4 ms·

If Apple was really serious about this, they would add one more feature to Lockdown mode: To delete and scrub permanently and definitively all your iCloud data.

If Apple was really serious about this, they would add one more feature to Lockdown mode: To delete and scrub permanently and definitively all your iCloud data. You can close the proverbially "front door" by enabling "Lockdown mode" but if that same government sends a subpoena to Apple, then they will just give them a copy of all your iCloud private data.

devnulll 4y ago
Nobody who is at risk for this is doing iCloud backups. That's something you can already turn off.
- sneak 4y ago
  Their conversation partners are. iCloud Backup is a backdoor in iMessage's end to end encryption preserved explicitly at the behest of the FBI.
  - sonofhans 4y ago
    I'd love to see evidence of this.
    - sodality2 4y ago
      It's not something that has evidence - what they mean is that even if you have iCloud backups disabled, everyone you talk to might not. The point of e2ee is that both ends must have it encrypted - not just you and the server, but more abstractly, the communication partners.
      - warkdarrior 4y ago
        That is a novel and quite broad interpretation of E2EE. In typical E2EE only endpoints of a (logical) communication channel can decrypt messages on that channel. But E2EE does not say anything about what an endpoint can do with those messages once they decrypted them -- they could print them at the public library and leave them there, they can forward them to the FBI, they can post them on reddit, etc. If you do not trust your communication partner to safeguard your messages, E2EE will not help you at all.
        concinds 4y ago
        The point is that many people have iCloud Backups enabled without any awareness whatsoever of the implications, as iCloud Backups are opt-out and there is zero disclosure within the OS (only an Apple Support webpage nobody will visit). It leads to E2E being systemically weakened, since most of your iMessage conversations will get immediately scooped up by Apple and alpbabet agencies, dragnet-style.
        sneak 4y ago
        There is no evidence that the messages are being collected dragnet-style. FAA702 is targeted.
        sodality2 4y ago
        I understand that, I didn't mean the concept of e2ee requires the endpoints to never share it at all. What I meant was, commonly people will disable iCloud backups hoping to regain some privacy, but it does nothing because most of your communication partners use iCloud backups. Just like people who switch to eg. Protonmail - if you only ever talk to GMail users, it doesn't really give you much extra privacy.
    - modeless 4y ago
      "For Messages in iCloud, if you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your messages" https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 Yes, that really does mean that Apple can decrypt your messages. In fact, Apple does it this way at the explicit request of the FBI, as reported by Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... And look at all the other potentially sensitive data that is not end-to-end encrypted in the backups. Photos, notes, reminders, calendars, the list goes on.
      - alwillis 4y ago
        Yes, that really does mean that Apple can decrypt your messages. I don’t think so: Apple doesn’t log the contents of messages or attachments, which are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can access them. Apple can’t decrypt the data. When a user turns on iMessage on a device, the device generates encryption and signing pairs of keys for use with the service. For encryption, there is an encryption RSA 1280-bit key as well as an encryption EC 256-bit key on the NIST P-256 curve. For signatures, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 256-bit signing keys are used. The private keys are saved in the device’s keychain and only available after first unlock. The public keys are sent to Apple Identity Service (IDS), where they are associated with the user’s phone number or email address, along with the device’s APNs address. From iMessage Security Overview--https://support.apple.com/guide/security/imessage-security-overview-secd9764312f/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/imessage-security-o...
        Tepix 4y ago
        But you can backup your keychain on iCloud
        alwillis 4y ago
        But the keychain is one-way encrypted and Apple doesn't have the key to decrypt it.
    - apeace 4y ago
      GP is partially right: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... According to Reuters sources, Apple abandoned plans to offer iCloud backup encryption, out of fear of government retaliation or even spawning new anti-encryption legislation. On the other hand, GP is responding to: > Nobody who is at risk for this is doing iCloud backups. That's something you can already turn off. And indeed, if you turn off iCloud backups, there is no "backdoor" into iMessage. You can also set up your phone to do encrypted backups locally to your laptop, if you want that instead.
threeseed 4y ago
If you care about your privacy don't upload your private data to ANY cloud service. Even if iCloud was encrypted they still run on third party cloud providers who nobody knows what relationship they have with governments. Many types of encryption are breakable if you have effectively unlimited resources.
- Tepix 4y ago
  I've been using iPhones since the first iPhone. I don't sync any relevant stuff to iCloud. However, during previous iOS updates this sync turned itself back on multiple times (more than three times for sure). It hasn't happened for a while but whenever there's an iOS update it's advisable to check your iCloud settings immediately afterwards and if they changed, you change them back and pray that your important data hasn't been sent to the cloud in the meantime.
luhn 4y ago
Most iCloud data is end-to-end encrypted; Apple doesn't have direct access to your data. In the end they do own the OS and could potentially backdoor your device, but if you're worried about that... well, Lockdown Mode is moot at that point. Worth noting Apple previously refused an FBI order to do just that. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI–Apple_encryption_dispute https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI–Apple_encryption_dispute
- jackvalentine 4y ago
  > Most iCloud data is end-to-end encrypted; Apple doesn't have direct access to your data. Depends what you think of as ‘most’ really, things that don’t have end-to-end includes photos, icloud drive files, notes and backups. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
  - mytherin 4y ago
    Secure notes are end to end encrypted [1] [1] https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec1782bcab1/web https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec1782bcab1/...
    - Tepix 4y ago
      So you have a passphrase protecting the note. On a mobile device chances are your passphrase is rather weak because it's tedious to enter.
- modeless 4y ago
  Apple refused an FBI order to decrypt a phone; however they allow the FBI to access iCloud data all the time. And iMessage is not end-to-end encrypted in iCloud at the explicit request of the FBI. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
  - 4y ago
stu2b50 4y ago
You can already turn off iCloud features?

