://www.pcmag.com/news/nordvpn-actually-we-do-comply-wit... NordVPN says they don't collect logs, but then it came out that they send information to law enforcement. So the big question is what information is being sent to law enforcement. Despite what NordVPN maintains, it seems like they do keep incriminating data about their users.
        Terry_Roll 4y ago
        Maybe the vast majority of big companies listed on stock markets work for the govt, and the price of a CEO or board member keeping quiet is the income and wealth gained from these stock market listed entities?
- SheinhardtWigCo 4y ago
  All E2EE does is keep the general herd of users safe from malicious insiders and script kiddies. It's valuable but doesn't make these apps worthy of the catch-all "secure" descriptor. For anyone worth targeting, there are so many options available to actors with moderate resources. They will pwn your OS with an RCE exploit; or interfere the next time you update that "E2EE" app via Google or Apple's servers; or your laptop will take a few seconds longer to reappear at airport security; etc. Marketing messengers as "secure" because they use some derivative of the Double Ratchet is like your bank saying your funds are secure because their website uses TLS.
- oceanplexian 4y ago
  You also have to keep in mind that spreading FUD about secure messaging apps can be a type of manipulation, in some cases planted by the FBI. If you don't have confidence in say, iMessage, which is pretty secure, you might instead go for a "secure" messaging app that's actually a plant (Like Anom).
  - asdff 4y ago
    I would be bewildered if the FBI doesn't have a back door into every messaging app allowed on american cell phones. That being said there is one chat app that cannot be easily broken by the FBI: Pictochat on the nintendo DS. You would need an FBI agent with a nintendo DS searching for chat rooms in physical proximity to the communicators.
    - mjreacher 4y ago
      I'm not sure if this is 100% serious but if it is, how could the FBI having a backdoor into every messaging app fit in with the relative ineffectiveness of the FBI?[0] If they truly did have the ability to spy on any messaging app without issue then you would expect them to have far more success than they actually do. For comparison, a quick Google search says China has a 99.9% conviction rate. Remember security and intelligence agencies also want people to think they are some omnipotent and omniscient entity that you cannot escape from, even though we know this is far from true[1][2]. [0]: https://time.com/magazine/us/5264136/may-14th-2018-vol-191-no-18-u-s/ https://time.com/magazine/us/5264136/may-14th-2018-vol-191-n... [1]: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/asia/china-cia-spies-espionage.html https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/asia/china-cia-spie... [2]: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/05/us/politics/cia-informants-killed-captured.html https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/05/us/politics/cia-informant...
      - danso 4y ago
        This is kind of a nitpick, but U.S. prosecutors also boast 99+% conviction rates. Note that conviction rate is not necessarily indicative of a systems effectiveness (or lack of fairness). Prosecutors only pursue charges in very few cases, and very few of those cases go to trial https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-f...
- legalcorrection 4y ago
  >Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. That's a broad claim. Do you have specific examples?
- londons_explore 4y ago
  How could it be done better? I imagine for example, the protocol could be opensource and documented, and then the app-maker could be a different company than the server-owner. The server-owner need not be trustworthy as long as the protocol is sufficiently reviewed. The app-maker still needs to be trusted, but you can at least constrain the app to only communicating with the one allowed server and having no other network access. Perhaps the server owner could also make a webpage showing all the people you have communicated with... That way a malicious client couldn't send your data astray.
- asdff 4y ago
  I don't know why radicals can't go back to physical written works and spoken word. No surveillance from someone sitting in a cubical 1000 miles a way at least. Suddenly the agency needs to spend a lot more money and effort to physically infiltrate your group and intercept written communication. It's worked for thousands of years, and the internet has not made it obsolete contrary to popular belief.
  - go_elmo 4y ago
    Still easier to do it digitally and e.g. physically exchange digital encryption keys?
    - sweetbitter 4y ago
      Yes lol. You can share your AES key physically and write/edit an application that encrypts with that. You could share one time pads, or other preshared secrets for techniques like winnowing and chaffing and whatnot. Always amusing that these guys always opt for trust in some bizarre app.
- more_corn 4y ago
  Anom wouldn’t pass a security review. Certainly not a successful decompile. Certainly not code review.
sneak 4y ago
> Last year, the FBI and its international partners announced Operation Trojan Shield, in which the FBI secretly ran an encrypted phone company called Anom for years and used it to hoover up tens of millions of messages from Anom users. What other services might be run, controlled, or surveilled by the US investigative authorities? What other services might have operators that can be extorted or blackmailed by those same authorities, due to the fact that US-based data aggregators (FAANG et al) have extensive information about the lifestyles, behaviors, habits, and travel of billions of people worldwide? We already know Apple has preserved a backdoor in the end-to-end cryptography of iMessage at the FBI's behest, as reported by Reuters. WhatsApp has always had the same backdoor (unencrypted backups to cloud services). The largest services are all unsafe for privacy. What about the medium-sized ones?
- mavhc 4y ago
  > What other services might be run, controlled, or surveilled by the US investigative authorities? All closed source software
- astroid 4y ago
  I know this isn't probably the best approach in general, but it feels like a decent compromise for my use case: I try to use medium sized services that are based in other countries. I figure if their government has insisted on backdoors it is less directly impactful than if my government does. I don't really have anything to hide anyway so if my assumptions/approach is wrong then worst case they find out about the concert I'm talking about going to. I grew up thinking encryption and technology were going to free us though, and have found reality to be quite the opposite -- so I try to cover my tracks out of spite I guess.
- xoa 4y ago
  >We already know Apple has preserved a backdoor in the end-to-end cryptography of iMessage at the FBI's behest, as reported by Reuters. WhatsApp has always had the same backdoor (unencrypted backups to cloud services). The largest services are all unsafe for privacy. I don't agree with your characterization of that as a "backdoor" and I think that dilutes the term dangerously. There is no need to use Apple's backup at all, iDevices can still be backed up to your own computer same as always. I do think it's a real problem and one of the real clear cases where Apple's lockdown is anti-user, it should be possible to direct convenient automatic backup at any service one wishes using standard APIs. But it's not any kind of backdoor in iMessage, in the same way it's not a backdoor in Signal or whatever else you might choose to run. Or would be a backdoor if you decided to do unencrypted backups to your own NAS because you decided under your threat model that physical attacks there were less of a risk/value then losing data due to losing keys or something. It's an entirely orthogonal system to the encryption of the messengers themselves. It's not a "backdoor" in a communications system, any communications system, if someone chooses to keep logs unprotected elsewhere. Lack of E2EE in the most convenient wireless backups is a flaw in the general iOS ecosystem, not iMessage specifically.
gavinray 4y ago
The decompiler they used to view that code is not very good, that output is garbled. If you're going to take apart JVM bytecode, you're better off using Recafe or Quiltflower. https://github.com/Col-E/Recaf https://github.com/Col-E/Recaf https://github.com/QuiltMC/quiltflower https://github.com/QuiltMC/quiltflower
- GranPC 4y ago
  The reason the output is "garbled" is because it was obfuscated with ProGuard - there's no real way around that except for manually renaming variables and classes. Any idea whether any of these two decompilers work with Dalvik bytecode?
  - AtNightWeCode 4y ago
    You could always use dex2jar first. https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar
jliptzin 4y ago
So what's the strategy moving forward? The operation clearly hasn't permanently solved crime, the next generation of organized crime bosses won't trust any apps to handle their secrets, so I guess their communication just moves offline again? Or maybe each develops their own methods in house that they know they can trust (such as shooting holes in a wall on call of duty)?
- phendrenad2 4y ago
  In my opinion the goal is similar to the MPAA's goals with movie piracy: Make it harder, and many people will stop doing it. Ultimately, that is what banks do when they put money into vaults. Someone could still steal the money, but it's insanely difficult.
  - soulofmischief 4y ago
    But in many cases, movie piracy is faster, more convenient and more agreeable than consuming through locked down ad funnels like Netflix or Disney+ which don't let me outright own the content or the viewing experience, or Blu-rays which enforce DRM and specific region-locked devices.
    - phendrenad2 4y ago
      You're the pirate equivalent of a master jewel thief. "It's so easy! Just hotwire the security system, dance through the laser field, duh!" It's stochastic. They want to cut out casual piracy, those of us who know how to pirate are acceptable losses.
      - soulofmischief 4y ago