devnulll 4y ago

Nobody who is at risk for this is doing iCloud backups. That's something you can already turn off.

sneak 4y ago
Their conversation partners are. iCloud Backup is a backdoor in iMessage's end to end encryption preserved explicitly at the behest of the FBI.
- sonofhans 4y ago
  I'd love to see evidence of this.
  - sodality2 4y ago
    It's not something that has evidence - what they mean is that even if you have iCloud backups disabled, everyone you talk to might not. The point of e2ee is that both ends must have it encrypted - not just you and the server, but more abstractly, the communication partners.
    - warkdarrior 4y ago
      That is a novel and quite broad interpretation of E2EE. In typical E2EE only endpoints of a (logical) communication channel can decrypt messages on that channel. But E2EE does not say anything about what an endpoint can do with those messages once they decrypted them -- they could print them at the public library and leave them there, they can forward them to the FBI, they can post them on reddit, etc. If you do not trust your communication partner to safeguard your messages, E2EE will not help you at all.
      - concinds 4y ago
        The point is that many people have iCloud Backups enabled without any awareness whatsoever of the implications, as iCloud Backups are opt-out and there is zero disclosure within the OS (only an Apple Support webpage nobody will visit). It leads to E2E being systemically weakened, since most of your iMessage conversations will get immediately scooped up by Apple and alpbabet agencies, dragnet-style.
        sneak 4y ago
        There is no evidence that the messages are being collected dragnet-style. FAA702 is targeted.
      - sodality2 4y ago
        I understand that, I didn't mean the concept of e2ee requires the endpoints to never share it at all. What I meant was, commonly people will disable iCloud backups hoping to regain some privacy, but it does nothing because most of your communication partners use iCloud backups. Just like people who switch to eg. Protonmail - if you only ever talk to GMail users, it doesn't really give you much extra privacy.
  - modeless 4y ago
    "For Messages in iCloud, if you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your messages" https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 Yes, that really does mean that Apple can decrypt your messages. In fact, Apple does it this way at the explicit request of the FBI, as reported by Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... And look at all the other potentially sensitive data that is not end-to-end encrypted in the backups. Photos, notes, reminders, calendars, the list goes on.
    - alwillis 4y ago
      Yes, that really does mean that Apple can decrypt your messages. I don’t think so: Apple doesn’t log the contents of messages or attachments, which are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can access them. Apple can’t decrypt the data. When a user turns on iMessage on a device, the device generates encryption and signing pairs of keys for use with the service. For encryption, there is an encryption RSA 1280-bit key as well as an encryption EC 256-bit key on the NIST P-256 curve. For signatures, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 256-bit signing keys are used. The private keys are saved in the device’s keychain and only available after first unlock. The public keys are sent to Apple Identity Service (IDS), where they are associated with the user’s phone number or email address, along with the device’s APNs address. From iMessage Security Overview--https://support.apple.com/guide/security/imessage-security-overview-secd9764312f/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/imessage-security-o...
      - Tepix 4y ago
        But you can backup your keychain on iCloud
        alwillis 4y ago
        But the keychain is one-way encrypted and Apple doesn't have the key to decrypt it.
  - apeace 4y ago
    GP is partially right: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... According to Reuters sources, Apple abandoned plans to offer iCloud backup encryption, out of fear of government retaliation or even spawning new anti-encryption legislation. On the other hand, GP is responding to: > Nobody who is at risk for this is doing iCloud backups. That's something you can already turn off. And indeed, if you turn off iCloud backups, there is no "backdoor" into iMessage. You can also set up your phone to do encrypted backups locally to your laptop, if you want that instead.

threeseed 4y ago

If you care about your privacy don't upload your private data to ANY cloud service. Even if iCloud was encrypted they still run on third party cloud providers who nobody knows what relationship they have with governments. Many types of encryption are breakable if you have effectively unlimited resources.

Tepix 4y ago
I've been using iPhones since the first iPhone. I don't sync any relevant stuff to iCloud. However, during previous iOS updates this sync turned itself back on multiple times (more than three times for sure). It hasn't happened for a while but whenever there's an iOS update it's advisable to check your iCloud settings immediately afterwards and if they changed, you change them back and pray that your important data hasn't been sent to the cloud in the meantime.

luhn 4y ago

Most iCloud data is end-to-end encrypted; Apple doesn't have direct access to your data. In the end they do own the OS and could potentially backdoor your device, but if you're worried about that... well, Lockdown Mode is moot at that point. Worth noting Apple previously refused an FBI order to do just that. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI–Apple_encryption_dispute https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI–Apple_encryption_dispute

jackvalentine 4y ago
> Most iCloud data is end-to-end encrypted; Apple doesn't have direct access to your data. Depends what you think of as ‘most’ really, things that don’t have end-to-end includes photos, icloud drive files, notes and backups. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
- mytherin 4y ago
  Secure notes are end to end encrypted [1] [1] https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec1782bcab1/web https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec1782bcab1/...
  - Tepix 4y ago
    So you have a passphrase protecting the note. On a mobile device chances are your passphrase is rather weak because it's tedious to enter.
modeless 4y ago
Apple refused an FBI order to decrypt a phone; however they allow the FBI to access iCloud data all the time. And iMessage is not end-to-end encrypted in iCloud at the explicit request of the FBI. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
- 4y ago

stu2b50 4y ago

You can already turn off iCloud features?