        I'm speaking on the UX involved in the process. If you can understand the technology at a working level (about as difficult as learning to install a browser or email client) then you have access to an ecosystem that prizes discoverability and lack of friction. There aren't laser fields. There's a directory and concierge. A full back-catalogue. A social network. Most importantly, the viewing experience is consistent across all media, your media viewer of choice, without the need for a constant internet connection. Just like it used to be. I don't encourage rampant piracy, but I certainly understand when some people don't have the luxury of purchasing an unlocked blu-ray ripper and storing old blu-rays in order to get the same viewing experience. Another good example is old games like NOLF which are entirely unplayable today without piracy. Pirated releases often contain much smaller download sizes as well as patches to enhance or correct the experience. Pirating won't convince companies to change, so I vote with my wallet by trying to avoid purchasing media which has unacceptable licensing terms or pervasive DRM, and purchasing any media which I think integrates my values. I also only purchase on platforms which prize discoverability, such as GOG or Steam, while avoiding locked-down platforms like Origin or Epic Games store.
jdc0589 4y ago
weird. the page briefly loads and then goes to a full screen 404 page for me.
- charonn0 4y ago
  I'm able to read it if I turn off Javascript.
xt00 4y ago
I wish somebody would create some scheme to like self host the backend of an app.. like you launch Signal and it has a button to type in the name of your own server, where that server runs a VM that you configure and setup on your own PC locally then upload to AWS or something and has some facility to constantly report to you the hash of the memory and disk contents, along with some contract from AWS that states that Amazon cannot alter the results of the hash function results sent to you under any circumstances. Plus there would be some facility to validate the contents of what runs in that VM at any instant in time. Basically the idea is you can’t trust anybody at all. I guess pgp would maybe solve this for direct messaging?
- spongechameleon 4y ago
  I think something like Ricochet (if it were still actively maintained) could be a good solution. https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet Every user is their own Tor onion service, so you get E2E encryption and no centralized servers. The whole thing hinges on the security of Tor itself which is probably a safe enough bet.
  - blepyzdiec 4y ago
    Briar https://briarproject.org/ https://briarproject.org/ is similar, plus, AFAIK, it's using E2E on top of Tor service. However, looking at massively caught Tor services, I believe, to keep it truly secure, you have to rotate your service address, aka reinstall the app, losing all your history of communication.
- cwoolfe 4y ago
  It's pretty easy to host your own chat server. https://twitter.com/inputmice/status/1170651869359804416 https://twitter.com/inputmice/status/1170651869359804416
- danielschonfeld 4y ago
  There’s plenty of that stuff. Jabber and XMPP. And also more up to date is Matrix.org which nobody seems to want to use and I’m not sure why. The problem though is that you’re still trusting the code. Nothing stops self hosted from rotting on you unless you look and read the code yourself.
onionisafruit 4y ago
Last year the author of this story was on Darknet Diaries talking about ANOM and encrypted phones in general. It was a good episode. https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/105/ https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/105/
- itintheory 4y ago
  Great podcast, I really like the stories. Unfortunately it's a little basic technically. Any suggestions for more techy podcasts on netsec / the scene?
  - onionisafruit 4y ago
    Not really. I have trouble following technical podcasts. I prefer to read technical details and listen to stories, so all the podcasts I like are focused on story telling.
mintplant 4y ago
> The code itself is messy, with large chunks commented out and the app repeatedly logging debug messages to the phone itself. […] > For this new analysis of the code, a source provided a copy of the Anom APK as a standalone file which Motherboard then decompiled. This doesn't add up. The code snippets they show are decompiled obfuscated Java. But compilation->decompilation wouldn't have preserved comments from the original source code. Sometimes Java decompilers spit out chunks of code they don't understand as commented-out sections for manual analysis. Maybe Motherboard is misinterpreting this output? And, yeah, decompiled Java is gonna be messy, especially if the compiled code was obfuscated, as looks to be the case here.
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
hertzrat 4y ago
And we wonder why the common person believes in conspiracy theories by the government against them
kali-ghost 4y ago
kali-ghost 4y ago
The only jump on encryption you can hope to have is quantum encryption....If you don't know what quantum encryption is well you better learn. In quantum computing qubits are always in the superimposed position meaning they are all information at the same time ....you change one thing of the first qubits and the second set changes automatically no matter the space or distance away. The military is already developing a way to use qubits to create an active network of communication that cannot be hacked there are papers already published cited:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1269020 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1269020 so you know it's real .....I say again if you ever create something that's world changing you better believe it's not solely yours

204 points by danso 4y ago

> The code shows that the messages were secretly duplicated and sent to a “ghost” contact that was hidden from the users’ contact lists. Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. Other areas that "secure" messaging apps have holes in is the anti-spam/moderation systems that need to view messages and in the clients themselves who have access to the unencrypted content. This is also taking place in other client apps as well: VPN, password managers, extensions, wallets, even build systems and more. Many like VPNs have logs sent elsewhere but deleted locally -- access to entire machine and all network access. People are way too trusting of "secure" systems/apps that are very common today based on trust. All of these apps/systems would pass code checks, reviews, security inspections and essentially be encrypted/"secure" though a copy is sent off to another area for review. At runtime the leak is in the direction of the data.

mavhc 4y ago
Matrix treats all chats as chatrooms, even 2 people chats. This is promoted as a simplification, but maybe it's a security problem. If a protocol only allows 2 people to chat, harder to exfiltrate the messages
- jeroenhd 4y ago
  Encrypted chats need device/key verification/permission before the receiver can see any message contents. Even if Matrix were to limit chats by protocol, a malicious sysadmin could probably fake a cross-signed device if they had access to the client like this. I don't think this is actually a problem, a chat room is as good a representation as anything.
- Arathorn 4y ago
  As the sibling implies: it doesn’t matter if the conversation is limited to 2 users - it’d just shift the attack adding a ghost device to one of those users, which is equivalent (and arguably more subtle) than adding a 3rd user to the conversation.
dmix 4y ago
> Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. It's how Apple would do iMessage intercepts for the FBI.
- criddell 4y ago
  I wonder if Messages will be available at all in lockdown mode? If Apple can be compelled to build in surveillance (and it's not clear to me that they can be), then it really should be.
  - selykg 4y ago
    I think they indicated it will be, for example, they indicated that link previews would not be available, if I recall correctly.
  - gabagool 4y ago
    In a word, yes. > Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled. https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/07/apple-expands-commitment-to-protect-users-from-mercenary-spyware/ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/07/apple-expands-commitm...
    - londons_explore 4y ago
      Lockdown mode protects against bad snoopers, not good snoopers...
- nojito 4y ago
  You can't really do this in iMessage.
  - vorpalhex 4y ago
    What makes you think that?
    - 4y ago
richbell 4y ago
> Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. Lots of VPNs, too! "We don't keep any logs! We just pipe a direct feed to the government so they can keep logs!"
- l33t2328 4y ago
  Do you have any examples?
  - richbell 4y ago
    Unfortunately Google is failing me right now. There was a case within the last few years where someone was convicted because their VPN provider was sharing raw traffic (not logs) with the government. If anyone knows what I'm referring to, please chime in. But given the existence of Room 641A[0], and other extra-judicial mass surveillance, I am confident in my assertion. Moreover, the explosion of VPN companies with large marketing budgets over the past few years has always made me suspicious. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A
    - mike00632 4y ago
      You're probably thinking of the big story from January of this year: https://www.pcmag.com/news/nordvpn-actually-we-do-comply-with-law-enforcement-data-requests https://www.pcmag.com/news/nordvpn-actually-we-do-comply-wit... NordVPN says they don't collect logs, but then it came out that they send information to law enforcement. So the big question is what information is being sent to law enforcement. Despite what NordVPN maintains, it seems like they do keep incriminating data about their users.
      - Terry_Roll 4y ago
        Maybe the vast majority of big companies listed on stock markets work for the govt, and the price of a CEO or board member keeping quiet is the income and wealth gained from these stock market listed entities?
SheinhardtWigCo 4y ago
All E2EE does is keep the general herd of users safe from malicious insiders and script kiddies. It's valuable but doesn't make these apps worthy of the catch-all "secure" descriptor. For anyone worth targeting, there are so many options available to actors with moderate resources. They will pwn your OS with an RCE exploit; or interfere the next time you update that "E2EE" app via Google or Apple's servers; or your laptop will take a few seconds longer to reappear at airport security; etc. Marketing messengers as "secure" because they use some derivative of the Double Ratchet is like your bank saying your funds are secure because their website uses TLS.
oceanplexian 4y ago
You also have to keep in mind that spreading FUD about secure messaging apps can be a type of manipulation, in some cases planted by the FBI. If you don't have confidence in say, iMessage, which is pretty secure, you might instead go for a "secure" messaging app that's actually a plant (Like Anom).
- asdff 4y ago
  I would be bewildered if the FBI doesn't have a back door into every messaging app allowed on american cell phones. That being said there is one chat app that cannot be easily broken by the FBI: Pictochat on the nintendo DS. You would need an FBI agent with a nintendo DS searching for chat rooms in physical proximity to the communicators.
  - mjreacher 4y ago
    I'm not sure if this is 100% serious but if it is, how could the FBI having a backdoor into every messaging app fit in with the relative ineffectiveness of the FBI?[0] If they truly did have the ability to spy on any messaging app without issue then you would expect them to have far more success than they actually do. For comparison, a quick Google search says China has a 99.9% conviction rate. Remember security and intelligence agencies also want people to think they are some omnipotent and omniscient entity that you cannot escape from, even though we know this is far from true[1][2]. [0]: https://time.com/magazine/us/5264136/may-14th-2018-vol-191-no-18-u-s/ https://time.com/magazine/us/5264136/may-14th-2018-vol-191-n... [1]: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/asia/china-cia-spies-espionage.html https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/asia/china-cia-spie... [2]: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/05/us/politics/cia-informants-killed-captured.html https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/05/us/politics/cia-informant...
    - danso 4y ago
      This is kind of a nitpick, but U.S. prosecutors also boast 99+% conviction rates. Note that conviction rate is not necessarily indicative of a systems effectiveness (or lack of fairness). Prosecutors only pursue charges in very few cases, and very few of those cases go to trial https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-f...
legalcorrection 4y ago
>Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. That's a broad claim. Do you have specific examples?
londons_explore 4y ago
How could it be done better? I imagine for example, the protocol could be opensource and documented, and then the app-maker could be a different company than the server-owner. The server-owner need not be trustworthy as long as the protocol is sufficiently reviewed. The app-maker still needs to be trusted, but you can at least constrain the app to only communicating with the one allowed server and having no other network access. Perhaps the server owner could also make a webpage showing all the people you have communicated with... That way a malicious client couldn't send your data astray.
asdff 4y ago
I don't know why radicals can't go back to physical written works and spoken word. No surveillance from someone sitting in a cubical 1000 miles a way at least. Suddenly the agency needs to spend a lot more money and effort to physically infiltrate your group and intercept written communication. It's worked for thousands of years, and the internet has not made it obsolete contrary to popular belief.
- go_elmo 4y ago
  Still easier to do it digitally and e.g. physically exchange digital encryption keys?
  - sweetbitter 4y ago
    Yes lol. You can share your AES key physically and write/edit an application that encrypts with that. You could share one time pads, or other preshared secrets for techniques like winnowing and chaffing and whatnot. Always amusing that these guys always opt for trust in some bizarre app.
more_corn 4y ago
Anom wouldn’t pass a security review. Certainly not a successful decompile. Certainly not code review.

sneak 4y ago

> Last year, the FBI and its international partners announced Operation Trojan Shield, in which the FBI secretly ran an encrypted phone company called Anom for years and used it to hoover up tens of millions of messages from Anom users. What other services might be run, controlled, or surveilled by the US investigative authorities? What other services might have operators that can be extorted or blackmailed by those same authorities, due to the fact that US-based data aggregators (FAANG et al) have extensive information about the lifestyles, behaviors, habits, and travel of billions of people worldwide? We already know Apple has preserved a backdoor in the end-to-end cryptography of iMessage at the FBI's behest, as reported by Reuters. WhatsApp has always had the same backdoor (unencrypted backups to cloud services). The largest services are all unsafe for privacy. What about the medium-sized ones?

mavhc 4y ago
> What other services might be run, controlled, or surveilled by the US investigative authorities? All closed source software
astroid 4y ago
I know this isn't probably the best approach in general, but it feels like a decent compromise for my use case: I try to use medium sized services that are based in other countries. I figure if their government has insisted on backdoors it is less directly impactful than if my government does. I don't really have anything to hide anyway so if my assumptions/approach is wrong then worst case they find out about the concert I'm talking about going to. I grew up thinking encryption and technology were going to free us though, and have found reality to be quite the opposite -- so I try to cover my tracks out of spite I guess.
xoa 4y ago
>We already know Apple has preserved a backdoor in the end-to-end cryptography of iMessage at the FBI's behest, as reported by Reuters. WhatsApp has always had the same backdoor (unencrypted backups to cloud services). The largest services are all unsafe for privacy. I don't agree with your characterization of that as a "backdoor" and I think that dilutes the term dangerously. There is no need to use Apple's backup at all, iDevices can still be backed up to your own computer same as always. I do think it's a real problem and one of the real clear cases where Apple's lockdown is anti-user, it should be possible to direct convenient automatic backup at any service one wishes using standard APIs. But it's not any kind of backdoor in iMessage, in the same way it's not a backdoor in Signal or whatever else you might choose to run. Or would be a backdoor if you decided to do unencrypted backups to your own NAS because you decided under your threat model that physical attacks there were less of a risk/value then losing data due to losing keys or something. It's an entirely orthogonal system to the encryption of the messengers themselves. It's not a "backdoor" in a communications system, any communications system, if someone chooses to keep logs unprotected elsewhere. Lack of E2EE in the most convenient wireless backups is a flaw in the general iOS ecosystem, not iMessage specifically.

gavinray 4y ago

The decompiler they used to view that code is not very good, that output is garbled. If you're going to take apart JVM bytecode, you're better off using Recafe or Quiltflower. https://github.com/Col-E/Recaf https://github.com/Col-E/Recaf https://github.com/QuiltMC/quiltflower https://github.com/QuiltMC/quiltflower

GranPC 4y ago
The reason the output is "garbled" is because it was obfuscated with ProGuard - there's no real way around that except for manually renaming variables and classes. Any idea whether any of these two decompilers work with Dalvik bytecode?
- AtNightWeCode 4y ago
  You could always use dex2jar first. https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar

jliptzin 4y ago

So what's the strategy moving forward? The operation clearly hasn't permanently solved crime, the next generation of organized crime bosses won't trust any apps to handle their secrets, so I guess their communication just moves offline again? Or maybe each develops their own methods in house that they know they can trust (such as shooting holes in a wall on call of duty)?

phendrenad2 4y ago
In my opinion the goal is similar to the MPAA's goals with movie piracy: Make it harder, and many people will stop doing it. Ultimately, that is what banks do when they put money into vaults. Someone could still steal the money, but it's insanely difficult.
- soulofmischief 4y ago
  But in many cases, movie piracy is faster, more convenient and more agreeable than consuming through locked down ad funnels like Netflix or Disney+ which don't let me outright own the content or the viewing experience, or Blu-rays which enforce DRM and specific region-locked devices.
  - phendrenad2 4y ago
    You're the pirate equivalent of a master jewel thief. "It's so easy! Just hotwire the security system, dance through the laser field, duh!" It's stochastic. They want to cut out casual piracy, those of us who know how to pirate are acceptable losses.
    - soulofmischief 4y ago
      I'm speaking on the UX involved in the process. If you can understand the technology at a working level (about as difficult as learning to install a browser or email client) then you have access to an ecosystem that prizes discoverability and lack of friction. There aren't laser fields. There's a directory and concierge. A full back-catalogue. A social network. Most importantly, the viewing experience is consistent across all media, your media viewer of choice, without the need for a constant internet connection. Just like it used to be. I don't encourage rampant piracy, but I certainly understand when some people don't have the luxury of purchasing an unlocked blu-ray ripper and storing old blu-rays in order to get the same viewing experience. Another good example is old games like NOLF which are entirely unplayable today without piracy. Pirated releases often contain much smaller download sizes as well as patches to enhance or correct the experience. Pirating won't convince companies to change, so I vote with my wallet by trying to avoid purchasing media which has unacceptable licensing terms or pervasive DRM, and purchasing any media which I think integrates my values. I also only purchase on platforms which prize discoverability, such as GOG or Steam, while avoiding locked-down platforms like Origin or Epic Games store.

jdc0589 4y ago

weird. the page briefly loads and then goes to a full screen 404 page for me.

charonn0 4y ago
I'm able to read it if I turn off Javascript.

xt00 4y ago

I wish somebody would create some scheme to like self host the backend of an app.. like you launch Signal and it has a button to type in the name of your own server, where that server runs a VM that you configure and setup on your own PC locally then upload to AWS or something and has some facility to constantly report to you the hash of the memory and disk contents, along with some contract from AWS that states that Amazon cannot alter the results of the hash function results sent to you under any circumstances. Plus there would be some facility to validate the contents of what runs in that VM at any instant in time. Basically the idea is you can’t trust anybody at all. I guess pgp would maybe solve this for direct messaging?

spongechameleon 4y ago
I think something like Ricochet (if it were still actively maintained) could be a good solution. https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet Every user is their own Tor onion service, so you get E2E encryption and no centralized servers. The whole thing hinges on the security of Tor itself which is probably a safe enough bet.
- blepyzdiec 4y ago
  Briar https://briarproject.org/ https://briarproject.org/ is similar, plus, AFAIK, it's using E2E on top of Tor service. However, looking at massively caught Tor services, I believe, to keep it truly secure, you have to rotate your service address, aka reinstall the app, losing all your history of communication.
cwoolfe 4y ago
It's pretty easy to host your own chat server. https://twitter.com/inputmice/status/1170651869359804416 https://twitter.com/inputmice/status/1170651869359804416
danielschonfeld 4y ago
There’s plenty of that stuff. Jabber and XMPP. And also more up to date is Matrix.org which nobody seems to want to use and I’m not sure why. The problem though is that you’re still trusting the code. Nothing stops self hosted from rotting on you unless you look and read the code yourself.

onionisafruit 4y ago

Last year the author of this story was on Darknet Diaries talking about ANOM and encrypted phones in general. It was a good episode. https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/105/ https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/105/

itintheory 4y ago
Great podcast, I really like the stories. Unfortunately it's a little basic technically. Any suggestions for more techy podcasts on netsec / the scene?
- onionisafruit 4y ago
  Not really. I have trouble following technical podcasts. I prefer to read technical details and listen to stories, so all the podcasts I like are focused on story telling.

mintplant 4y ago

> The code itself is messy, with large chunks commented out and the app repeatedly logging debug messages to the phone itself. […] > For this new analysis of the code, a source provided a copy of the Anom APK as a standalone file which Motherboard then decompiled. This doesn't add up. The code snippets they show are decompiled obfuscated Java. But compilation->decompilation wouldn't have preserved comments from the original source code. Sometimes Java decompilers spit out chunks of code they don't understand as commented-out sections for manual analysis. Maybe Motherboard is misinterpreting this output? And, yeah, decompiled Java is gonna be messy, especially if the compiled code was obfuscated, as looks to be the case here.

deleted 4y ago

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hertzrat 4y ago

And we wonder why the common person believes in conspiracy theories by the government against them

kali-ghost 4y ago

The only jump on encryption you can hope to have is quantum encryption....If you don't know what quantum encryption is well you better learn. In quantum computing qubits are always in the superimposed position meaning they are all information at the same time ....you change one thing of the first qubits and the second set changes automatically no matter the space or distance away. The military is already developing a way to use qubits to create an active network of communication that cannot be hacked there are papers already published cited:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1269020 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1269020 so you know it's real .....I say again if you ever create something that's world changing you better believe it's not solely yours